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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. CaseNo.20041035-CA 
JOHN L. LEGG, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Third District Court of Tooele County 
State of Utah 
HONORABLE RANDALL SKANCHY 
1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for THEFT BY RECEIVING 
STOLEN PROPERTY, a 2nd Degree Felony and from a judgment of conviction for 
ARSON, a 3rd Degree Felony in the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable RANDALL N. SKANCHY, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). See Addendum A 
(Information, Sentence, Judgement and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Was Mr. Legg sentenced in violation of his rights under the Utah 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by being sentenced 
without counsel? 
Standard of Review: The issue presents a purely legal question 
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph 
89. 
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence 
2 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah 
1985). 
ISSUE II: Were Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 
22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure violated when the prosecuting attorney 
was not given the opportunity to speak at sentencing. 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a purely legal question 
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph 
89. 
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah 
1985). 
ISSUE III. Were Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 
22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure violated when he was not given the 
opportunity to speak and present information regarding his criminal record and other 
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mitigating factors. 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a purely legal question 
which the Court reviews for correctness. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App. 241, paragraph 
89. 
Preservation of the Argument: Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure permits the Court of Appeals to consider the legality of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Brock, 908 P.2d. 856 (Utah 
1985). 
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that good cause existed to not 
dismiss the charges against Defendant because of the failure to bring Defendant to trial 
within 120 days after receiving notice of Defendant's written demand as required under 
Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 and did the trial court misinterpreted Utah Code 
Annotated §77-29-1 and §77-29-2 by refusing to dismiss pending charges against him 
because more than 120 days had transpired between when tendered his disposition request 
and when his trial occurred. Matters of statutory interpretation present questions of law 
which the court reviews for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's interpretation. 
4 
Standard of Review: This issue is in part a legal question which is 
reviewed for correctness and in part a review of the Court's discretion which standard is 
abuse of discretion. 
Preservation of the Argument: Appellant John L. Legg, JR.'s, 
("Legg") challenge to the Trial Court's failure to dismiss the charges under Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-1 is preserved on the record for appeal (R00271 at pp. 32 and 33). Mr. Legg 
raised the issue of the 120 da> i iile under UCA Section 7 1 29 1 and Section 77-29-2 at a 
motion hearing on the 6th of May 2004 and the 23rd of August 2004. Mr. Legg also made 
several written motions with respect to the 120 day rule. 
C O N S T 1 T U T I O N A L PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
4th and 14th Amendments, U.S. Constitution 
6th Amendment, U.S. Constitution 
Utah Constitution 
Article I section 7 
Article I section 12 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-2 
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Legg appeals his jury conviction for THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 and 
with ARSON, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-102(l)(b). 
Mr. Legg also appeals his sentencing alleging his rights to due process under Utah and 
United States Constitutions, his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and his rights under UCA §77-29-1 and §77-29-2 were violated. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
The State's Information was filed in the Third Judicial Court In and for Tooele 
County, State of Utah on the 14th of January 2004. 
The State's information charged Mr. Legg with one count of Theft by Receiving 
Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-408 
and one count of Arson, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-
6-102(l)(b). 
An Initial Appearance was held on 26 January 2004 
6 
A Roll Call was held on 2nd of February 2004 
A Preliminary Hearing was held on the 3rd of March 2004. 
An Arraignn lent w as held 8th day of 1!\ lai ch 2 0 0 5 . 
A Pre-Trial Conference was held on 26th day of April 2004. 
A disposition hearing was held on the 6th of May 2004 with respect to a Motion 
filed by Defendant's counsel, Mr. Broadhead. The motion asked that the charges against 
Mr. Legg be dismissed because Mi 1 egg's rights u •? UCA Section 77-29 1 dealing 
with dispositions had been violated. This motion was denied. The trial was reset for the 
25th of May 2004. 
A motion hearing was held on the I <>lh of August 2004, a disposition hearing was 
held on the 23rd of August 2004 and a pretrial conference was held on the 18th of October 
2004. 
Disposition at the Trial Court 
A one day jury trial was held on the 3rd of November 2004. The jury found Mr. Legg 
guilty of botl I Theft and Arson. 
On the 24th of January 2005 Mr. Legg was sentenced on the charge of theft by 
receiving stolen property to 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison and on the arson charge 
7 
from zero to five years. The two sentences to run consecutively. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 3, 2003, Defendant an inmate at the Utah State Prison, received a 
packet of information regarding 120 day Dispositions under UCA § 77-29-1 which 
included a form entitled "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges." 
(R00271atP.26) 
Defendant filled out the form December 9, 2003 and placed it in the mailbox for the 
Division of Institution of Operations (DIO) (R00271 at p.26) 
The DIO agent marked the "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges," as being received on January 8, 2004, but date stamped the document as being 
received on January 5th, 2004. (R00271 at p.27) 
On the 14th of January 2004 an Information against Mr. Legg was filed with the 
Third District Court-Tooele, Tooele, County, State of Utah. (R at p.3) 
On the 15th of January 2004 a letter from the Prison about the 120 day disposition 
was filed with the trial court. (R at p. 6) 
On the 16th of January 2005 a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charge was filed with the trial court. (R at p. 7) 
On the 8th of March 2004 a two day jury trial was scheduled for the 19th of May 
8 
2004 before Judge Skanchy. (R at p. 26) 
On the 26th of April 2004 a pretrial conference was held in this matter. The date of 
the jury trial in this * r was advanced thirteen days from a setting on the 19th of May 
2004 to a new date of 6 May 2004. (R at p. 42) 
The reason given for this rescheduling is stipulation of parties. (R at p. 42) 
On the 4th of May 2004, counsel fc n I\ It I -egg, I\ It Bi oadhead, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. In his Motion to Dismiss Mr. Broadhead points out that the "Notice and Request 
for Disposition of Pending Charges" was delivered on the 9th of December 2003 by Mr. 
Legg to the DIO. Mr. Broadhead then points out that based upon the 9th of December 
delivery (Lilt flu I ,N) clays .- • • iy-52). '•'•.,..'.-
Mr. Broadhead further points out in his Memorandum and again at the Motion 
Hearing, that DIO stated that the Notice was received on January 8, 2004, but date 
stamped the document as being received on January 5, 2004. That based upon the January 
5, 2004 date stamped delivery dat : *he "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charges" the 120 days passed on May 4, 2004 and if the January 8, 2004 hand written 
delivery date is used, the 120 days passes on May 6, 2004. (R at pp.49-52), (R00271 at pp. 
26-35). 
On the 6th of May 2006, a disposition hearing was held with respect to Mr. 
Broadhead's Motion to Dismiss. (R00271 atpp.26-36) 
At the Disposition Hearing Mr. Broadhead pointed out to Judge Skanchy that Mr. 
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Legg's Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges sat at the office of the DIO 
(Utah State Prison) for approximately four weeks before they sent it to the Court. (R 
00271 at pp.26 and 27) 
At this Disposition Hearing Defendant's counsel argued that the Defendant signed 
and delivered the "Notice and Request For Disposition of Pending Charges" on December 
9, 2003 to the DIO consistent with the requirements of the statute and that based upon the 
December 9, 2003 delivery date, the 120 days passed on April 7, 2004. (R00271 at pp. 27 
and 28) 
The DIO wrote on the Notice that they had received from Mr. Legg that they had 
received the Notice on January 8, 2004, but the DIO then date stamped the document as 
being received on January 5, 2004. Based on the January 5, 2004 date stamped delivery 
date, the 120 days passed on May 4, 2004. If the January 8, 2004 hand written delivery 
date is used, the 120 day period passes on May 6, 2004. (R00271 at pp. 26 and 27). 
At this 6th of May 2004 deposition hearing on the Mr. Legg's Motion to Dismiss, 
the Court, counsel for the defense and the prosecutor discussed which date would be 
correct to begin the 120 days. The prosecutor argued that the defendant remained silent 
during his various court hearings regarding the 120 disposition rule and therefore 
shouldn't be able to take advantage of such rule. (R00271 at pp.32 and 33) 
At this Disposition Hearing the Court determined that the beginning date as to the 
120 day period must be either January 5th or January 8th 2004. The Prosecutor argued that 
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the Court did not receive the notice until January 16, 2005 and therefore the prosecutor 
had good cause not to begin the tolling of the 120 days until January 16, 2005. Further, 
tl le Pi osecu ltor argi led that Defendant and his coi insel came before the Coi irt for felony 
first appearance, arraignment, pretrial conference and that these dates were set with the 
approval and agreement of Defendant and his Counsel. The Prosecutor argued that neither 
Defendant nor his counsel ever objected to those dates and therefore cannot complain that 
there 1 it been a 120 day disposition. (R00271 . J>2 and 33). 
On the 6th of May 2004 the Court ruled that: 
"All right, I appreciate these arguments and I understand this problem. This is what 
I consider to be a serious problem by the prison. As I read the statute though it 
suggests to me that receipt oiit to be receipted by the prison. I've got two dates 
frankly to pick from, January 8 or January 5, Frankly, it appears to me to be 
irrelevant which one of those two dates I pick and the reason for it is, I think there's 
good cause to set this matter over,. . . (R00271 at pp 32 and 33). 
The Court finally selected the 8th of January, 2005. (R00271 at 35). 
Mr. Legg, prior to trial, had requested to represent himself during his trial. He 
agreed to have standby counsel to assist him during his trial if necessary. (R0027 at pp 63-
70) At 1 1: ic em i of I" I Legg's trail, Mi "h ::n i Williams, Mr. Legg's standby counsel, asked 
the Court if he should continue to act as Mr. Legg's standby counsel for sentencing 
purposes or at least to consult with Mr. Legg. The Court stated that it thought that was 
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appropriate. (R00269 at p. 287) and (R00271 at pp. 63-70). 
During sentencing, Mr. Legg at first tried to convey to the Court errors that Mr. 
Legg believed existed with respect to the pre-sentence report. When Mr. Legg decided he 
needed counsel to help him present these errors to the court he asked that he be appointed 
counsel to help him.. 
"Mr. Legg: Okay then, then why don't you appoint me counsel and we'll get all 
this straightened out?" 
THE COURT: Because you have chosen to go the other route. 
Mr. LEGG: Make up your mind. 
THE COURT: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges to theft 
by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, 1 to 15 years in the Utah State 
Prison. On arson, zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. I'll run them 
consecutive to each other. I'll do so based upon the aggravating circumstances that 
your adult record is legend and as a result of it being legend. (R271 at p. 85). 
Summary of the Argument 
When Mr. Legg asked for counsel at his sentencing hearing the Court should have 
appointed counsel. 
At Mr. Legg's sentencing hearing the Court should have allowed the prosecuting 
attorney the opportunity to speak. 
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At Mr. Legg's sentencing hearing the Court should have allowed Mr. Legg the 
opportunity to finish speaking. 
Mr. Leggs trial was held more than 120 days after Mr. Legg til )tice 
and the charges against him should have been dismissed. 
Argument 
I. Mr. Legg was sentenced without counsel in violation of his rights under the 
Sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution Article 1 section 12. 
It has been held that the Sixth Amendment i ij:li( to counsel applies at sentencing. 
Gardner v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 430 U.S. 349, 51 L.Ed.2d 393. 
It has also been held that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceeding at 
which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005 (Utah 1982). 
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has held that under California 
law a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of an attorney at a post-trial hearing 
when prior to trial he waived the right to counsel and chose to represent himself. This 
Court stated, "We therefore hold that, at least in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, an accused who requests an attorney at the time of a motion for a new trial 
is entitled to have one appointed, unless the government can show that the request is made 
13 
for a bad faith purpose." Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989). 
In Menefield the defendant had asserted his right to self-representation during the 
trial. After his conviction on all counts, Menefield asked the court to appoint counsel to 
assist him in the preparation of a motion for trial. The trial court denied his motion. One of 
the factors cited by the trial court for its denial was that the proceeding would be delayed 
while counsel familiarized himself with the transcript and the issues in the case 
The Court in Menefield held that, 
Because the right to counsel is so central to our concepts of 
fair adjudication, we are reluctant to deny the practical 
fulfillment of the right—even once waived—absent a 
compelling reason that will survive constitutional scrutiny. 
We are certainly unwilling to deny counsel because of 
some conception that the defendant's initial decision to 
exercise his Faretta right and represent himself at trial is a 
choice cast in stone. It is not surprising that a criminal 
defendant, having decided to represent himself and then 
having suffered a defeat at trial, would realize that he would 
be better served during the remainder of the case by the 
assistance of counsel. . . . 
Forcing the defendant to stumble through post-trial 
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proceedings serves neither the individual nor our system of 
adversarial justice well. Therefore, although we recognize 
that the right to counsel—once waived—is no longer absolute, 
we start with the strong presumption that a defendant's post-
trial request for the assistance of an attorney should not be 
refused. (Cites omitted). {Menefield at 700). 
The Court went on to state, "In determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance, courts of appeals have considered whether 
the continuance would adversely affect witnesses, counsel, the court and the government; 
. . . There is, however, a substantial practical distinction between delay on the eve of trial 
and delay at the time of a post-trial hearing Conversely, it is unlikely that a 
continuance after the verdict will substantially interfere with the court's or the parties 
schedules." {Menefield at 700). 
The Menefield Court further stated, "Under harmless error jurisprudence, Sixth 
Amendment violations that pervade trial require automatic reversal of the tainted 
proceedings. The parties do not suggest that the rule should be different when the error 
pervades a post-conviction hearing.(Cites Omitted). (Menefield at 701, fn 7). 
While the Court in Menefield was dealing with a defendant's request to have an 
attorney help him with a motion for a new trial, much of the language of the Menefield 
court is stated in terms of "post —trial proceedings" and there is little doubt that the 
15 
holding in Menefield would apply to the sentencing phase of a trial. 
It has further been held that a defendant who was convicted of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter and robbery was entitled to remand to enable the trial court to consider 
defendant's motion for appointment of counsel to assist at sentencing after the defendant 
had earlier waived right to counsel. People v. Ngaue, 280 Cal.Rptr. 757 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 
1991). This California Court of Appeal while not adopting Menefield completely, relied 
on the Menefield rational in making its ruling. The court in Ngaue stated, 
Application of these principles to the present case suggests 
counsel should have been appointed unless appellant was 
seeking representation for an improper purpose such as delay: 
Since he had already been convicted, granting appellant's 
request would cause less disruption than that considered 
acceptable in Hill, Cruz and Elliott (see Menefield v. Borg, 
supra, 881 F.2d at p. 701);. . . 
More persuasive is appellant's contention that entirely 
apart from the new trial motion, counsel would have been 
able to assist at sentencing either by arguing for a lesser 
sentence or by raising the claims of error addressed in later 
portion of this opinion Counsel might have made a 
difference. Accordingly, it is necessary to remand for a ruling 
16 
on appellant's motion for appointment of counsel." 
(Nague at 765). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal 
proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, (see 
Casarez) This court should find that Utah law requires a trial court to appoint counsel at 
sentencing upon the defendant's request even if the defendant had previously chosen to 
represent himself. 
Application of the analysis found in Menefield and Nague to the present case leads 
to the conclusion that counsel should have been appointed to Mr. Legg for his sentencing 
phase. 
As the Court in Menefield so apply stated, "It is not surprising that a criminal 
defendant, having decided to represent himself and then having suffered a defeat at trial, 
would realize that he would be better served during the remainder of the case by the 
assistance of counsel." 
In our present case, Mr. Legg, at his sentencing, finding himself unable to convey 
to Judge Skanchy the errors Mr. Legg believed were in his pre-sentence report, became 
overwhelmed and frustrated. Mr. Legg at this time appears to have realized that his self-
representation had done him little good during the trial and that he needed help at his 
sentence hearing. From the transcript of his sentencing hearing, Mr. Legg clearly 
understood that he was facing up to twenty years of prison and he knew that he needed 
17 
help to straighten out his pre-sentence report. Mr. Legg also seems to have realized that 
his limited resources in prison required Mr. Legg to have the help of an attorney to 
properly research and address the issues with respect to his record. At the Sentencing 
Hearing we find the following dialog between Mr. Legg and Judge Skanchy 
Mr. LEGG: Okay then, then why don't you appoint me counsel and we'll get all 
this straightened out" 
THE COURT: Because you have chosen to go the other route. 
Mr. LEGG: Make up your mind. 
THE COURT: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges. 
As this dialog shows, Mr. Legg asked Judge Skanchy for counsel to assist him at 
this sentencing hearing. Judge Skanchy in essence said you have chosen not to be 
represent by counsel, that choice is cast in stone and I deny your Motion. 
There is no compelling reason shown that will survive constitutional scrutiny as to 
why Mr. Legg could not have been appointed counsel to help him at sentencing. 
Mr. Legg's standby counsel, Mr. Williams, was present at the sentencing hearing 
and had been present throughout the trial. Mr. Williams was very familiar with Mr. 
Legg's case. 
Sentencing is of course a post trial hearing and the appointment of counsel and the 
rescheduling of the Legg's sentencing would not have involved a significant disruption 
of court scheduling. 
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There is no indication that appellant was attempting to manipulate the right to 
counsel for any improper purpose. Defendant Legg made an attempt to represent himself 
at trial and at sentencing. At sentencing, after trying to convey to the judge the errors he 
believed existed in his pre- sentence report and the problems he was having to prepare for 
his sentencing hearing because of his incarceration, Mr. Legg realized he needed the help 
of an attorney and asked the Court for such attorney. Judge Skanchy could easily have 
asked Mr. Legg's stand by counsel, Mr. Williams to assist Mr. Legg. Such motion was 
incorrectly denied. 
II. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated when the prosecuting attorney was not given 
the opportunity to speak. 
Rule 22(a) URCP states: 
"Before imposing sentencing the Court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also 
be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of the 
sentence" 
However, the record of the sentencing shows that the prosecuting attorney was not 
given opportunity to present any information in the imposition of the sentence in violation 
19 
of 22(a), URCP. The rule states, "The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of the sentence." The 
rule uses the word "shall" which under statutory construction means the Court must 
affirmatively ask the prosecutor to material information as to Mr. Legg's sentencing. The 
prosecutor may have agreed with the Judge's sentence or he may disagreed and 
recommended a lesser sentence in accordance with the pre-sentence report. It is not known 
what may have happened if the prosecutor was given the opportunity to speak. The 
prosecutor could have chosen to remain silent and submit the case to Court or he could 
have presented mitigating facts and recommended concurrent sentences. 
It has been held that a trial court erred when it failed to provide the prosecutor an 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App. 
241, 31 P.3d 615 affd 2003 Ut 46, 79 P.2d 937. 
As the Court of Appeals of Utah stated in the first Wanosik case, 
At sentencing in this case, the trial court did hear briefly from 
defense counsel on the issue of Wanosik's absence 
concerning any "legal cause why sentence should not (have 
been) imposed" at that time, Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) briefly 
addressed that issue as discussed above; and then proceeded 
to impose sentence. However, before proceeding with 
sentencing, the trial court heard from neither defense counsel 
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nor the prosecutor with regard to "information in mitigation 
of punishment" or "and (other) information material to the 
imposition of sentence." Id. The state argues that under rule 
22(a) the burden rests on counsel to request an opportunity to 
present information relevant to sentencing. The State's 
argument is contrary to the plain language of the rule and the 
construction given it in case law... . 
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative obligation on the 
trial court to extend the opportunity to be heard; it does not 
contemplate the court will passively wait for counsel to make 
a request to be heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
has said that rule 22(a) "directs trial courts to hear evidence 
from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to 
the sentence to be imposed" State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 
118 (Utah 1985)... . The onus is thus on the trial court to 
"afford" the defendant and to "give the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present relevant information. Utah R.Crim. P. 
22(a). The trial court in this case erred by not affording 
defense counsel an opportunity to present information in 
mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor an 
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opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. 
Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this case was not 
harmless, as the State suggests. Had either defense counsel or 
the prosecutor been given a chance to address AP&P's 
recommendation that Wanosik be sentenced to 20 days in jail 
with credit for time served and that he then be committed to a 
substance abuse treatment program, the sentencing outcome 
for Wanosik may well have been more favorable than the 
maximum sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus, we 
vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for re sentencing. 
(Paragraph numbers and head notes omitted and emphasis 
addedj Wanosik, 2001 Ut. App paragraph 64-66. 
As in Wanosik, had the prosecutor been given a chance to address the Court, the 
sentencing outcome for Mr. Legg may well have been more favorable than the sentence 
imposed against Mr. Legg by the Court. According to the record, The Court did not 
afford the prosecutor an opportunity to speak. This is especially egregious violation of 
Mr. Legg's rights where the Court sentenced to harsher then sentence then requested in 
the Pre-Sentence report. 
In Wanosik, it was not considered harmless error since the defendant was 
sentenced to the maximum sentence by the Judge and the Judge did not follow the pre-
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sentence recommendation of credit for time served and treatment. Mr. Legg was 
sentenced to a consecutive sentence instead of the pre-sentence report recommendation of 
a concurrent sentence. 
III. Mr. Legg's rights to due process and his rights under Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure were violated when he was not given the opportunity to speak and 
present information regarding errors in his criminal record and other mitigating factors. 
Mr. Legg was asked by the judge if anything was not correct in his record. He 
started to explain that were things that were not correct in his social history. The Judge 
cut him off and asked him about his criminal record. As stated above, he had several 
concerns about the accuracy of his criminal record. He wanted an attorney to help him. 
Rather then being given that opportunity, the judge proceeded to sentence him. 
Rule 22(a) URCP states in part: 
"Before imposing sentencing the Court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show 
any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed.." 
Clearly the Court did not afford Mr. Legg the opportunity to speak on his behalf 
concerning these issues. This was a violation his constitutional due process rights under 
the Utah Constitution Article I section 12 and Utah Constitution Article I section 7 and 
United States Constitutions and in violation of Rule 22(a) URCP. 
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IV. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that good cause existed to not dismiss 
the charges against Defendant Legg because of the failure to bring Mr. Legg to trial within 
120 days after receiving notice of Defendant's written demand as required under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-29-1. Mr. Legg's rights to due process under the United States 
and Utah's constitutions and Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1 and 77-29-2 were violated by 
the State failing to bring Mr. Legg's case to trial within 120 days. 
Defendant rights under UCA 77-29-1 have been violated. This statute gives an 
incarcerated individual the right to request a 120-day disposition for any pending 
indictment or information. Under this statute defendant must submit a written notice 
requesting a 120-day disposition. If the case is not tried within 120 days plus any 
reasonable continuances for "good cause/' it must be dismissed with prejudice. Once a 
proper notice has filed with the appropriate authorities, the burden is on the prosecutor to 
comply with this statute. If the prosecutor does not comply with the statute then the case 
must be dismissed with prejudice. This statute states: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand 
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specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written 
notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted 
any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the even the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within 
the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion 
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for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed 
with prejudice. 
Determining whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the UCA §77-29-1 requires a two-step analysis. See State v. Coleman, 2001 
Ut App 281, 6, 34 P.3d 790. "First, we must determine when the 120-day period 
commenced and when it expired, Second, if the trial was held out the 120-day period, we 
must then determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay". State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
911, 916 (Utah 1998). State v. Pedockie 95P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224, 2004 UT at 
paragraph39. 
In the absence of good cause, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) requires the court to 
grant the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
A finding of 'good cause ' that will excuse the failure of the prosecution to bring a 
defendant to trial within the time required means (1) delay caused by the defendant—such 
as asking for a continuance; or (2) a relatively short delay caused by unforseen problems 
arising immediately prior to trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). State 
v. Pedockie 95 P.3d 1182, 2004 UT App 224, 2004 UT at paragraph 42 
PREMATURE REQUEST 
Under UCA 77-29-1 a notice for a 120-day disposition by a defendant incarnated 
shall occur when there is a pending information or indictment. The Utah Supreme Court 
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and the Utah Court of Appeals have consistently ruled that there must be a pending 
indictment or information filed before such notice can be valid. State v. Leatherbury, 65 
P.3d 1180, (2003) and State v. Lindsay 18 P.3d 504, (2000). In the present case there was 
no pending indictment or information pending when Mr. Legg submitted to the prison his 
notice for a 120-day disposition on December 9, 2004. (R52) There was some dispute as to 
which day the prison received Mr. Legg's notice, whether it was December 9, 2004, 
January 5, 2004 or January 8, 2004. The court made a factual ruling that the prison 
received it on January 8, 2004. (R217-pg35) In a case where 120-day demand was 
submitted previous to the filing of an information or indictment, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has stated in Lindsay that the defendant's notice for a 120-day disposition does not "kick-
in" on the day the information was filed. 
However, if we look at the 120-day disposition UCA 77-29-1 in conjunction with 
UCA 77-29-2, it can be argued that Due Process requires that it should "kick-in" on the 
day the information was filed under the facts of this case. 
Section UCA 77-29-2 states: 
"The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in 
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or information 
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that 
prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof." 
This code section places an affirmative duty upon the warden or prison to promptly 
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inform prisoner in writing of any untried indictments and of the prisoner's right to make a 
request for the final disposition thereof. 
In this case, the defendant was given the packet on Dec 3, 2003. (R00271-p26) He 
submitted filled it out and put it in his mail box to be sent to the prison's Division 
institutional Operations (DIO). The information charging him was not filed with the 
Third District Court, Tooele Department until January 14, 2005. The prison did not 
promptly notify Mr. Legg in writing of the source and contents of his untried indictment of 
Arson and Receiving Stolen Property out of the Third District Court Tooele Department 
and of Mr. Legg's right to make a request for a final disposition thereof as required under 
UCA 77-29-2. 
Further, Mr. Legg had a hearing on this matter on May 6, 2004, the Court ruled that 
the 120 days began January 8, 2004 when the prison dated his request. Further, at another 
hearing on this matter on August 23, 2004, the Court changed its mind and ruled that the 
120-days did not begin until the information was filed January 14, 2004. The State cannot 
come back and state Mr. Legg's request for a 120-day disposition is "null and void" when 
the prison did not follow the statutory requirements under UCA 77-29-1 and 77-29-2. 
After reviewing the arguments presented by the defense and the prosecutor and the 
rulings by the Judge in this matter, it is clear that they did not understand the law in this 
matter. If the prison had given Mr. Legg his packet and explained his rights after the 
information had been filed with the Court as required by UCA §77-29-2, Mr. Legg would 
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have the opportunity to comply with it. If the Judge had understood the statute and had 
ruled accordingly on May 6, 2004, Mr. Legg would have sent the required notice at that 
time. 
The State could argue that the prison did not have a duty to promptly notify Mr. 
Legg in writing of the information filed in this case and explain his rights to a final 
disposition after the information was filed. The rationale being that it previously gave Mr 
Legg this packet with an explanation of his rights on December 3, 2003 and it would 
"kick-in" on the date the information was filed and therefore due process was already 
followed in this matter. Mr. Legg could argue that the State was also on notice since in 
fact the State received his demand for a 120-day disposition. If the prison, attorneys and 
the Judge did not understand UCA 77-29-1, then how can Mr. Legg, a prisoner with 
limited resources and understanding of the law be expected to perfectly understand this 
statute. It is such common sense that it would "kick-in" when the information was filed 
that apparently neither the court nor prosecutor thought otherwise. 
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Legg met with Utah Department of Corrections 
contract attorneys' Freestone and Angerhoffer to obtain information relating to the 
procedures in filing his 120-disposition, but Mr. Legg states that he was told they could not 
provide any services in regards to his request. (R103) 
The State was on notice that Mr. Legg filed his notice and that the prosecutor knew 
of his duties under this statute. There is no prejudice to the State in fulfilling its duties 
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under the statute since on January 16, 2004, they had actual notice of Mr. Legg's demand 
for a 120-day disposition. (R00271-p35) 
Also in this case Mr. Legg was being held on an arrest warrant issued by the Utah 
Board of Pardons issued on December 2, 2003. (warrant #22128) (R103). His parole 
hearing with the Parole Board would be put on hold until the disposition of these charges. 
It was imperative to his fundamental rights of due process and freedom that this case had 
been adjudicated as soon as possible. 
As Mr. Legg argued on his motion filed with the Trial Court on September 1, 2004, 
the County Attorney's office sat on Fire Marshall's report dated for December 10, 2003 in 
regards to the incident Mr. Legg was subsequently charged with. This report was faxed to 
the Tooele County Attorney's office on December 12, 2005. (R00112 and 00111 and 
R00032). It was one month before the Court filed his charges with the Court on January 
12,2004. 
In Leatherbury, the prosecutor signed the information, but did not file it with the 
court until about one month later. The defendant filed his 120-day disposition demand 
prior to actual filing the information. The Court ruled that this still was premature even 
though the prosecutor apparently sat on the information for about a month before filing 
with the court. The present case is different in that we are looking at several factors to 
show that the State had violated Mr. Legg's rights under 77-29-2. Thus Mr. Legg's due 
process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to United States Constitution 
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and Article I section 7 of the State of Utah's Constitution and UCA §77-29-2 require that 
the State recognize his demand for a 120-day disposition of his case. 
All these factors taken together as a whole dictates that the commencement of 120-
day period should begin on January 14, 2004, the day the information was filed. This 
means that the 120-days expired on May 12, 2004, absent any continuances for "good 
cause." 
The trial court held two hearings on the 120-day disposition to determine if the 120-
day disposition. The first was held on May 6, 2004 and the second one was held on August 
23,2004. 
May 6, 2005 Hearing 
On May 6, 2005, the court heard arguments on Defendant's motion for a 120-day 
disposition. The Trial Court made a factual determination that the prison received Mr. 
Legg's notice for a 120-day disposition on January 8, 2004. The Court then ruled that this 
date was the date to begin counting the 120 days under UCA §77-29-1. This put the 
expiration date of the 120-days at the trial date scheduled for May 6, 2004. This trial, 
scheduled on May 6, 2004, was continued without placing any good cause reasons on the 
record. 
On R 271- p 35, the Judge stated that on three different occasions the defendant 
stood in front of the court prior to this hearing and never objected to what would have 
otherwise been the window time for the 120-day time period. The court stated that this 
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was a factor the Court weight associated with good cause why this action was not brought 
within the time period. 
The court incorrectly stated the law on this particular issue. In State v. Heaton 958 
P.2d 421 (Utah 1991) the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
In Peterson, the trial court asked the defendant whether the trial date was 
acceptable, and the defendant did not object to the date, which was outside 
the 120-day period. Nevertheless this court concluded that the defendant was 
not required to object to the trial date in order to maintain his rights under the 
statute because the burden of bringing the case to trial within the disposition 
period rested solely with the prosecution. 
Clearly the burden is on the prosecutor to bring the case within 120 days. The 
Court in Heaton also stated in this case in referring to complying with section 77-29-1 
that: "Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone the burden in bringing the case to 
trial within 120-day period..." (emphasis added) The defendant is allowed to remain silent. 
The burden is solely on the prosecutor. 
Since the Court did not address the issue of a pre-mature notice, it ruled incorrectly 
as to the dates. However, it is important to analyze this ruling in conjunction with the trial 
court's ruling on August 23, 2004 to completely analyze if "good cause" was shown for 
any continuances beyond the 120-day period beyond May 12, 2004. 
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August 23, 2004 
On August 23, 2004, the court allowed Mr. Legg to again argue the 120-day 
disposition rule pro-se with Mr. Hogan acting as standby counsel. The court states that: 
"Extension has been granted as a result of requests of counsel and they're 
reasonable." (R00271-P58 
The Court does not refer to which court dates have been extended. It does not 
specifically state which counsel, the prosecutor or defendant's, requested the extensions. It 
further states they are reasonable. Reasonable is not the standard set forth by case law. 
The rule is "good cause." The Court did not rule that whatever extension it was referring 
to was for "good cause." The Court is vague and did not apply the correct rule of law. 
The Court needed to specifically state for the record the facts to show good cause. As 
stated in Heaton above: 
"Rather, when concluding that the defendant's owns actions constitute "good 
cause" for denying a motion to dismiss under section 77-29-1(4), a trial court 
must have sufficient evidence to support a finding a that, but for the 
defendant's actions, the trial would have been brought within the required 
disposition period." 
The court ruled that the date pursuant to UCA §77-29-1 disposition of detainer for 
prisoners begins to run the date the information is filed. In this case the information was 
file on January 14, 2004. (R00003) This contradicted his earlier ruling on May 4, 2004, 
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that it begin to run on January 8, 2004. (R271-pg35) 
More problematic, the court stated that the 120-day disposition began on the 
January 14, 2004 and that 120 days landed on May 29, 2004. Therefore, the Court 
reasoned the trial dates set on May 6, 2004 or May 25, 2004 is well within the 120 days. 
(R271-P58.) The problem is that from January 12, 2004 to May 29, 2004 is 137 days. 120 
days would fall on May 12, 2004. This incorrect assumption of dates caused the court not 
to do a proper analyze to determine if any continuances were for "good cause." The Court 
is all over the map in its analysis of this issue especially comparing when the May 6, 2004 
hearing date and August 23, 2004 hearing date. The end result of this error of 
miscalculating when 120 would fall is that the Court gave a vague and incomplete ruling. 
Any ambiguity should be held in the favor of the defendant. 
The first prong of test of this rule is to determine when this date began and 
expired. In this matter the Court ruled on two different dates at two different hearings. 
Second, On the August 23, 2004 hearing, the Court clearly miscalculated the expiration 
date of the 120 days. Therefore it did not properly follow a proper analysis. It also failed 
the second prong of the test. It did not determine if the May 6, 2004 trial continuance to 
the May 25, 2004 trial dates were continued for good cause. Nor did it analyze if any 
continuances beyond the May 25, 2004 trial date were continued for "good cause". In 
light of this obvious miscalculation the prosecutor had a duty to stand up and correct the 
record. The prosecutor had a duty to show that any continuances were for "good cause." 
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The May 25, 2005, trial date was continued off the Court record. The Court did not 
state why. (R56) No inquiry was made as to reasons. Nothing was put on the record as to 
why. As stated above the burden is on the prosecutor has the burden to put it on the record 
and show that the continuance was for "good cause." 
Clearly, the May 25, 2004 trial date was beyond the 120 days. Also there was no 
"good cause" was shown for any of the continuances in this matter. It was continued off 
the record as reflected by a court clerk e-mail dated May 24, 2004. (R56). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that the charges against Defendant Legg should be dismissed 
because of the failure of the Trial Court and prosecutor to adhere to the requirements of 
UCA Section 77-29-1 and UCA Annotated 77-29-2. 
If The Court does not hold that the charges against Defendant Legg should be 
dismissed then at a minimum the Court should hold that Defendant Legg should be re-
sentenced. 
SUBMITTED THIS 27th day OF October 2005. 
ALAN J. BUIVIDAS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Addendum A: Determinative statutes and rules. 
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77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Contin-. 
uance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for, 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state^l 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is< 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-j 
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in^ 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying [ 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting, t 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
 t | 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, j 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the, 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. ^ 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or withia 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Right to speedy trial, 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. Utah Const., Art. I, § 12; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
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Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
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Dismissal with prejudice. 
Forfeiture. 




9 0 8 9 fe 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 7 7 - 2 9 - 1 
Showing of prejudice. 
Standard of review. 
Warden's delay. 
Written demand. 
Burden of compliance* 
The language of Subsection (4) clearly places 
the burden of complying with the statute on the 
prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1991). 
The trial court erred in concluding that de-
fendant was in the same position as was the 
state and therefore shared some of the respon-
sibility to find out why his case had not been set 
for trial. State v. Heaton, 958 P2d 911 (Utah 
1998). 
The trial court erred in concluding that a 
delay caused by the court clerk's error consti-
tuted "good cause" and thereby relieved the 
prosecutor of its burden under this section. 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). 
It is the State's responsibility to ensure that 
all determinations of good cause shall be shown 
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, as required by this section; the 
burden of complying with this requirement is 
on the prosecutor. State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT 
App 146, 473 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 71 P3d 184. 
Commencement of period. 
Ninety-day period for prosecution under for-
mer § 77-65-1 commenced on the day defen-
dant notified county attorney of his request for 
final disposition of case or cases pending 
against him; and the filing of a complaint, 
information or indictment did not affect the 
commencement of the period. State v. Moore, 
521 P2d 556 (Utah 1974). 
Motion to dismiss charges against defendant 
who was brought to trial 92 days after warden 
received notice of his request for final disposi-
tion of pending charges was properly denied 
since computation of then 90-day time period 
commenced from date that notice was delivered 
to county attorney and appropriate court. State 
v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Delay caused by codefendant's action. 
Defendant was not entitled to a dismissal of 
the charges where the trial was delayed beyond 
the 120-day time period, and the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that there 
was good cause for the delay, where the delay 
was reasonable and not the result of the pros-
ecution's actions or inactions, but was due to a 
codefendant, who was to be jointly tried with 
defendant and who was expected to plead guilty 
at trial as the result of plea negotiations, 
changing his plea to not guilty on the scheduled 
trial date. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403 (Utah 
1982). 
Delay caused by prisoner. 
Where statute provided that prisoner be 
brought to trial within ninety days of his re-
quest for disposition of pending charges, the 
ninety-day disposition period was to be ex-
tended by the amount of time during which 
defendant himself created delay. State v. 
Velasquez, 641 P2d 115 (Utah 1982). 
When a defendant causes a trial to be de-
layed, he temporarily waives the right to a 
speedy trial. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986); State v. Maestas, 815 R2d 1319 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1991); State v. Sioudonne Phatham-
mavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Because defendant's own actions in request-
ing continuances, changing counsel, and agree-
ing to postpone trial until after disposition of 
pretrial motions were the main cause of delay 
and because defendant failed to show any prej-
udice caused by the delay, he was not denied his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. 
Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Dismissal with prejudice. 
Defendant's convictions were reversed and 
the charges against him dismissed with preju-
dice, where the trial date was set for 218 days 
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of 
disposition, and the trial court's finding of good 
cause could not be supported by a conclusion 
that the delay was for the purpose of allowing 
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve 
their conflicts. State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1991). 
Forfeiture. 
Defendant did not forfeit his right to have 
charges against him dismissed by remaining 
silent and failing to request an earlier setting 
when trial court set date for trial beyond 
ninety-day period required under former § 77-
65-1; burden of complying with statute rested 
on prosecutor. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 
453 P.2d 158 (1969). 
Good cause for delay. 
Where defendant's trial date was originally 
set for time within ninety-day period provided 
for under former § 77-65-1 but, to accommo-
date defendant's counsel, was postponed until 
five days beyond the statutory period, the order 
fixing the trial date was within the authority of 
the court since good cause for a continuance 
had been shown. State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 
117, 477 P2d 147 (1970). 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he had 
other cases pending against him and in one of 
those cases requested and received psychiatric 
examination and who was appointed various 
counsel because of necessity and at his own 
request, was not denied right to speedy trial. 
State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 478 P.2d 326 
(1970). 
Trial court was within its discretion in grant-
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ing continuance for trial on date 91 days after 
defendant had submitted written request for 
disposition of pending criminal case where sub-
poenas had not been issued soon enough to 
proceed with trial on original date, despite 
defendant's counsel suggesting trial date 
within ninety-day period. Danks v. Turner, 28 
Utah 2d 277, 501 P.2d 631 (1972). 
Extending the trial date to a reasonable time 
outside the disposition period to accommodate, 
in part, defense counsel's schedule constituted 
"good cause" under this section. State v. Hea-
ton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). 
Trial court's sua sponte postponement of trial 
date, noting only that defendant's trial had 
been "bumped by a high priority case," did not 
comply with the requirement that a determina-
tion of good cause be made in open court. State 
v. Wagenman, 2003 UTApp 146, 473 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 57, 71 R3d 184. 
P r e m a t u r e r e q u e s t . 
Defendant's request for final disposition was 
premature where proceedings had advanced 
only to point of filing of complaint against him, 
since person accused of felony must plead to 
and be tried under information or indictment. 
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 
(1970). 
Defendant, who was not finally tried within 
ninety days from date of request made pursu-
ant to former § 77-65-1, was not entitled to 
exoneration because his request was premature 
since only complaint for felony charge had been 
filed, good cause was shown for granting con-
tinuance, and insanity defense had precluded 
earlier trial. State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 
475 P.2d 60 (1970). 
Parolee who, after being arrested on com-
plaint, filed petition requesting final disposi-
tion of case within ninety days was denied relief 
under former § 77-65-1, where trial was held 
more than ninety days after filing date of peti-
tion but within ninety days of filing of informa-
tion. State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 
274 (1972). 
Former § 77-65-1 did not apply to unfiled 
charges and defendant was not entitled to as-
sert ninety-day limitation upon prosecution for 
any crime discovered or undiscovered he might 
have committed. State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 
2d 435, 519 P.2d 244 (1974). 
There was no error in refusing inmate's re-
quest for a speedy trial ruling because no infor-
mation had been filed, and thus the case was 
not officially pending when the request was 
made. State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 18 
P.3d 504. 
Appellate court's determination that there 
was no information pending against defendant 
at the time of his request for disposition was 
proper where defendant's request for disposi-
tion of the charges against him was made on 
February 8, 1999; the request was premature 
because there was no pending information until 
the clerk of the court received the signed docu- * "I 
ment and filed it on March 26, 1999. State v 
Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, 467 Utah Adv. Rep 3 
6 5 P . 3 d l l 8 0 . 
P r o s e c u t o r ' s delay. ». • 
A prosecutor's delay in filing charges does not 
violate defendant's right to a speedy trial where 
no tactical advantage is gained over the defen-., 
dant, since a strict rule that prosecutors musi 
file charges as soon as probable cause exists 
could result in the charging of innocent people, - ; 
and could also hamper the investigation of y ^ 
crimes. State v. Smith, 699 R2d 711 (Utah ' ""tS1 
1985). 
S h o w i n g of p re jud ice . 
Nothing in this section, its predecessor, 
any of the case law under either statute re-1^ 
quires a showing of prejudice in order for the 
charges against a defendant to be dismissed. 
On the contrary, this section clearly provides 
that if there is not good cause for the delay, the 
court shall order the matter dismissed. State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). 
S t a n d a r d of review. 
The decision not to dismiss under Subsection 
(4) is based on a finding of "good cause," as is 
the decision to grant a continuance under Sub-
section (3). Therefore, the same standard of 
review should be applied to both subsections. 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). 
Warden 's delay. 
Any attempt by the warden to retain, beyond 
a reasonable time, a prisoner's request for final 
disposition of pending charges, his failure to 
complete the required certificate, or any at-
tempt to misdirect the request and certificate, 1 
would violate prisoner's right to a speedy triaW| 
and provide a basis for judicial relief. State v.;f 
Taylor, 538 P2d 310 (Utah 1975). 
Wr i t t en d e m a n d . , 
Defendant's reliance on his notice of appear-
ance to commence the running of the 120-day ' 
period within which his trial had to be held was • 
misplaced since the notice, which merely conVij 
tained a plea of "not gui l ty and a request that ; | 
he be granted a trial upon the charge, was not s 
delivered to the warden, and did not specify the,
 t 
nature of the charge or the court where the" ,' 
charge was pending. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d-*? 
1175 (Utah 1985). '[ . 
A letter from defendant's federal probation , 1 | 
officer to a Utah county attorney which did not ^ 
specify the nature of the charges pending J 
against defendant, was merely an inquiry and': 
did not trigger the statutory right to demand- ' 
trial. State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987).'.~ 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 2 LA Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 849 to 875. 
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of 
untried indictments or informations. 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in 
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations 
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prison-
er's right to make a request for final disposition thereof. 
His tory : C. 1953, 77-29-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged 
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand. 
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand 
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request. 
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, e n a c t e d by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and 
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
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Amendment Notes . — The 2004 amend-
ment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule 21.5, 
and substituted "'Protected'" for "'Controlled"' 
in Subdivision (a). 
Repeals . — Former Rule 21.5", establishing 
procedure for pleas claiming mental illness or 
insanity, was repealed effective January 1,', 
1996. For similar provisions, see § 77-16a-103. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds tha t a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi-
gation, § 76-3-404. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
Suspending imposition of sentence and plac-
ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 


















—Presence of counsel. 
—Presence of defendant. 
—Time. 
Continuance for defendant. 
Waiver. 
—Waiver of rights. 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant. 
—Duty of court. 
Validity of conviction. 
Cited. 
Advis ing defendant of right to appeal . 
Trial court's failure to again advise defendant 
of his right to appeal at sentencing was harm-
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN L LEGG, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041300016 FS 
Judge: RANDALL N SKANCHY 
Date: January 24, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tawnil 
Prosecutor: CUNDICK, DAVID C 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 13, 1968 
Video 
Tape Number: 2005-005 Tape Count: 9:45 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2004 Guilty 
2. ARSON - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/03/2004 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN 
PROPERTY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ARSON a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the. defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the TOOELE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Page 1 
00223 
Case No: 041300016 
Date: Jan 24, 2005 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison sentences on Counts I and II are to run consecutive; and 
these sentences are to run consecutive to the prison sentence the 
defendant is now serving. 
Jon D Williams is present as standby counsel. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of _Ja-7C~ , 20 ^ TfJ" 
RANDALL N SKANCHY 
D i s t r i c t B^On-rt .TnHg^ 
^ M P USED AT 
D.nECTiON OF JUDGE 
Page 2 ( last) 
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."ILEDBY ^ t ^ 
Gary Searle, 7620 
Deputy County Attorney 
47 South Main Street 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Telephone: (435)843-3120 
Fax: (435)843-3127 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




4726 West Caplan Street 





Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
OTN: 15766611 
The undersigned Gary Searle, Deputy County Attorney, under oath states on information 
and belief that the defendant committed the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, as follows: That John Legg on or about November 
30, 2003, in Tooele County, State of Utah, received, retained or disposed of property of another, 
knowing that the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or 
concealed, sold or withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing 
the property had been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the property stolen was 
an operable motor vehicle. 
00003 
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COUNT 2: ARSON, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b), as 
follows: That John Legg on or about November 30, 2003, in Tooele County, State of Utah, 
unlawfully and intentionally damaged the property of another by means of fire or explosives, and 
the value of the property was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): Craig 
Ward of Utah Highway Patrol; Jim Dudzinski, State Firemarshall; Bruce and Barbara Webb; 
Layne Morris; Ken Smith, and Kirk Peterson. 
DATED this/^_ day of January, 2004. 
Authorized 
for presentment and filing 
B y _ 
Gary Searle 
Deputy Coun 
This form (fully filled in) must be 
presented to a magistrate as soon as 
possible but in any event no later 
than 48 hours after the time of arrest 
A y arrest and for con-
L / tinued detention from 
P/C statement below. 
Yes No 
Date: . ;Time 
Judge: __ 
Bail amount" 
Date 8c Time of Arrest 11/30/03 12:41 
Arresting Agency Case Number: 080301241 
Name: LEGG, JOHN 
AKA: 
S0#; DOB: 12/13/1968 
CHARGE INFORMATION 











Agency: UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL ID#: 
VC-41-1A-1316 
CC-76-6-102 
OFFENSE INFORMATION AND PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT FOR ARREST 
Date: 11/30/03 Time: 12:41 Location: 1-80, MP 49 EXIT 
Victim: 
Statement of P.C. as of the time of arrest. 
I WAS CALLED TO A VEHICLE FIRE OFF EXIT 49, NORTH OF THE FREEWAY. WHE 
N I EXITED THE OFF RAMP I SAW A SUBJECT WALKING TOWARD THE FREEWAY. I 
TALKED TO THE SUBJECT AND HE BASICALLY STATED HE DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING 
ABOUT THE FIRE OR VEHICLE. I TOOK HIM BACK TO THE SCENE. THE REPORT 
ING PERSON WAS STILL AT THE SCENE. HE STATED HE HAD PICKED UP THE SUB 
JECT I HAD WITH ME AND HE STATED TO HIM THAT HE DIDN'T NOTICE THE FIRE 
I CHECKED AROUND THE BURNING VEHICLE AND COULD ONLY SEE ONE TREAD 
PATTERN OF TRACKS. THERE WAS A BUNDLE 5 0 YARDS FROM THE VEHICLE. THE 
TRACKS LED THAT DIRECTION DRAGGING A BLACKET HOLDING MISCELANEAOUS PRO 
PERTY FROM THE VEHICLE. THE SUJECT STARTED OUT GIVING ME ONE STORY AND 
THEN CHANGING IT. A FRIEND BROUGHT HIM OUT TO SHOW HIM SOMETHING. SH 
OWED HIM THE VEHICLE THEN STARTED TEARING IT APART. MY SUBJECT THEN S 
TARTED REMOVING ITEMS FROM THE VEHICLE TO KEEP THEM FROM GETTING DESTR 
OYED. ANOTHER WITNESS STATED THAT HE SAW THE SUBJECT I HAD PULLING 
STUFF OUT OF THE VEHICLE AND THAT THERE WAS NO OTHER VEHICLE OR PERSON 
S AROUND. THE VEHICLE THAT WAS BURNED WAS NOT LISTED ONNCIC. DISPATCH 
CONTACTED THE REGISTERED OWNERS AND THfiY NOTICED THE VEHICLE WAS NO LO 
NGER IN THEIR POSSESSION. DISPATCH CALLED SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF OF 
FICE FOR THE VICTIMS. I CONTACTED THE' VICTIM, SHE DOES KNOW THE SUJEC 
T I HAD WITH ME LEAVING THE AREA OF THE CAR FIRE. AFTER TALKING WITH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF, I ARRESTED THE MY SUJECT FOR THE STOLEN VEHI 
CLE AND ARSON. I STATE TAX IMPOUNDED THE VEHICLE. THE STATE FIRE MA 
RSHAL AND SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTIES WILL COME OUT TO WENDOVER TO FURTH 
ER INVESTIGATE. I TRANSPORTED MY PRISONER TO TOOELE COUNTY JAIL. 
Screening cases is the responsibility of the arrestng officer and agency. 
Arresting Officer: /^__ l 
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materially increases the amount of exempt 
property withdrawn from liability for the 
c^ebts of the owner of the property impairs 
the obligation of existing contracts and is, as 
to existing creditors, unconstitutional be-
cause an exemption may not be applied ret-
roactively"). ;. ;., 
U 34 Accordingly, based upon the principles 
of statutory interpretation discussed above 
and : the public policy considerations, sur-
rounding homestead exemption statutes as 
articulated in Macumber, we.conclude that in 
supervising the distribution of proceeds from 
the sale of the Property, the trial court 
should determine the amount of the home-
stead exemption based upon the declaration 
in effect at the time of the actual sale. The 
trial court's ruling is therefore reversed and 
remanded in order that a factual finding may 
be made upon which to base the determina-
tion.7 
CONCLUSION 
U 35 We conclude the trial court correctly 
determined that Homeside's trust deed is, not 
a purchase money mortgage, and that equita-
ble subrogation is inapplicable in this matter. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's deci-
sions regarding these matters. 
1136 We reverse the trial court's decisions 
finding circularity and establishing priorities, 
and hereby assign the following priorities: 
(1) Transworld's judgment lien; (2) Home-
side's trust deed, and (3) the Millers. The 
hen and trust deed are each to be satisfied, 
in turn, to the extent that assets are. available 
to satisfy the claims; We acknowledge that 
different assets, or a portion thereof, may be 
available . as each succeeding creditor at-
tempts to satisfy their claim because the 
homestead exemption protects a portion of 
the proceeds from Transworld's judicial lien. 
The proceeds from the sale,are to b^distrib-
7. We are reluctant to determine the^ specific 
amount of the exemption because niultiple^decla-
rations may be filed before the Property is actual-
ly sold; Further, it is more appropriate for the 
trial court to make the determination because the 
Millers' original declaration is neither part of the 
record, nor part of the, addenda submitted. 
1. While I concur in the result regarding the 
circularity of liens issue, I believe it is unneces-
uted and supervised by the trial court ina< 
manner not inconsistent with our opinion.: 
1137 We also reverse the trial court's deci-
sion that the sum the Millers received from' 
Academy should be considered a portion of 
the Millers' homestead exemption. Finally, 
we conclude that the trial court should deter-
mine the amount of the homestead exemption 
based upon the declaration in effect at the 
time of the actual sale of the Property. 
11 38 The trial court's decision is affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. 
1139 I CONCUR:., PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge. 
DAVIS, Judge (concurring, concurring in 
result, and dissenting): 
If 40 I concur in the main opinion respect-
ing the purchase money mortgage and equi-
table subordination issues. I concur in the 
result respecting the circularity of liens is-
sue; * however, I dissent on the issue of the 
allowable homestead exemption." 
1141 In my view, under the facts of this 
case, the amount of the allowable homestead 
exemption was determined at the time of 
filing and in accordance with the amounts set 
out in the declaration of homestead.2 Here, 
the Millers apparently filed their declaration 
of homestead shortly after, and probably as a 
result of, Transworld's judgment. Between 
the time that the Millers filed their declara-
tion of homestead and the time that this 
matter was tried, the statutory homestead 
allowance was increased, by the Legislature. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-23-3(2) 
(Supp.2000), with Utah Code; Ann. § 78-23-
3(1) (1996), and Utah Code Ann, § 78-23-
3(1) (1991). , 
1f42 By filing their 1991 declaration .»of 
homestead, the Millers were immediately 
protected from the Transworld judgment 
Ken.. "A homestead is exempt from judicial 
sary for this court to address the allocation of 
proceeds if a sale of :the property ever occurs. 
Once it has been determined that no circularity 
of liens exists, the rules of priority will control' 
the respective positions of the parties. 
2. The Miller's actual 1991 declaration of home-
stead was apparently not made part of the record 
at trial or on appeal. 
STATE yf WAN6SIK 
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lien and from levy, execution, ^forced sale." 
Utah Code Ann.- § 78-23-3(3) (Supp.2000) 
(emphasis added). - The filing of the declaraW 
tion immediately exempted the amount set 
out in the declaration from Transworld's lien/ 
regardless of whether a levy, execution, or 
forced sale ever occurred. Here, the Millers 
could have waited to declare their homestead 
exemption up to the date of sale of the 
property; however, they chose not to. In-
stead, they elected to immediately exempt 
the allowable homestead from Transworld's 
Hen. 
If 43, In order to exempt property from 
judicial; hen, the statute requires the filing of 
a "sighed and acknowledged declaration of 
homestead.'' Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4(1) 
(1996).' The Utah Exemptions Act does not 
specifically provide for1 sequential declara^ 
tions of the homestead exemption. See, id. 
§§ 78-23-1 to~15. ' ' ' ; ' '" '' 
1144 Further, while it is
 ;true that-the 
deadline for filing a, declaration of homestead 
is, the sale of the property, it is illogical to tie 
the exemption amount to a' sale which may or 
may not occur. This approach suggests' that 
a sale of the property and generation of the 
sales' proceeds is a precondition to realiza-
tion of the homestead by the debtor. 
1145 "[T]he purpose of the; homestead ex ;^ 
emption of, -Article XXII, Section, 1 of the 
Utah Constitution is to protect 'the depen-
dent and helpless' and to insure such persons 
shelter ,and support free from ,fear of. forced 
sale." Sanders v^Cassiiy, 586 p.2d 4^3, 425 
(Utah 1978) (citation omitted)!5" Jhus, al-^  
though /the declaration can be filed or served 
any time prior to,sale, see id" the amount of 
the exemption should not"'jbe determined as 
of the time of sale, because^ a sale' fh'ay never 
take place. See Utah Code AhhV •§ 78-23-
4(5) (1996) ("Property that,includes-a 
stead shall not be sold at execution if there is 
no bid which exceeds the amount of the 
declared homestead exemption':'*).' 
1146 In addition, the 1991 declaration gave 
constructive notice to all,interestedparties of 
3. Although the homestead exemption, in general,, 
is to be construed irt favor o£'Qie:debtor,'-see 
Russell M. Miller Co. v. Givan, 7. Utah 2d 380, 
325 P.2d 908, 909 ,(1958), ttas line of cases does 
hot apply here because Ho'meside, .as' a result of 
our decision, effectively succeeds to the Miller's 
, exemption amount.t ;• . 
the scope of Transworld's lie^ n on the real 
property. To the extent Transworld or> other 
creditors may have relied on the amount" 
stated in the declaration, the Millers should' 
ber bound by that amount. " 
1f 47 Finally, the Millers'cannbt rely^ori the 
amendments to the Exemption amount" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (Supp.2000) be-: 
cause when statutory'amendments are "sub-
stantial and substantive,"•* and not merely 
procedural, then "retroactive application" is 
not appropriate." '-Thronson v. Thronson, 
810 P:2d;428, 432 (Utah.App.1991). If the 
"vested rights" given by a statute have been 
enlarged, then-the amendment cannot'be 
considered procedural. Smith v. ~ Cook, 803 
P.2d 788,!792 (Utah, 1990K' . The- changes 
made by the Legislature to the' Utah Exemp-
tions Act since 1991 significantly increase the 
allowable homestead.4. Thus, the.amend-
ments to the exemption amount in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (Supp. 2000) are not 
merely procedural, • and "retroactive applica^ 
tion is not appropriate." Thronson^ 810 P.2d 
at 432. 
1148 Accordingly, I would 'remand- to^'the' 
trial court for the limitedpurpose
 f of ^ deter-
mining the amount claimed by the Miller's in 
the 1991 declaration of hdm&siead.' 
:2001 UTApp241 ; 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
AnthonyJames WANpSI^pefendaji t 
and-Appellant. 
No. 20000541-CA. 
Court of Appeals of IJtah. 
Aug. 16; 2001;; 
. Defendant who pleaded.tguilty to drug" 
charges in the,District Court^Salt Lake De-
4. Assuming' the Millers did" not have: as many- as 
sixty children in 1991. See, Utah Code .Ann. 
§ 78-23-3(1) (1991). 
partment, J. Dennis Frederick, J.,:,and. was 
sentenced in absentia. Defendant appealed. 
The Court,of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) 
defendant was not entitled to explicit warn-
ing that, even if defendant were absent,.the' 
court might proceed with sentencing; (2)- sen-
tencing court was required to inquire into 
defendant's ability to appear at sentencing 
proceeding, and State was required to make 
preliminary showing of voluntariness of de-
fendant's absence, before sentencing court 
could decide that defendant had waived his 
right to be present; (3) sentencing court's 
failure to properly inquire into whether de-
fendant's absence at sentencing hearing was 
voluntary was harmless error; and (4) sen-
tencing court's failure to hear evidence from 
prosecutor and defense counsel at sentencing 
hearing was not harmless error. , .-..• 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>341 
A criminal defendant's right to be pres-
ent at all stages of trial includes the right to 
be present at sentencing. > 
2. Criminal Law <3»636(1) 
To intentionally relinquish the right to 
be present, the defendant must have notice 
of the proceedings. Rules Crim.Proc., Rules 
17(a)(2), 22(b). • ' . , 
3. Sentencing and Punishment <^ =»345 
Defendant's right to be present at all 
proceedings may be waived by defendant's 
voluntary absence from sentencing; this 
waiver must be voluntary and involve an 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
4. Sentencing and Punishment ®=>345 
Defendant was not entitled to explicit 
warning that, even if defendant were absent, 
the trial court might proceed with sentenc-
ing, and thus defendant's voluntary absence 
from sentencing proceeding after He. pleaded 
guilty did not bar trial court from pronounc-
ing sentence. .Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 
17(a)(2), 22(b). • 
5. Sentencing and Punishment ®=»345 
To require an explicit warning that sen-
tencing will proceed even in the defendant's 
voluntary absence.is to conclude, that, with-
out such a warning, defendants will assume 
they have the right to avoid sentencing sim-
ply by refusing to appear. Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
6. Criminal Law <3=»636(2) 
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufi>, 
cient to allow a defendant to exercise the. 
right to be present by appearing, or to waive, 
that right through voluntary absence. Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
7. Criminal Law <s=>636(2) 
A defendant need not be warned that 
the proceedings may go forward in his, ab-
sence in order to deem voluntary absence a 
knowing.waiver of the right;to be present. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
8. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>345 
Sentencing court was not required to 
conduct analysis as to whether the public 
interest in proceeding with sentencing clearly 
outweighed the interest of the voluntarily 
absent defendant in attending the proceed-
ing; neither federal rules, nor federal consti-
tution required such a balancing test. Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). ' 
9. Criminal Law ®=*636(2> 
The fact that a defendant was1 informed 
of the time and place of the proceeding al-
lows a court to presume that a defendant's 
absence therefrom is knowing, i.e., that the 
defendant knows he is missing the proceed-
ing; the fact that an absent defendant had 
notice of the proceeding does not, however, 
allow a presumption that absence, therefrom 
is voluntary. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 
17(a)(2), 22(b). J. 
10. Criminal Law ^636(2) 
A trial court may not assume a defen-
dant's knowing absence is voluntary, but 
rather is required to determine whether a 
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary. 
Rules Crim.Proc., Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
11. Sentencing and Punishment @=»345 
Sentencing court was required to inquire 
into defendant's ability to appear at sentenc-
ing proceeding, and State was required to 
make a preliminary showing of the voluntari-
O l A l J C i V. TTXJLL I^V70XXV 
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ness of defendant's absence, before-sentenc- the reasons for his^absence..-; Rules Crhh. 
ing, court could decide that defendant, had Proc, Rules 17(a)(2),22(b). 
waived his right to be present at sentencing. ; / 
Rules Crim>Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b), .. 18. Sentencing and Punishment <s=>345 
12. Sentencing and Punishment <s=»345 
The voluntariness of defendant's absence 
from sentencing; proceeding may not be pre-
sumed by the trial court; rather, an mquiry 
into the defendant's ability to appear at the 
proceeding is required; Rules Crim.Pi:pc> 
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
13. Sentencing and Punishment ^ 3 4 5 
The voluntariness of defendant's absence, 
from, sentencing proceeding is determinecl,by 
considering the totality of the circumstances,. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). '* •' 
14. Sentencing and Punishment <S=>345 
The state carries the burden of showing 
the voluntariness of defendant's absence 
from sentencing proceeding.. .Rules Crim. 
Proc,-Rule:sa7(a)(2)„22(b),'",,'. "/',',.'"{ \', 
15. Criminal Law <3=>636(2) v 
A defendant must have a compelling rea-
son to stay away from the trial; if his absence 
is deliberate ^ without a-sound reason, the trial 
may start in his absence.,,v Rules(,Qrim.Proc, 
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b)'. T , 
16. Sentencing and Punishment <3=*345 > 
When defendant is absent from sentenc-
ing proceedings, the State must make a pre-, 
liminary showing, based on reasonable:inqui-
ry, that' defendant's absence is voluntary; 
except as otherwise required by the attor-
ney-client privilege, defense counsel has an 
obligation to aid the State by being forthcom-
ing with any information "defense counsel 
may have that could be helpful hi determin-
ing the defendant'swhereabou'ts or reasons 
for the defendant's 'absence. '•: Rules Crim. 
Proc,-Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). ! v ' • V'--' 
17. Sentencing and Punishment <§=»582 i 
When'neither court nor "counsel'have 
information as to why the defendant is not 
present at sentencing, a continuance will or-
dinarily be required to allow the prosecution 
and defense counsel an opportunity to in-
quire into the defendant's whereabouts and 
Some avenues for establishing voluntary 
ness of defendant's absence at sentencing 
proceeding are: (1) ihcjuiry of law Enforce-
ment agencies to determinei whether' defen-
dant is incarcerated;1 (2) inquiry1 of local 'hos-
pitals as to whether defendant is admitted to' 
one of them; (3) inquiry of defendant's em-
ployer,, if employer can j be readily deter-
mined, as to employer's knowledge of defen-
dant's whereabouts; (4) a reasbiiably diligent 
attempt to contact defendant at'his residence 
or other place counsel knows; defendant t;6 
frecjuent;! (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or 
other entity supervising defendant's presen-
tence release; and "(6) inquiry; of any bail 
bond'comjpany or other person or entity post-
ing bond to secure defendant's appearance. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(.a)(2)>-22(b).; , 
19. Sentencing and Punishment <3=»345 
Once inquiry appropriate to the case has 
been made, and a compelling reason for the 
defendant's absence at sentencing proceeding 
remains unknown, voluntariness, while not 
guarantied, may then be properly inferred; 
however, defense counsel must then have,the 
opportunity to rebut the inference of volun-
tariness. • Rules Crim.Proc, Rules '17(a)(2),! 
22(b). 
20. Criminal Law <3=>1166.14 
A trial court's error in failing to conduct 
an adequate inquiry into whether a defen-
dant's absence was voluntary does not merit 
reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced 
by the lack of adequate inquiry. Rules Crim. 
Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
21. Criminal Law ^IITIZ^ 
Sentencing court's failure 'to properly in-
quire into Whether defendant's absence at 
sentencing hearing was Voluntary was harm-
less error; where defendant^ after being ap-
prehended* sent letter to''sentencing court 
stating that defendant did "not have a legiti-
mate excuse" for appearing for sentencing. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)@);:22(b). • 
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22. Sentencing and Punishment @=>345, 360 
Defendant, by his voluntary absence at 
sentencing proceeding, waived the right to 
personally make a statement at sentencing 
and to personally present information, in miti-
gation. of punishment or to show legal cause 
why sentence should not be imposed; howev-
er, sentencing court was required to afford 
the defendant,the opportunity to exercise his 
allocution rights through counsel. . Rules 
CrimJProc., Rule 22(a). „ , '_','"^ i 
23. Sentencing and Punishment €=>356 
,,.. A defendant's personal exercise of the 
rights granted in the rule of criminal ^ proce-
dure which allows,defendant to make a..state-
ment at sentencing is referred, to as "allocu-
tion." Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 22(a). 
See publication Words and,Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. '" ' 
24. Sentencing and Punishment <£»360 
Allocution is an inseparable part of the 
right to be present at sentencing, which a 
defendant waives by; his .voluntary absence. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a). , 
25. Sentencing and Punishment ^ 3 6 0 , 
A defendant does not altogether waive 
his? allocution rights through voluntary, ab-
sence at sentencing; he waives only the right 
to personally exercise them., Rules Crim. 
Proc, Rule 22(a). 
26. Criminal Law <S=>641.13(7) 
Sentencing is a critical stage of a crimi-
nal proceeding at which a defendant is enti-
tled to the effective assistance of counsel, and 
the right to effective assistance of counsel 
cannot be waived through voluntary-absence 
alone. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; Rules 
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b). 
27. Sentencing and Punishment <&=>345 
Even when defendant is voluntarily ab-
sent from sentencing, and thereby waives his 
right to allocution, trial court is; required to 
afford defense counsel opportunity to make 
statement in: mitigation of sentence and to 
give prosecutor opportunity to present infor-
mation relevant to sentencing. Rules Crim.; 
Proc, Rule 22(a). < 
28. Criminal Law «®=>1177 
Sentencing court's failure to hear evi-
dence from prosecutor and defense counsel 
at sentencing hearing was not harmless er-
ror, even though defendant voluntarily failed 
to appear at sentencing; defense counsel had 
to be given an opportunity to present infor-
mation in mitigation of punishment and pros-
ecutor had to be given an opportunity to 
present information relevant to sentencing. 
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a). 
29. Constitutional Law <s=>270(2) 
The state due process clause requires 
that a sentencing judge act on* reasonably 
reliable and relevant information in exercis-
ing-discretion in fixing a sentence. Const. 
Art. 1, § 7. ' ! 
30. Sentencing and Punishment <s=>40, 66, 
90 
A sentence in a criminal case should be 
appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and 
also serve the interests of society which un-
derlie the criminal justice system. Const. 
Art. 1, § 7. 
31. Constitutional Law <3=>270(2) 
Sentencing and Punishment <3=>94 
Defendant's state due process rights 
were violated by sentencing court's failure to 
base.its sentencing decision on relevant and 
reliable information regarding the crime, de-
fendant's background, and the interests of 
society, and basing the court's decision solely 
on defendant's voluntary absence, at sentenc-
ing. Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
32. Criminal Law <®=>1177 
Sentencing court's failure to base, its 
sentencing decision on relevant and reliable 
information regarding the crime,, defendant's 
background, and the interests of society, and 
basing the court's decision instead solely on 
defendant's voluntary absence at sentencing, 
was not harmless error. Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
Joan C. Watt, Catherine E. £.illy, and An-
drea J. Garland, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lant. ,.•<•-
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OPINION 
ORME, Judges ;7" " " r ? 
111 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik ap-
peals the sentences imposed by the trial 
court pursuant to his guilty pleas to attempt-
ed unlawful possession or use of a controlled 
substance and unlawful' possession or use of a; 
controlled substance^ class A and fr misde-
meanors, respectively, each in violation 6f 
Utah Code Ann. •; § 58-37-8(2J(a)(i); feupp. 
2000); We vacate the sentences and remand 
for resentencings u '• :-- -'' 
•'•, BACKGROUND ; 
112 The facts are: Undisputed. Wanosik 
pled guilty to-two misdemeanor^ drug ofn 
fenses- At the plea hearing, the trial court 
told Wanosik that sentencing would be held' 
on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., and, ordered 
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation .and 
Parole (AP & P) for preparation of a presen-
tence report. The trial; court did not specifi-
cally inform Wanosjk.that he could be sen-
tenced in absentia..if he.;,failed,to appear for 
sentencing. . . _.; .,. ,;... • . , ,. 
H 3 Wanosik reported %o, AP .i & • P, and a 
presentence report was completed. AP &,P 
recommended that, Wanosik be sentenced, to 
twenty days, in jail^with, credit for time 
served and that he then be, committed.toa 
substance abuse treatment program.
 ;..'. : 
14 A sentencing hearing, was held as 
scheduled on May 26, 2000.,; Wanosik was 
represented at the; hearing by .counsel but 
did not appear personally at the hearing or 
at any other time that morning. ....... 
115 Defense counsel expressed:to,the court 
her belief that Wanosik had intended.to ap-
pear for sentencing but had perhaps written 
down the wrong date. Defense counsel 
asked the court to wait before issuirig' an 
arrest' warrant to give counsel time to locate 
Wanosik. The court denied defense' coun-
sel's request and proceeded to impose, sen-
tence:.. '••! '••, . ; ;.:::. .v .« = ;\ J.~ :'-i.\] 
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will 
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a war-
rant for his arrest returnable forthwith no 
bail. My inclination is to sentence him 
. today, and I recognize -'you,would prefer 
(that Id id not, but I am inclined to do so. 
It is curious that he has failed to appear 
today, although I can only assume because 
he has not been in touch with you nor has 
he been in touch with my court that he has 
chosen to voluntarily absent himself from 
these proceedings, ••••;,; 
Consequently,-it is the judgment and 
sentence of this Court that he serve the 
term provided by law in the adult deten-
tion center of one year for the class A 
misdemeanor crime of attempted posses-
sion of..,a. controlled substance, and six 
months for. the possession of a controlled 
substance, a misdemeanor charge to which 
he fhas pled guilty. I will; order that those 
.terms be served,concurrently and not,con-
secutively,and that;they be,imposed forth-
. . W i t h . , . .•:.• / • • • . . , . ; !- f . -*V-.:KV- ;..- • • • - , . , • ; • • . . 
JVEs. Garland, in the, event he is in touch 
with you or shows
 tup before he's arrested, 
then you
 umay approach me, but in the 
meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro, you prepare 
the findings of fact,, conclusions of law and 
order;, determining,.voluntary absent, com-
pliance, and that will be the; order. , ,,-,. >• 
Defense, counsel promptly objected: .,., .• .».• ,••..., 
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to 
that order because, I donft think that. it 
takes into account his due process rights 
- or his rights about— : >. •'! •-;•: .• <^ --
THE COURT:,Right twil - ; >.s, 
MS. GARLAND: Howeverl I realize that's 
your order. ;•• '':-: :.-;;'';r'' v .••.-««..»•,•.. • •>:.. 
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. 
I'll grant him credit for the eight days 'he 
served awaiting inipositibn or a resolution. 
The hearing was then immediately conclud-
ed. The 'prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandrb, wsfe' 
present but made no statement during the; 
sentencing hearing^ .and the" court addressed 
the prosecutor only to direct him to prepare 
the court's .findings, of fact and conclusions of 
l a W i •'- ' " • < • • • • •••••<;•'*:••• ' • ' • • • ' >••'• • ' ' ; • : •"-'•'• 
\ i 6 \ bn June " 14^£oo6V %anosik, through 
counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal of the 
sentences imposed' in his absence;' Wanosik 
was arrested a few moniiis^ater on the war-
rant issued at the: sentencing^' -After his ar-
w* * « v i i X\J xvxujr KJM\in<rv, da OHililJCiS 
rest, Wanosik sent a brief, handwritten letter 
to the trial court in which he forthrightly 
acknowledged, with his own emphasis:/"I do 
not have a legitimate excuse" for being ab-
sent at sentencing. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1f 7 Wanosik makes two general claims on 
appeal: (1) that sentencing should not have 
proceeded in his absence; and (2) that even 
if sentencing him in absentia was proper, the 
trial court erred by the manner in which it 
conducted sentencing. 
1f8 Under Wanosik's first general claim, 
i.e., that sentencing should not have proceed-
ed in his absence, we address several distinct 
issues. First, we address Wanosik's conten-
tion that, as a matter of law, a defendant's 
absence at sentencing cannot be deemed Vol-
untary if the defendant was not Warned that 
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary 
absence. This contention presents a purely 
legal question, which we review for correct-
ness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932;" 935-
36 (Utah 1994). Second, we address Wano-
sik's argument that even if a defendant's 
absence is properly deemed voluntary, the 
trial court may not proceed with "sentencing 
without first balancing society's -interest1 in 
proceeding and the defendant's interest in 
being present. This argument also presents 
a question of law, which we review for cor-
rectness. See id. Thirds we believe that 
sound analysis requires us to address wheth-
er, in this case, the trial court's inquiry re-
garding the voluntariness of Wanosik's ab-
sence was properly conducted. Specifically, 
we address the, questions of what type of 
inquiry is required of the trial court in mak-
ing ;the factual determination of voluntari-
ness; who has the burden of proving volun-
tariness; and what type of evidence may 
suffice to meet that burden. These are all 
legal questions, which, again, we review for 
correctness. See id. Finally, we conclude 
1. Wagstaff involved a defendant's absence; from 
trial rather than from sentencing. See 772 P.2d 
, at 988-89. The Utah Supreme Court, however, 
has previously relied oh both Wagstaff arid State 
v.Houtz, 714 P.2d-677 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), 
another Utah case involving a defendant's ab-
sence at trial, in addressing a criminal defen-
dant's right td 'oe present at Sentencing. See 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 
this first section of the opinion by consider-
ing whether any error by the trial court was 
harmless. .:,. r 
119 Wanosik's second claim is that, even 
assuming proceeding with sentencing in his 
absence was appropriate, "[t]he trial court 
violated due process and Utah R.Crim. P. 
22[ (a) ] when it sentenced [Wanosik] without 
considering relevant and reliable information 
and without affording defense counsel or the 
prosecutor the opportunity to speak at sen-
tencing." These assertions require us to in-
terpret both the mandates of Rule 22(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
the requirements of Due Process at sentenc-
ing. Each of these inquiries pose questions 
of law, which we review for correctness, 
granting no particular deference, to the con-
clusions of the trial court. See Broivn v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, 1115, 16 P.3d 540 ("[T]he 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law that, we review for correct-
ness."); State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 
119, 27 P.3d 573 ("Issues of constitutional 
interpretation are questions of law, which we 
review for correctness."). 
I. Sentencing; in Absentia 
[1-3] H10 We begin by addressing Wano-
sik's claim that the trial court erred by sen-
tencing him in his absence. A criminal de-
fendant's right to be present at all stages of 
trial included the right to be present at sen-
tencing. See State v: Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996): "To intentionally 
relinquish the right to be present, the defen-
dant must have notice of the proceedings." 
Id. at 1110. See Utah R.Crim;; P. 17(a)(2), 
22(b). "However, this right may be waived 
. . . [by] the [defendant's] voluntary absence 
from [sentencing]. This' waiver must be vol-
untary and involve an intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right." State v. Wagstaff, 
772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (ci-
tations omitted).1 
1996) (citing Wagstaff, 772 ,P.2d at 990;; Houtz, 
714 P.2d at 678), Likewise, the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure .treat identically a defen-
dant's right to be present at trial and a defen-
dant's right to be present at sentencing. See 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(b). We therefore see no 
basis on which to distinguish between trial and 
sentencing in our analysis of a defendant's right 
A. Specific Warning of Consequences' :. 
[4] 1111 Notwithstanding that-the Utah 
case law and rules referred to above appear 
to require only notice to defendant of the 
proceedings and of the right to be present in 
order to permit the court to proceed to a 
determination whether a defendant's volun-
tary absence is a waiver of the right to be 
present, Wanosik argues that a further warn-
ing is required. Specifically, Wanosik argues 
he was entitled to be warned that-the court 
might proceed, with sentencing if he were.to 
be voluntarily absents We disagree.*.. ,, •, j 
' [5,6] 1112 To require an explicit warning 
that sentencing will'proceed even in the de-
fendant's voluntary absence is to conclude 
that, without such a warning, defendants will 
assume they have the right to avoid sentenc-
ing simply by refusing'to appear. See Tay-
lor v. United State&WA U.S. 17^20/94 S.Ct. 
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174-(1973) (per* curiam). 
It is inimical to the commonre'spect due'our 
governmental institutions for us to indulge in 
the presumption that- persons will assume 
they have the right to impede the judicial 
system by deliberately absenting themselves 
from criminal proceedings to which they are 
a party. See id. ("It seems I. .• incredible 
to us . . . 'that .a defendant who flees from a 
courtroom in the midst of a trial—where 
judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are-pres-
to be present and a defendant's voluntary waiver 
of that right. 
2. Wanosik references both the Utah: Constitution 
and the United States Constitution as well as the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in making this 
argument. However, '
 ; H 
[n]o argument has been made as to why, if we 
were to uphold the [sentencing] under, the 
Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result 
would be different under either the Utah'or the 
federal constitution. We will. therefore treat 
the contention as a single argument with three 
legal bases rather than as three separate 'krgu-
•
 :
 ments. • '••.. i < f : r. -•.••.: >•,<•:. x\ •, 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 n. 3 (Utah 
1996). . ,,; . •• ;-SJ. >r 
3. We acknowledge that, a defendant who flees in 
the midst of a trial may have more; reason to 
know that the proceedings will move forward in 
his absence than a defendant, who absents him-
self from sentencing after entering a guilty plea. 
We nevertheless remain unpersuaded that1 a 
warning is required to disabuse defendants of the 
belief that they may prevent their own sentencing 
:<; STATE *.;WANOSIK uian ozx 
Cite as 31 P.3d 615 (Utah App. 2001) 
ent and ready to continue—would not know 
that as a consequence the trial could continue 
in his absence."' (citation omitted)).3 "The 
right at issue is the right to be present." Id. 
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufficient to 
allow a defendant to exercise the right to be 
present by appearing, or to waive that right 
through voluntary absence. See id. Wheth^ 
er it be trial or sentencing, we must presume 
defendants fully understand that important 
proceedings will go forward without them in 
the event of their, voluntary absence.4 Thus,: 
there is no need to specially warn defendants 
of this obvious fact. :.
 v r- .. ,; 
11 IS Wanosik observes that although nei-
ther Wagstaff- nor Anderson '-addresses 
whether a spech c^ warning is required, sudh: 
a requirement would not be inconsistent with' 
the holdings of those cases. However, the 
only federal case; Wanosik cites directly-sup-
porting his proposition that a specific warn-
ing is required'to inform defendants that 
sentencing may proceed in their voluntary 
absence is United States v. McPherson, 421s 
F.2d 1127 (t).C.Cir.l969), which ; held that 
such a warning is required. See id. at 1129-
30. The United'States Supreme Court has, 
however, explicitly rejected McPherson's 
holding requiring such a warning.' See\ Tay-
lor, 414 U.S. at 20 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3 
("[T]he Court of Appeals:.... disagreed with 
through deliberate absence from the sentencing 
proceeding. We therefore, again, do not distin-
guish between the right to be present at trial 
from the,right to be present a| sentencing, in 
terms of what type.. of notice is required to deem 
a defendant's voluntary absenqe a knowing waiv-
er of the right-to be present. See note 1. 
4. Nor is this some unique'feature of the judicial 
system that will be foreign to the average citizen. 
Whether one is; a season ticket holder or a team 
member, a scheduled basketball game will go-
forward whether or not he or she shows up. If 
one does not appear for a scheduled dental or 
medical appointment, he or she should expect to 
be billed anyway. If one misses an employment 
interview without prior explanation, he or she 
knows the job will go to someone else. While 
the uniqueness of judicial business makes these* 
examples less than perfect, the expectation in 
contemporary American society .is that one 
should appear at duly scheduled events >;pr: ^ be 
willing to accept the ramifications of his or her 
voluntary absence. In most social and commer-
cial arenas,,-an expectation of unexcused absence 
without consequence is not the order of the day. 
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McPherson, and, in our view, rightly so.").5 
Nonetheless, Wanosik maintains that 
McPherson 's -holding is good law and cites 
the more recent United States -Supreme 
Court case, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 
255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993)* as. 
"further support for the McPherson require-
ment." Crosby, however, does not under-
mine Taylor's rejection of McPherson-s 
warning requirement. 
1114 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure and holds 
that, under the explicit language of that rule, 
a court may never commence trial in a defen-
dant's absence.6 See 506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 
S.Ct. at 751-53. The Crosby Court, also ,pb-
serves, however, that under Rule 43 a defen-
dant's absence after\{ trial... has commenced 
will automatically be deemed .a knowing 
waiver of the right to,be present, even,with-
out prior warning to the defendant regarding 
the consequences of voluntary absence.. See 
5Q6U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752. Thus, 
like Taylor^ Crosby concludes that in circum-
stances where the federal, rules .otherwise 
allow for trial in absentia, a warning is not 
required to inform defendants that,voluntary 
absence will likely result in trial in absentia. 
See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 
752; Taylor, 414 U.S.. at 20, 94 S.Ct. at 196. 
[7] 1115 Significantly, the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of 
5. Wanosik observes that the Utah Supreme Court 
has cited McPherson with approval. See State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 11 I'd (Utah 1996). 
• However/the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on 
McPherson extended only to the 'proposition that 
"[t]o intentionally relinquish the right to be pres-
ent, the defendant must have notice of the pro-
ceedings." Id. Nowhere does Anderson intimate 
that any further warning is;.required. Indeed, 
Anderson implicitly rejects the notion that a fur-
ther warning is required by: affirming the sen-
tencing, in absentia, of a; defendant. who,. al-
though he waived in writing, his right to be 
present at trial, was not explicitly warned that 
sentencing would proceed in his voluntary .ab-
sence. See id. at 1110-11. 
6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure states in relevant part: •>••..-.. 
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be 
present at the arraignment, at the time of the 
plea, at every stage of the trial including the 
impaneling of the jury and the return of the 
verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except 
as otherwise provided by this rule. • 
Criminal Procedure differ in an important 
respect highlighted by Crosby. Federal Rule 
43 treats differently absence at the com-
mencement of trial from absence after the 
commencement of trial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 
43; Crosby, .506.U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 
751-53. The Utah Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure draw no such distinction, but rather 
treat a defendant's absence at any stage of 
criminal proceedings similarly to the federal 
rule's treatment of a defendant's absence 
after commencement of trial.7 Compare 
Utah R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed. 
R.Crim.P. 43(a) & (b)(1). . Thus, for our pur-
poses, the significance of Crosby is that it 
affirms the United States Supreme Court's 
view that a warning of the consequences of 
voluntary absence is not required to deem a 
defendant's absence after commencement of 
trial voluntary. Our holding, therefore, ac-
cords with that of the United States Supreme 
Court when we conclude that a defendant 
need, not be warned,that the proceedings 
may go forward in his absence in order to 
deem voluntary absence a knowing waiver of 
the right to be present. Thus, although at 
least one state mandates a warning like that 
required in McPherson, see People v. Link, 
291, Hl.App.3d 1064, 226 Ill.Dec. 369, 685 
N.E;2d 624,;626 (1997), we, with the United 
States Supreme Court,; decline to adopt 
McPherson 's holding. 
(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The 
further progress of the trial to and including the 
return of the verdict shall not be prevented and 
the defendant shall be considered to have waived 
the... right to be present whenever a defendant, 
initially present, 
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has 
commenced (whether or not the defendant has 
been informed by the court of the obligation to 
remain during the trial) [.] 
7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by 
death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time 
for trial shall not prevent the case from being 
tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein 
shall have the same effect as if defendant had 
been present.. .. 
Furthermore, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defen-
dant may be tried in defendant's absence, defen-
dant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's 
absence." 
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4 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date 
and time of his sentencing.: He had the right 
to appear if he chose; he-had no right io 
assume the matter could be1' taken care of 
some other time, when he felt more in the 
mood to attend. We see no error in the trial 
court's failure to specifically'^warn Wanosik 
that sentencing would proceed -in the event of 
his voluntary absence from "the proceeding. 
B. Balancing of Interests' " 
[8] H17 Relying on two in a line of cases, 
from the Second Circuit, Wanosik' argues 
that even if a defendant's absence is properly 
deemed knowing and voluntary,1 a trial court 
may not proceed unless "the public interest 
in proceeding clearly butweijghs the interest 
of the voluntarily absent defendant in attend-
ing." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2nd 
Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S1 ,884, 120 S.Ct 
200, 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (199^, Set United 
States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2oT'33, 37 (2nd 
Cir.1989). , \ .; '. ; ' , 
If .18 The Second Circuit .. acknowledges 
"that while [it believes], prudential concerns 
animate the need for a balancing of interests 
before a district court exercises its discretion 
to conduct a. trial in absentia, all that the 
Constitution requires, is a knowing and vol-
untary waiver of the right to, be present at 
trial." Mann, 173 F.3d at 76 (emphasis add-
ed). Accord Clark v. Scott, 70 F.3d 386, 389-. 
90 (5th Cirii995), cert, denied, 52$ U.S. 88V 
120 S.Ct. 200; 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999); The\ 
Second Circuit has thus, but of "prudential 
concerns," hedged their trial courts' discre-
tion to proceed in a defendant's" absence hf 
imposing a judicially created balancing test 
not required by either thei federal rules or 
the tlnited States Cbnstitutibn/'We decline 
the invitation to 'adopt a similar balancing 
test in Utah. When a defendant's' absence1 
from a '(iriminal proceeding''is properly 
8. The fact that a defendant was informed of the 
time and place of the proceeding allows' a court 
. to presume that a defendant's absence therefrom 
is knowing, i.e., that the defendant,knows he. is 
missing the proceeding. The fact mat an absent 
defendant had notice of the proceeding does not, 
however, allow a presumption that absence 
therefrom is voluntary. See Houtz, 714 P.2d at 
678. After all, such a defendant may be incar-
ce ra ted on another charge or comatose in: a 
hospital. '' '-1 ' "•'••'• 
deemed knowing and voluntary, the trial 
court may proceed without further inquiry or 
analysis. Therefore* it was not error for the 
trial/court in this case* to fail to balance the-
public interest in proceeding against Wano-
sik's; interest in being present. 
C. Vbluhtanhess" Inquiry-v 
[9-11] 1f 19, We; hayerconclub^d,!(;hat a 
trial court is :not required, to warn a defen-
dant that trial or sentencing^may^proceed in 
the defendant's voluntary absence.*' We" have 
also concluded that a trial court is not re-
quired to balance the .public lnferest in .re-
solving the matter against'the defendant's 
interest in being present before proceeding 
in a defendant's voluntary afeehcei Howev-
e r / a trial court may not 'assume a'defen-
dant's knowing absence is voluntary; but 
rather is required to determine -whether a: 
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary.8 
See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678. (Utah 
1986) (per curiam). , We therefore review 
whether the trial court in this case properly1 
concluded that Wanosik's absence at sentenc- -
ing was actually voluntary. ••' 
• ' - . , • , • ) , - • • . . . . . . . . . . . 
1120 The sum of the trial court's oral find-
ings and; analysis'on':'the voluntariness of 
Wanosik's absence' 'at Sentencing is the fol-
lowing: '*, "I can only assume' because he has 
not been m touch with'[defense counsel] nor 
has he been: in touch with my court ihathe' 
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from*' 
these proceedings.'* We do 'not; question the' 
underlying findings of the trial court, i.e., 
that Wanosik -hid0 hot' been iti' touch with1' 
counsel or the court.' These bindings, howev^ 
er, suggest nothing more than that no one 
knew why Wanosik , was absent With f no 
reliable' information on the voluntariness of 
Wanosik's absence, the trial court merely^ 
assumed that Wanosik's absence was volun-
tary.10 • -; .,: ,,'.:.> • »•• .-• 
9. The trial court's written findings and conclu-
sions do not substantively differ'from what the 
court stated orally at.the hearing. , 
10. As'hereafter more' fully .explained, case law. 
rejects the legitimacy of'such an assumption, but* 
it is not intrinsically an unreasonable one. Sta-
tistically, the vast majority of court no-shows 
spaced it out, could not muster the courage or 
effort*to be present, or got sidetracked in some 
Volitional way. Only a tiny minority find them-
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[12-15] 1121 "[V]oluntariness<may not be 
presumed by the, trial court." Houtz, 714 
P.2d at 678.: Rather, an inquiry into/the 
defendant's, ability to appear at the proceed-
ing is required. See id. We have not previ-
ously detailed the type of inquiry required to. 
determine if a defendant's absence is volun-
tary. We have, however, outlined some gen-
eral principles: 
Voluntariness is determined by considering 
the totality of the circumstances. The 
state carries the burden of showing volun-
tariness. A defendant must have a com-
pelling reason to stay away from the trial. 
If his absence is deliberate without a sound 
reason, the trial may start in his absence. 
State..v. Wagstaff; 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (internal quotations and cita-
tions omitted). This case presents an oppor-
tunity to elaborate on these, general princi-
ples. 
[16,17] U 22 In such circumstances, the 
State must make a preliminary showing, 
based on reasonable inquiry,
 f that defendant's 
absence is voluntary. Except as ,'otherwise 
required by the attorney-client privilege, de-
fense counsel has an obligation to aid the 
State by being forthcoming with any infor-
mation defense counsel may have that could 
be helpful in determining the defendant's 
whereabouts or reasons, for jphe defendant's 
absence. When neither court nor counsel 
have information as to why the defendant is 
not present, a continuance will ordinarily be 
required.to allow the prosecution and defense 
counsel an opportunity to inquire into the 
defendant's whereabouts and the reasons for 
his absence. 
[18,19] 1f 23 Ascertaining whether a de-
fendant's absence is voluntary will often be 
difficult if the defendant is simply a no-show. 
While we need not in this case definitively 
prescribe what the State must do to meet its 
preliminary burden, and while the showing it 
must make will vary with the facts and cir-
cumstances of particular cases, some ave-
nues for establishing voluntariness are: (1) 
inquiry of law enforcement agencies to de-
selves comatose or otherwise involuntarily inca-
pacitated at the time of trial or sentencing. Even 
those who are incarcerated, assuming it is in this 
state, usually have the means to let their circum-
termine whether the defendant is incarcerat-
ed, see Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678 ("When a 
defendant is in custody, he is not free to 
make a voluntary decision about whether or 
not he will attend the court proceedings."); 
(2) inquiry of-local hospitals as to whether 
the defendant has been admitted to one of 
them, cf. State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642. 
(Utah-1982) (per curiam) ("Trial proceeded 
for four days, when on the fifth day, defen-
dant failed to appear. He was found in a 
Salt Lake City hospital suffering from a 
heart attack, diagnosed as minor. His doc-
tor contacted the court and recommended a 
one-month continuance."); (3) inquiry of the 
defendant's employer, if the employer can be 
readily determined, as to the employer's pos-
sible knowledge of the defendant's where-
abouts; (4) a reasonably diligent attempt to 
contact defendant at his residence or other 
place counsel knows the defendant to fre-
quent; (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or 
other entity supervising defendant's presen-
tence release; and (6) inquiry of any bail 
bond company or other person or entity 
posting bond to secure defendant's appear-
ance. Once inquiry appropriate to the case 
has been made, and a compelling reason for 
the defendant's absence remains unknown, 
voluntariness, while not guarantied, may 
then be properly inferred. 
1124 Defense counsel, however, must then 
have the opportunity to rebut the inference 
of voluntariness. Defense counsel may by 
that time have gathered additional informa-
tion regarding the defendant's whereabouts 
and may, for example, be able to contend 
that although no local hospital shows the,. 
defendant as currently registered, his room-
mate says he took him to the emergency 
room the previous evening, suggesting the 
possible involuntariness of the defendant's 
absence at a proceeding early the next morn-
ing. 
1125 In this case, the State made no pre-
liminary showing of voluntariness whatever, 
and the trial court erred by making "inade-
quate inquiry into [Wanosik's] ability to ap-
stances be known. Cf. In re A.E., 2001UT App 
202, H 5, 29 P.3d 31 ("Father'... was not trans-
ported from the jail for the trial because he did 
not inform jail officials of the trial dates."). 
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pear on [May 26, 2000] or his subsequent 
availability before deciding that he had 
waived his1 right to be present at [sentenc-
ing].". Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678, . • ^ : 
0i- D, Harmless Error - - ;; •/ 
[20,21] ; U 26 A trial court's error in fail-, 
ing to conduct an adequate inquiry into 
whether a defendant's absence Was voluntey^ 
does not merit reversal, however,'unless the: 
defendant was prejudiced by the lack of ade-
quate inquiry. See State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah 199.6) ("It stands to 
reason that a. defendant cannot demand reper 
tition of a trial or sentencing.in which>lie 
suffered no unfairness."). When finally ap-
prehended, Wanosik sent a letter.to the trial 
court candidly acknowledging: "I do not 
have a legitimate excuse" for not appearing 
for sentencing. Based on Wanosik's. subse-
quent concession of actual voluntary absence 
at sentencing, we conclude that. Wanosik suf-
fered no. prejudice, by the ,trial court's failure 
to make adequate mquiry into whether his 
absence was voluntary. Accordingly, the 
court's error in proceeding to impose sen-
tence was, in this case, harmless. .... ,, 
II. Sentencing' Procedure 
If 27 Wanosik. .argues that, even if .proceed-
ing with sentencing in. his absence-was ap-
propriate, "[t]he trial, court violated due pro-
cess and. Utah RCrim. P. 22[ (a) J when it 
sentenced [him] without considering relevant, 
and reliable information and without afford-
ing defense counsel or the prosecutor the. 
opportunity to J3peak at sentencing."n../ 
;
-"'
 V::/ ;A;' Rule 22(a) ' • ' • ' ; f - ' j 
[22] 1128 We first address Wanosik's 
claim that the trial court violated rule 22(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.11 
The .second paragraph of rule 22(a) states: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall 
afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any in-
11. The State asserts that Wanosik must show 
plain error with regard to his rule 22(a) claim on 
appeal because he did not preserve the'claim 
below. We observe ' 'that rule 22(e) [of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure] permits the court 
of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on 
formation in mitigation of punishment, ot-
to show ' any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting; 
attorney shall also be given an opportunity 
to present any .information material to the 
.. imposition of sentence. 
Utah 'R.Crim. P. 22(a^ Initially, we must 
determine whether Wanosik waived ', nis. 
rights under rule 22(a) by voluntarily absent-
ing' himself from the sentencing proceeding.' 
[23,24] H 29 A defendant's personal exer-
cise of .the rights granted in rule 22(a) is 
referred to as allocution."; See State v. 
Anderson, 929 P,2d 1107,; 1110-1^; (Utah 
1996); State 1 KelbacK & Utah 2d 231, 461 
P.2d 297, 299 (1969), vacated and remanded, 
408 U.S. ^35, 92 S.Ct. 2i858; 33 L.Ed.2d 551 
(1972). "[Allocution] is: an inseparable part 
of the right to be present, which [a] defen-
dant waive[s] by his voluntary, absence." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Wanosik, ;there^ 
fore, .by his voluntary absence, waived the 
right' to personally make a statement at seh-
tencihg and to personaUy ^presentinforma-
tion in mitigation of punishmentorto_,$how 
legal cause why sentence should not be im-
posed. See id. / 
[25-27] 1130 A defendant does not/ how-
ever, altogether waive- his
 t rule 22(a) rights 
through voluntary absence at sentencing; he 
waives.only the .right,to personally exercise 
them. ".Sentencing is a .critical stage of a. 
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to. the effective assistance of coun? 
se\;i State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007. 
(Utah. 1982), and the right to effective assis-
tance, of counsel cannot be waived through. 
voluntary absence alone. See State v.. Baka-
lov,im UT 45, 1116, 979 P.2d 799 (holding 
that, in order to waive the right to Counsel 
and "invoke the right of self-represejitation, 
a defendant must in a timely manner' "clear-
ly and Uriequiv6caHy"; ''request,[self-repre-
sentation]" ;r(citations omitted))., ..Further-
more), rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the 
appeal." State v. Brooks, 908' P.2d 856; 860 
(Utah 1995). The Brooks holding obviates the 
need for appellants to show plain error in assert-
ing on appeal unpreserved claims that the sen-
tence imposed by the trial court was illegal. See 
id. at 858-60. ' ' "'.,. 
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sentencing court to "give[ ] [the prosecuting 
attorney] an opportunity to present any in-
formation material to the imposition of sen-
tence." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). It would be 
patently unfair, in the case-of .an absent 
defendant, to hear only from the prosecuting 
attorney and not from defense counsel re-
garding sentencing considerations. Thus,' we 
hold that a sentencing court is required, to 
afford a voluntarily absent defendant the op-
portunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rights 
through counsel. . ' •''•.:• ' :••'•.) 
If 31 At sentencing in this case, the trial 
court did hear briefly from defense counsel 
on the issue of Wanosik's absence concerning 
any "legal cause why sentence should not 
[have been] imposed" at that time, Utah 
R.Crim. P. 22(a); briefly addressed that is-
sue as discussed above; and then proceeded 
to impose sentence. However, before pro-
ceeding with sentencing, the trial court heard 
from neither defense counsel nor the prose-
cutor with regard to "information" in mitiga-
tion of punishment" or "any [other] informa-, 
tion material to the imposition, of sentence." 
Id. The State argues that under rule 22(a) 
the burden rests on counsel to request an 
opportunity to present information relevant 
to sentencing. The State's argument is con-
trary to the plain language of the rule and 
the construction given it in case law., 
ff 32 The language of the rule is that "the 
court shall afford the defendant an: opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of punishment." 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative obli-
gation on the trial court to extend the oppor-
tunity to be heard; it does not contemplate 
12. Howell actually interpreted the predecessor of 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a), Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982). See 707 P.2d 
at 118. Current rule 22(a) differs from then-
section 77-35-22(a) only in.that rule 22(a) omits 
the words "in his own behalf' from section 77-
35-22(a)'s sentence: "Before imposing sentence 
the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to 
present any information in mitigation of punish-
ment. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22 (a) (1982) 
(emphasis added). See also. Utah R.Crim. P. 
22(a). If anything, deletion of the italicized 
phrase emphasizes that while defendant is enti-
tled to make a statement, he need not personally 
make it. 
ig the court will. passively wait for, counsel to 
i- make a request to be heard. Furthermore* 
i- the Utah Supreme Court has said that rule, 
'e 22(a) "directs trial courts to hear, evidence 
it from both the defendant and the prosecution 
g that is relevant to the sentence to be im-
J- posed." State v. Howell, 707 P£d;115, 118 
e (Utah 1985).12 This, directive is nowhere 
0
 made conditional on a preliminary request by 
,T. counsel to present the information. Even if 
s
 a defendant is voluntarily absent, the trial 
court has the duty to set its aggravation 
j aside and impose a reasonable sentence, and 
j to that end the court is required to hear 
y evidence from both sides relevant to sentenc-
ing. The onus is thus on the trial court to 
i "afford" the defendant and to "give" the 
- prosecutor the opportunity to present rele-
i vant information.13 Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). 
- The trial court in this case erred by not 
3 affording defense counsel an opportunity to 
- present information in mitigation of punish-
- ment or giving the prosecutor an opportunity 
-. to present information relevant to sentenc-
ing. 
) • • • : ; . : • • • . • • _ • « v - - " 
1
 [28] 1133 Noncompliance with rule 22(a) 
' in this case was not harmless, as the State 
suggests. Had either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor been given a chance to address 
AP & P's recommendation that Wanosik be 
: sentenced to 20 days in jail with credit for 
time served and that he then be committed 
• to a substance abuse treatment program, the 
• sentencing outcome for Wanosik may well 
have been more favorable than the maximum 
sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus, 
we vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand 
for resentencing. 
13. We [here] note that it is not just the defen-; 
. dant, but the State as we'll, that has an interest 
" in the sentence being based on accurate infor-
mation. Decisions as to the type of rehabilita-
. tion program, if any, to which a defendant is 
assigned and the duration of incarceration 
both influence the allocation of scarce person-
nel and monetary resources. Such decisions 
should be based upon the most reliable data 
•:. possible as to each defendant so that this State 
may deal with its criminal justice program as 
efficiently as possible. 
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 
1982). ' . . . rv , 
•>. ESTATE v. ' 
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B. Due Process Requirements 
at Sentencing >\ 
[29-32] 1134 Due Process considerations' 
underscore the propriety of our remand for 
resentencing. "The due process clause of 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
requires that a sentencing judge act on rea-
sonably reliable and relevant information iir 
exercising discretion in fixing a' sentence." 
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah' 
1985). "A sentence in a criminal'case should,, 
be appropriate for the' defendant in light of 
his background and the crime committed and 
also serve the interests of society which -un-
derlie the criminal'justice system." State v. 
McClendon, 611 P i d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). 
"[T]he sentencing judge[ ][has] discretion in 
determining what punishment fits both'the 
crime and the offender," but we have consis-
tently sought "to shore up the soundness and 
reliability of the factual basis upon which the 
judge must rely in the exercise of that sen-
tencing discretion/' State v.. Lipsky, 608' 
P.2d 1241,1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring disclo-
sure of presentence report to defendant prior 
to sentencing). Although rule 22(a) imple-
ments sound procedures ainied at insuring 
that the trial court bases its sentencing deciJ 
sion on such, information, a- criminal defen-
dant's right to be sentenced based-on rele-
vant and reliable information regarding his 
crime, his background, and the interests of 
society stands independent of -Utah .Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 22(a). .-__./ ,.:;i.:. 
1135 The; record in this case fails to dis-
close any relevant i: or reliable information, 
other than the fact that defendant was ab* 
sent from the proceeding, relied on by the 
trial court in imposing maximum—albeit con-
current—sentences for both crimes. '•V6iun-
tary absence from sentencing may properly 
serve as one factor m determining an appro* 
priate sentence, as it is aniindirect—but tellri 
ing—indication of the defendant's suitability 
for probation or susceptibility !to rehabilita-
tive efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to' 
rely upon that fact alone in deciding what 
sentence to impose, nor may such absence be 
punished by imposing a sentence more se-
vere than is otherwise warranted., Fromn all 
that appears in the record, however,: Wano-
sik's absence at sentencing was; the .only 'inr 
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formation considered by the trial court in 
deciding,what sentences to impose. 
^1f36 Wanosik's- Due Process rights were 
compromised by the trial *court?s failure to 
base its sentencing decision on relevant and 
reliable information - regarding the crime, 
Wanosik's background, and the interests of 
society. For the same reasons noted in the 
preceding section, the trial court's'failure to 
base its sentencing decision on relevant and 
reliable information was not harmjess.
 ; , 
CONCLUSION 
,H 37 A defendant informed of the time and 
place for'sentencing need not be further 
informed that sentencing may proceed in the 
defendant's voluntary absence.
 t Further-
more, a sentencing court need not balance 
society's interest in proceeding against a vol-
untarily absent defendant with. the. defen-
dant's interest in being present before pro-
ceeding with sentencing in-absentia. In.this 
case, the trial court's only ercor in regard to 
proceeding in absentia was,;.its inadequate 
inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Wan-
osik's absence.
 ; The > error, was,; however, 
harmless given Wanosik's later concession 
that his absence, was indeed voluntary.. 
If 38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in 
not complying with Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(a) by failing to aiford defen-
dant, through his counsel, an opportunity to 
present information in. mitigation of punish-
ment and by failing to also give the prosecu-
tor an opportunity to- present"' information 
relevant to sentencing. This course was also 
at odds with Wanosik's. Due^  Process rights, 
as, the court failed to. base, its ~.(sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliablei .information. 
'• f 39 We vacate. Wanosik's sentences and 
remand for resentencing;; i. 
/:MT 40 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, 
WILLIAM A; THORNE, Jr., Judge/ -
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5.2 acres in lieu thereof. The evidence is in 
dispute as to why plaintiffs did not deliver 
a deed to the designated 4.24 acres, al-
though it is undisputed that defendant did 
not pay the sum due nor tender his per-
formance. Thereafter, plaintiffs served no-
tice of default, and ultimately initiated this 
lawsuit. From a judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs' terminating the contract, defend-
ant appeals. 
[1] Defendant's first contention on ap-
peal is that his duty to pay and plaintiffs' 
duty to convey were concurrent acts and 
that neither could put the other in default 
without a tender of performance. Defend-
ant further contends that he was excused 
from tendering his own performance be-
cause plaintiffs' alleged refusal to convey 
the designated acreage constituted a repu-
diation or anticipatory breach of the con-
tract. 
Defendant cites and relies upon the case 
of Johnson v. Jones1 as supportive of his 
position. However, his reliance is mis-
placed. That case restates the familiar rule 
of law that: 
There is implied in an agreement for the 
sale of real estate, unless a contrary in-
tention is expressed, that the vendor shall 
retain title until the balance of the pur-
chase price is paid. . Where there is an 
agreement on the part of one to convey 
and on the part of another to pay a 
definite sum, payment and conveyance 
are concurrent acts, unless a contrary in-
tention appears. [Emphasis added.] 
In the instant case, a contrary intention 
does appear in the clear, unambiguous 
terms of the contract of the parties by 
which they are bound. Plaintiffs' perform-
ance of conveyance is conditioned upon and 
not concurrent with defendant's perform-
ance of payment. This is to be seen in the 
language of the initial contract which pro-
vides in paragraph 19 thereof that: 
The Seller on receiving the payments 
herein reserved to be paid . . . agrees to 
1. 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893 (1946). 
2. Utah, 645 P.2d 52 (1982). 
execute and deliver to the Buyer . . . title 
to the above described premises . . . . 
[Emphasis added.] 
Like language is found in the addendum 
agreement, wherein it provides: 
[U]pon receipt of said payment, Sellers 
will release to Buyer 4.24 acres of land 
The rule of law recited in Johnson v. 
Jones, supra, causes no hardship on a buyer. 
If there is a basis for apprehension that the 
seller will not, or cannot perform, the buyer 
need only tender payment and demand the 
seller's performance. 
[2] In the instant case, defendant con-
cedes that he made no tender of payment, 
his remaining contention on appeal being 
that he was excused therefrom. 
This is not a case like Century 21 All 
Western Real Estate v. Webb,2 Where the 
facts were undisputed that the seller refus-
ed to convey property free and clear of 
encumbrances and the buyer refused to pay 
unless the seller removed the encum-
brances. Under those circumstances, we 
concluded that neither party could default 
the other without first making a tender of 
his own agreed performance. 
In this case, there is a dispute in the 
evidence. Therefore, it lies within the pre-
rogative of the trial court to determine 
where the truth lies, and the rules of appel-
late review preclude this Court from substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the trial 
court in resolving issues of fact.3 
There is substantial evidence in the rec-
ord which supports' the conclusion of the 
trial court that plaintiffs did not refuse to 
convey, but simply declined to do so unless 
and until payment was received. /Not hav-
ing made or tendered payment, defendant's 
contention of error is without merit. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
3. Reimschiissel v. Russell, Utah, 649 P.2d 26 
(1982). 
O l A l f l Y. 
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OAKS, Justice (dissenting): 
The buyer had paid $120,395 of the $245,-
000 principal due on the purchase of the 20 
acres. An additional payment of $50,895 
was due on February 2, 1980. Under the 
amended agreement, the buyer was entitled 
to designate 4.24 acres of the subject prop-
erty for conveyance to him upon making 
this payment. He made a timely designa-
tion and offered to make the Feb. 2, 1980 
payment (though not formally tendering 
the money), but the seller disputed the acre-
age chosen and offered an alternative 5.2 
acres instead. Six weeks after the due 
date, the seller served a notice of default, 
and one week later the seller brought this 
suit and obtained a decree forfeiting the 
buyer's interest. The majority affirms that 
decree on the basis that the seller's agree-
ment to convey the 4.24 acres was "condi-
tioned upon and not concurrent with" the 
buyer's payment, and the buyer made no 
payment or tender of payment. 
The buyer's payment and the seller's par-
tial conveyance were concurrent conditions. 
Simultaneous obligations, each dependent 
upon the other, are commonplace in real 
estate contracts. Such obligations should 
be interpreted as concurrent conditions un-
less the contract clearly directs otherwise. 
The language in this contract ("upon re-
ceipt of said payment, Sellers will release to 
Buyer 4.24 acres of land") does not make 
these obligations other than concurrent con-
ditions. 
As we said in Century 21 All Western 
Real Estate' v. Webb, Utah, 645 P.2d 52 
(1982); a contract that contemplates simul-
taneous performance by both parties—i.e., 
concurrent conditions—can. pose "precisely 
the sort of deadlock meant.to be resolved 
by the requirement of tender." Id. at 55. 
In that circumstance, we held, 
[N]either party can be said to be in de-
fault (and thus susceptible to a judgment 
for damages or a decree for specific per-
formance) until the other party has ten-
. dered his own performance. 6 Corbin on 
Contracts § 1258 (1962). > In.other words, 
the party who desires to use legal process 
. to exercise his legal remedies under such 
^AOAivJCi^ u t a n J.VUO 
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a contract must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the 
other party in default Huck v. Hayes, 
[Utah, 560 P.2d 1124 (1977)]; 15 Willi-
ston on Contracts § 1809 (3d ed. W. Jae-
ger 1972). [Emphasis supplied.] 
Id. at 56. 
Under the quoted rule, the district court's 
finding that this buyer made no payment or 
tender of payment would prevent the buyer 
from suing for specific performance of the 
seller's promise to make the partial convey-
ance. But the buyer's nonperformance does 
not entitle the seller to a decree forfeiting 
the buyer's interest unless the seller has 
tendered performance of his own concur-
rent obligation—to convey the acreage des-
ignated by the buyer. Since the seller 
made no such allegation and the court made 
no such finding, the decree of forfeiture 
was inappropriate. I would reverse. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opin-
ion of OAKS, J. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. : 
Steven Michael CASAREZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16997. 
Supreme Court of Utah; 
Dec. 9, 1982. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., J., of aggravated sexual as-
sault, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that full disclosure 
of presentence report should be made ex-
cept that identify indicia of person who 
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would be sentenced may be ev.-ln^d from 
report. 
Affirmed, vacated and rei • rl. 
, Hall, C.J., concurred in re, 
1. Criminal Law <§=>988 
Sentencing is critical stage of criminal 
proceeding at which defendant is entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law «»986.1 
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at 
sentencing phase of trial as at guilt phase. 
3. Criminal Law «==>986.5 
If defendant cannot inspect contents of 
presentence report, his constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel at time of 
sentencing is seriously impaired if judge 
may rely on information which may be inac-
curate and is unknown to defendant, U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
4. Constitutional Law ^=>48(1) 
Statutes to 181(1) 
It is policy of court to construe statutes 
when possible to effectuate legislative in-
' tent and to avoid potential constitutional 
conflicts. 
5. Criminal Law <e=978 
Statute providing that court may dis-
close all parts of presentence report to de-
fendant or his counsel as interest of justice 
requires was not intended to make disclo-
sure of presentence report depend on per-
sonal whim or subjective standard of indi-
vidual judge; rather, Legislature expressly 
provided that exercise of discretion should 
be guided as "the interest of justice re-
quires" and, thus, statute was constitution-
al. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-1(2). 
6. Criminal Law «=> 986.5 
Only when disclosure of presentence 
report will jeopardize life or safety of third 
parties should there be deletions from re-
port to protect them and, in such cases, 
disclosure to defendant of as much of report 
as possible should be made. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18-1(2). 
7. Criminal Law «=> 339.5, 1169.5(2) 
In prosecution for aggravated sexual 
assault, inasmuch as whether .defendant 
took bus home or drove home was not mate-
rial to central issue of whether he was 
guilty, it was error to admit evidence com-
paring his footprints in area where rape 
occurred with footprints around a stolen 
vehicle later found near defendant's resi-
dence; however, court's striking of that 
part of testimony relating to stolen car and 
its subsequent admonishment and instruc-
tion to jury to disregard stricken evidence 
was sufficient remedy under circumstances. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30. 
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Joseph P. McCarthy, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant was convicted of two counts 
of aggravated sexual assault, one for rape 
and one for sodomy, in violation of U.C.A., 
1953, § 76-5-405. He contends that the 
trial court erred in 1) denying him access to 
his presentence report prior to sentencing; 
2) admitting evidence of another crime; 
and 3) denying him his statutory right of 
allocation at the time of sentencing. 
As is to be expected, the testimony of the 
prosecutrix and the defendant are in con-
flict. We, of course, accept that version of 
the facts which supports the jury's verdict. 
E.g., State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91 
(1982). 
The prosecutrix testified that at approxi-
mately 9:00 p.m. on December 21, 1979, she 
parked her car on First South and State 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and proceed-
ed to her place of employment. She was 
confronted on the street by the defendant 
who told her that he was a prison escapee 
and needed her car and warned her that if 
she did not comply with his wishes he would 
kill her. At defendant's instruction the 
prosecutrix walked back to her car. The 
defendant pushed her into the car, drove a 
STATE v. 
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few blocks, and stopped the car. After two 
acts of sexual assault, rape, and forcible 
sodomy, the prosecutrix bit the defendant, 
who then struck her in the face. During 
the ensuing commotion the prosecutrix es-
caped from the car. The driver of a passing 
car took her to the rape crisis center at 
Holy Cross Hospital. An emergency room 
physician examined the victim that evening 
and the defendant the following morning. 
At trial the physician testified that the 
bruises on the prosecutrix and the defend-
ant were consistent with the prosecutrix's 
testimony. Other facts in support of the 
State's case need not be recounted. 
The defendant testified that he had 
stopped to ask the prosecutrix for the time. 
He then asked her if she would like to go 
out and have a good time, and she accepted 
the invitation. He drove her a couple of 
blocks and stopped. According to defend-
ant, the prosecutrix then engaged in sex 
acts with him voluntarily, upon the conclu-
sion of which she unexpectedly bit him, and 
after being struck by defendant, she fled 
the car in fear. Defendant stated that he 
then also left the car and took a bus home. 
On appeal the defendant contends that 
the imposition of the sentence was improper 
because the trial court did not, prior to 
sentencing, give him access to the presen-
tence report as required by State v. Lipsky, 
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241 (1980). The State 
counters with the argument that an amend-
ment to U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(2), enacted 
subsequent to the decision in Lipsky, modi-
fied the rule in that case and justified the 
trial court's discretionary refusal to give 
the defendant the presentence report. 
That amendment reads: 
Prior to imposition of any sentence for 
an offense for which. probation may be 
granted, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date 
for the imposition of sentence for a rea-
sonable period of time for the purpose of 
obtaining a presentence report on the de-
fendant. . . . The contents of the report 
shall be confidential. The court may dis-
close all or parts of the report to the 
defendant or his counsel as the interest of 
justice requires. [Emphasis added.] 
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On the basis of that provision, the State 
argues that the trial judge acted within the 
proper bounds of discretion in not disclosing 
the report. 
[1-3] Sentencing is a critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. Kg., Mempav. May, 389 U.S. 128, 88 
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Specht v. 
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 
L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). 
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the 
sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt 
phase. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16, 
99 S.Ct. 235, 236, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 
1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), held that it is a 
denial of due process in a capital case to 
sentence a defendant on the basis of confi-
dential information not disclosed to a de-
fendant or his counsel. In Lipsky, a non-
capital case, this Court held on a due proc-
ess analysis that "fundamental fairness" re-
quires that a defendant have the right to 
inspect a presentence report prior,to sen-
tencing so that a sentence will not be influ-
enced by inaccurate information. 608 P.2d 
at 1248. Furthermore, if the defendant 
cannot inspect the contents of the presen-
tence report, his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel at the time 
of sentencing is seriously impaired if a 
judge may rely on information which may 
be inaccurate and is unknown to the de-
fendant. 
A number of other courts have held that 
fundamental fairness requires disclosure of 
the presentence report. See, e.g., Buchea v, 
Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 (1972); 
State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 
(1969); Jones v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 477 
P.2d 85 (1970). This rule is implicit in sev-
eral more recent cases. For example, in 
State v. Lockwood, La., 399 So.2d 190 
(1981), the court approved disclosure and 
held that a defendant, who alleged that 
false and prejudicial statements were con-
tained in his presentence report, was enti-
tled to an opportunity to refute or explain 
IUUS Utan ooo rAi^in.^ ivrijrwxviJCJK^ ^u orjjtvijDo 
even though the trial court contended that 
its decision was unaffected by the report. 
In State v. Phelps, N.D., 297 N.W.2d 769 
(1980), the court held that the trial court 
acted unreasonably and abused its discre-
tion in allowing defendant's counsel insuffi-
cient time to read and investigate a presen-
tence report which contained a complicated 
medical history. And in Ho well v. State, 
Del, 421 A.2d 892 (1980), the court, constru-
ing a statute which provided that the trial 
court "may, in its discretion, permit the 
inspection of the [presentence] report, or 
parts thereof by the offender or his attor-
ney," id. at 900, stated in dictum that "[fail-
ure to disclose the investigative portion of 
a presentence report to counsel for a crimi-
nal defendant may 4in practical effect' be 
equivalent to denial of access to counsel." 
Id. at 900 (quoting in part from United 
States v. Verdugo, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 
1968), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct. 
1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971). 
Except for the very rare possibility when 
disclosure might lead to harm of a third 
person, there is no substantial reason for 
sentencing criminal defendants on the basis 
of confidential information gleaned from a 
variety of more-or-less reliable sources 
without affording those defendants some 
opportunity to point out mistakes in that 
information. It is essential to both the 
form and substance of a fair proceeding 
that the defendant have the right to point 
out errors, misinterpretations, or even to 
demonstrate that he is not in fact the per-
son who is the subject of the report. Such 
errors are not unknown. Particularly when 
the criminal justice system is being pressed 
to deal with ever more criminal defendants 
on an impersonal basis not unlike an assem-
bly line, the possibility of error becomes 
even greater. If a defendant were not 
allowed to correct an error at the time of 
sentencing, the error is likely to go unde-
tected for as long as the defendant remains 
subject to the criminal justice system since 
the presentence report remains in the file 
on the defendant and is used by the Board 
of Pardons and other authorities in making 
decisions as to the length and terms of his 
incarceration, rehabilitation, and parole. 
We also note that it is not just the de-
fendant, but the State as well, that has an 
interest in the sentence being based on ac-
curate information. Decisions as to the 
type of rehabilitation program, if any, to 
which a defendant is assigned and the dura-
tion of incarceration both influence the allo-
cation of scarce personnel and monetary 
resources. Such decisions should be based 
upon the most reliable data possible as to 
each defendant so that this State may deal 
with its criminal justice program as effi-
ciently as possible. 
[4-6] It does not follow, however, that 
§ 77-18-1(2) is unconstitutional. It is the 
policy of the Court to construe statutes 
when possible to effectuate the legislative 
intent and to avoid potential constitutional 
conflicts. E.g., State v. Wood, Utah, 648 
P.2d 71, 82 (1982); In re Boyer, Utah, 636 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1982). In accord with this 
approach, we find no difficulty in reconcil-
ing the defendant's right to disclosure with 
the language of § 77-18-1(2). That provi-
sion was not intended to make disclosure of 
a presentence report depend on a personal 
whim or a subjective standard of an individ-
ual judge. The interests at stake are far 
too important for that. Rather, the Legis-
lature expressly provided that the exercise 
of discretion should be guided as "the inter-
est of justice requires." Under that stan-
dard, it is the exceptional case where full 
disclosure is not justified. Only when dis-
closure of the presentence report would 
jeopardize the life or safety of third parties, 
should there be deletions from the report to 
protect them. In such cases, disclosure to a 
defendant of as much of the report as possi-
ble should be made. Identifying indicia of 
a person who would be threatened should 
be excluded from the report, sealed, and 
included in the record on appeal. In all 
other cases, full disclosure of the report 
should be made. 
Finally, it is of no moment that the trial 
court may disregard the presentence report 
altogether in imposing a sentence. A de-
fendant still has a right to disclosure of the 
report because of the subsequent uses made 
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of it. State v. Lockwood, La. 399 So.2d 190 circumstances. 
(1981). 
[7] Defendant also alleges error in the 
admission of evidence comparing his foot-
prints in the area where the rape occurred 
with footprints around a stolen vehicle later 
found near defendant's residence. Defend-
ant argues that the evidence was improper-
ly offered to link him with a separate, unre-
lated crime. The State contends that the 
evidence was admissible to contradict de-
fendant's testimony that he took a bus 
home from the scene of the crime, and 
thereby attack the defendant's credibility. 
Whether the defendant took the bus 
home or drove home was not material to 
the central issue of whether he was guilty 
of aggravated sexual assault. There was 
no need to prove how the defendant re-
turned home. The testimony was neither 
background evidence useful to establish the 
circumstances surrounding the commission 
of the crime nor did it shed any light on 
defendant's conduct which might tend to 
show a consciousness of guilt. The only 
possible materiality of the evidence was 
with respect to defendant's credibility. The 
inference that he drove a stolen car home is 
indeed inconsistent with his testimony of 
taking the bus home. However, not every 
inconsistency is admissible on the theory 
that it bears on credibility. The law is that 
a witness may not be impeached on matters 
collateral to the principal issues being tried. 
E.g., State v. Oswalt, 62 Wash.2d 118, 381 
P.2d 617 (1963); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 
in Trials at-Common Law §§ 1000-1003 
(Chadboum rev. 1970). The manner in 
which defendant returned home following 
the crime is a collateral issue; therefore, 
impeachment evidence on that issue was 
inadmissible. 
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On no reasonable view of 
the evidence did the objectionable evidence 
taint the fairness of the trial. 
Defendant also complains that he was not 
afforded his statutory right of allocution 
before sentence was imposed. See U.C.A., 
1953, § 77-35~22(a). We have reviewed 
the record and conclude the allegation is 
without merit. 
The conviction is affirmed, but the sen-
tence is vacated. The case is remanded for 
the defendant to review and verify the con-
tents of the presentence report, unless the 
narrow exception above defined applies, 
and for the trial judge to resentence the 
defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis. 
Affirmed. 
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., con-
cur. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result. 
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Wendell Alan JENSEN and Ann Jensen, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 17754. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 10, 1982. 
However, the admission of the evidence 
was harmless. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-
30. Even assuming the evidence was of-
fered to link defendant with an uncharged 
crime, the court's striking of that part of 
the testimony relating to a stolen car and 
its subsequent admonishment and instruc-
tion to the jury to disregard the stricken 
evidence was a sufficient remedy under the 
Bank brought action seeking money 
judgment against defendants for unpaid 
balance on defendants' credit card account. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., entered default judg-
ment against defendants and denied de-
fendants' motion to set aside the default, 
and defendants appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) summons 
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James W. MENEFIELD, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
Robert G. BORG, Warden 
Respondent- Appel let 
No. 87-6651. 
Un States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
Argue nd Submitted Oct, 31, 1988. 
ecided Aug. 2, 1989. 
Defendant convicted of burglary peti-
tioned for writ of habeas corpus. The 
United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, Alice Marie H. Stot-
ler, J., denied relief, and appeal was taken. 
The Court of Appeals, Bernhardt, Circuit. 
Judge, held that defendant who requested 
attorney at time of motion for new trial 
was entitled to have one appointed, though 
he had waived his right to counsel and 
represented himself at trial, absent show-
ing that request was made for bad-faith 
purpose. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law €=641.3(2) 
Criminal defendant's constitutional 
right to counsel in critical stage of prosecu-
tion cannot: be denied absent compelling 
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.3(4) 
Under California law, motion for new 
trial is critical stage of prosecution, for 
purposes of determining . whether Sixth 
Amendment protections attach. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6; West's Ann.Cal.Penal 
Code § 1181. 
1. Although the record before us does not in-
clude the court's inquiry into the voluntariness 
of appellant's waiver of the right to counsel, it 
does include the trial court's recollection of ear-
lier hearings. 
THE COURT: Mr. Menefield, I suspect Judge 
Miller talked about the issue of you represent-
ing yourself. You have probably been over that 
a lot. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, he did. 
3. Criminal Law ®=»641.3(4) 
Defendant who requested attorney at 
time of motion for new trial was entitled to 
have one appointed, though he had waived 
his right to counsel and represented him-
self at trial, absent showing that request 
was made for bad-faith purpose. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
James W. Menefield, Techachapi, CaL, in 
pro per, 
Donald F. Roet , Deputy Atty. Gen., 
Los Angeles, Cal respondent-appellee. 
Appeal from tht* United States District 
"jurt for the Centra District of California. 
= -z--re SCHROEDER, REINHARDT 
ar^ ISAVY, Circuit Judges. 
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 
I. 
Appellant James Menefield, presently 
serving a twenty-nine year, 10 month sen-
tence in.California state prison, appeals the 
denial of his petition for habeas corpus. 
Menefield argues that the state trial court 
violated the Sixth Amendment when it re-
fused his request for assistance of counsel 
in the preparation of a motion for a new 
trial. 
In 1984, Menefield was arrested and 
brought to trial for burglary, attempted 
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, 
mayhem, and armed robbery. At pretrial 
proceedings, he was successively represent-
ed by two attorneys, and dismissed each in 
turn. After failing to achieve a working 
relationship with appointed counsel, Mene-
field asserted his right to self-representa-
tion.1 Appellant represented himself dur-
THE COURT: You're convinced you want to do 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: I am not going to hassle you 
about it. I asked Judge Miller the simple ques-
tion, is this guy some nut that's trying to turn a 
courtroom into a circus or is it a guy that wants 
to defend himself? And he said you are legit-
imately interested in doing your best to try the 
case. And, you know, that's cool. 
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ing extensive pretrial proceedings and then 
during a protracted trial. After his convic-
tion on all counts, Menefield asked the 
court to appoint counsel to assist him in the 
preparation of a motion for a new trial. . 
His request concentrated upon the intrica-
cies of the California statute governing 
new trials. "I've studied it, but I just can't 
grasp it. I see what they're saying, but I ' 
just can't get deep off into it, Tike the other 
studies I did." The trial court denied the 
motion, citing two factors. First, the judge 
feared that the proceedings would be de-
layed while counsel familiarized himself 
with the transcript and the issues in the 
case. Second, although California grants a 
statutory right to petition the trial court 
for a new trial, the court concluded that the 
statute confers no substantive rights that 
could not later be raised on appeal. 
"To tell the truth, if I appointed coun-
sel at this point, we would have to get 
the entire transcript done, he would have 
to read every word of it to make the 
motion. Since its denial is going to re-
sult in the appeal, it seems to me the 
most appropriate thing is to wait for that 
time, or to say it differently, even though 
you waived your rights to counsel under 
the Faretta case that you are very famil-
iar with, if I could see any significant 
impact that appointing counsel at this 
stage, and we are only talking about new 
trial motion for a practical matter, I 
would, go ahead and do it, but I can't, so 
I am going to deny that." 
Appellant's subsequent pro se motion for a 
new trial was denied. • After exhausting his 
state remedies, appellant sought a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court. The dis-
trict court, adopting the magistrate's find-
ings of law and fact, dismissed the petition. 
Menefield appealed, and we reverse. :;•. • 
II. 
A. 
The right of self-representation, long rec-
ognized in statute, first explicitly fell under 
On appeal, Menefield does not contest whether 
the trial court's inquiry satisfied the knowing 
and intelligent waiver standard articulated in 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 
2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We there-
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the protection of the Constitution in Faret-
ta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In Faretta, 
the Supreme Court, while noting the ten-
sion between a right of self-representation 
and the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel, concluded that the 
principles of free choice and human dignity 
woven through the Bill of Rights dictate 
deference to a defendant's decisions to pro-
ceed without a lawyer. "It is the defen-
dant . . . who must be free personally to 
decide whether in his particular case coun-
sel is to his advantage. And although he 
may conduct his own defense ultimately to 
his own detriment, his choice must be hon-
ored out of 'that respect for the individual 
which is the lifeblood of the lawl' " Id. at 
834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Illinois v. 
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 9G: S.Ct. 1057, 
1064, 25 L.Ed^d 353J1970) (Brennan, J , 
concurring)). 
Faretta struck the fundamental constitu-
tional balance between the right to counsel 
and the right to self-representation; how-
ever, certain problems were clearly antici-
pated from the first formulation of the 
doctrine. Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the three dissenters, pointed out that Far-
etta left unresolved a series of important' 
issues and questioned the federal court's 
ability to reconcile the procedural dilemmas 
raised by the self-representation rule, 
"How soon in the criminal proceeding must 
a defendant decide between proceeding by 
counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to 
switch in midtriaU"Faretta,l422 U.S. at 
852, 95 S.Ct. at 2549 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).2 The dissenters an-
ticipated that "these questions . . . [would] 
. . . be answered with finality in due 
course," id , and the issue of waiver "and 
reassertibn of the right to counsel has been 
frequently addressed in state or federal 
court. Although we have previously con-
sidered the interaction of the right to coun-
fore do not consider the constitutionality of the 
state waiver inquiry. 
2. The question in this case, of course, does not 
involve a midtrial switch but, instead, a change 
of course in a post-trial proceeding.
 : 
w
 sel and the right to self-representation in 
the context of pretrial and trial proceed-
ings, we now face a question of first im-
pression in our circuit: is a criminal defen-
dant entitled to the assistance of an attor-
ney at a post-trial hearing when prior to 
trial he waived the right to counsel and 
chose to represent himself? 
B. 
[1] Faretta notwithstanding, we have 
long recognized that the right to counsel is 
among the most fundamental rights of our 
criminal justice system. "Of all the rights 
that an accused person has, the right to be 
represented by counsel is by far the most 
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert 
any other right he may have." Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. — , , 109 S.Ct. 346, 
352, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (quoting Schae-
fer, Federalism and State Criminal Pro-
cedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). Our 
adversary system is premised on the theory 
that the clash of trained counsel will best 
serve the court's truth-seeking function. 
Without the "guiding hand of counsel," the 
defendant may be unable to muster an 
adequate defense. See Argersinger v.. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31, 92 S.Ct. 2006,. 
2009, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S.Ct.., 
792, 796-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Absence 
of counsel may frustrate the truth-seeking, 
and fairness goals of the system. Justice 
Sutherland's observations, clear and accu-
rate in 1932, are no less valid today. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman 
has small and sometimes no skill in the 
science of law. If charged with crime, 
he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is 
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence. Left without the aid. 
of counsel he may be put on trial without 
a proper charge and convicted upon in-
competent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissi-
ble. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, 
even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against 
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, 
he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish 
his innocence. 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 
S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Because 
of the centrality of the right to counsel, we 
will not deny a defendant that right during 
a critical stage of the prosecution unless 
compelling circumstances require us to do 
so. 
C. 
Before discussing the interaction be-
tween the Faretta right and the right to 
counsel, we must first answer the question 
whether a defendant possesses the latter 
right at the time of the motion for a new 
trial. The right to effective assistance of 
counsel only attaches to certain parts of 
the criminal prosecution. The right to 
counsel was originally a trial right, but the 
Sixth Amendment provision of effective as-
sistance of counsel has been extended to 
various "critical" stages of the prosecution. 
See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 
471, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1877, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 
(1981) (psychiatric interview); Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 
L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (sentencing); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 
18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (pre-trial line-up); 
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 
1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (preliminary 
hearings). See also Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 
811 (1963) (appeals). But cf. United States 
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 
L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (photographic arrays). 
Critical stages of the prosecution include 
all parts of the prosecution implicating sub-
stantial rights of the accused. Mempa, 389 
U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. at 256. 
[2] Since this circuit has never settled 
the question of whether a motion for a new 
trial is a critical stage of the prosecution, 
we must consider the factors enumerated 
by the Supreme Court. First, if failure to 
pursue strategies or remedies results in a 
loss of significant rights, then Sixth 
Amendment protections attach. Id. 389 
U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 257. Second, where 
Clteas881 F.2d 6' 
skilled counsel would be useful in helping 
the accused understand the legal confron-
tation, we find that a critical stage exists. 
Third, the right to counsel applies if the' 
proceeding tests the merits of the ac-
cused's case. Ash, 413 U.S. at 311, 93 S.Ct-
at 2574. - • -; 
Under Asfi, although the state trial court 
expressed doubt as to the significance of 
the motion, we think there can be little 
question that the motion for a new trial 
under California law is a critical stage of 
the prosecution. California penal code sec-
tion 1181 provides nine distinct grounds for 
a new trial. The statutory provisions are 
the exclusive grounds for the trial judge to 
overturn the conviction of the accused. 
See People v. Diltard, 168 Cal.App.2d 158, 
335 P.2d 702, 707 (1959). 
Although section 1181 lists several inde-
pendent grounds for reversing the jury, the 
most important, and most .frequently in-
voked, provision is section six, providing 
for a new trial if the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the verdict.3 Unlike an 
appellate court, the trial judge hearing a 
motion for a new trial reviews the evidence 
de novo and examines the record indepen-
dently. The trial court "is under the duty: 
to give the defendant the benefit; of its,, 
independent conclusion as the sufficiency 
of credible evidence to support the verdict." 
People v. Veitch, 128 Cal.App.3d 460^ 467, 
180. Cal.Rptr. 412 (Div. Two .1982).,' The 
trial judge sits as the "13th juror" in evalu-. 
ating the weight of the evidence against 
the defendant. As a practical matter, the 
motion for a new trial is the defendant's 
last opportunity for an unconstrained re-. 
3. "When a verdict has been rendered or. a find^ 
, ing made against the defendant, the; court may, 
upon his application, grant a new, trial, in the 
following cases only: • ... 
6. When the verdict or finding is contrary to 
law or evidence, but if the. evidence shows the 
defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the 
crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a 
lesser degree thereof, or a lesser crime included 
therein, the court may modify the verdict, find-
ing or judgment accordingly/Without granting 
or ordering a new trial, and this power shall 
extend to any court to which the cause may.be 
appealed; 
6 (9th Clr. 1989) 
view on the merits of the evidence against 
him. On appeal, both jury conclusions and 
the factual decisions of the trial court are 
either immune from review or treated un-
der a highly deferential standard. See, 
e.g:t People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal.3d 156,127 
Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d843, cert, denied, 
429 U.S. 847, 97 S.Ct 13%"50 L.Ed.2d 119 
(1976); People v. Love, 51 Cal.2d 751, 336 
P.2d 169 (1959). See 'generally Witkin, 
California Criminal Procedure §§581* 
582 (1985). Consequently; the defendant's 
failure to take full legal advantage of the 
statutory right substantially diminishes1 his ' 
ability to challenge the "sufficiency of the 
evidence. ':ui 
Not only are substantive rights involved 
but counsel can,enable the defendant to 
protect these rights. An effective motion 
for a new trial ordinarily requires a law-
yer's understanding of legal rules and his 
experience in presenting claims before a, 
court. The presence of trained counsel at 
this stage insures that the most favorable 
arguments will be; presented and ''that the 
accused's interests \ will be protected con^  
sistently with our theory of criminal prose? 
cution." Wade, 388U.S. at 227, 87vS.Ct. a t 
1932. Consequently, we hold that the right : 
to counsel attaches ta the motion for a new 
trial, stage.4 
III. 
Since we conclude that there ;is a consti-
tutional right to counsel at the time "of a 
new trial hearing, we; mustnow determine' 
whether the trial court erred in '' denying 
appellant's posttrial request for appoint-' 
4. The Supreme Court";has expressed a limited 
concern with the effect on the efficient adminis-
tration and investigation of justice of expanding 
the right to counsel. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 314, 
93 S.Ct. at 2576. There are, indeed, potential 
costs to providing counsel at the postconviction 
stage. However^ as a general matter,* the mo-
tion for a new trial is simply one part of the 
basic trial court litigation, and the trial; attorney 
can handle the motion. In the unusual case, the 
proceedings might be delayed for preparation of 
a transcript or to allow counsel tb familiarize 
himself with the case. Nevertheless, we think 
that this occasional delay does not rise to the 
level of the heavy burden on police investigation 
discussed in Ash which would justify the denial 
of counsel. 
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*' ment of counsel, and; for a continuance 
which would have enabled appointed coun-
sel to prepare an adequate motion. Be-
cause the right to counsel is so central to 
our concepts of fair adjudication, we are 
reluctant to deny the practical fulfillment 
of the right—even, once waived—absent a 
compelling reason that will survive consti-
tutional scrutiny. 
We are certainly unwilling to deny coun-
sel because of some conception that the 
defendant's initial decision to exercise his 
Faretta right and represent himself at trial 
is a choice cast in stone. It is not surpris-
ing that a criminal defendant, having decid-
ed to represent himself and then having 
suffered a defeat at trial, would realize 
that he would be better served during the 
remainder of the case by the assistance of 
counsel. A criminal defendant may initial-
ly assert his right to self-representation for 
reasons that later prove unsound.5 The 
accused may doubt the willingness of an 
appointed attorney to represent his inter-
ests. More often, the accused may have a 
baseless faith in his ability to mount an 
effective defense. The lure of self-repre-
sentation may, however, exact a significant 
price; lost at trial, the defendant may miss 
important opportunities and even create 
gaping holes in his own case. The accused 
has little recourse against the failings 
caused by his own inartfulness. See Unit-
ed States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 
1977) (defendant representing himself may 
not claim ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Forcing the defendant to stumble through 
post-trial proceedings serves neither the in-
5. Because of the potentially detrimental effect 
of the right of self-representation on the defen-
dant's case, federal courts have been unwilling 
to find a waiver, of the right to counsel absent a 
knowing and intelligent judgment on the 
record. See, e.g., United States v. Wadsworth, 
830 F.2d 1500, 1504 (9th; Cir. 1987). The trial 
court is required to make a formal record show-
ing that the defendant explicitly waived counsel 
and was aware of the nature of the charges 
against him, the potential penalties, and the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representa-
tion. See United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 
996, 1005 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 
1209, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984). 
Absent such assurances on the record, the re-
viewing court will not permit deprivation of the 
assistance of counsel. 
:e dividual nor our system of adversarial jus-
n- tice well. Therefore, although we recogrj 
e- nize .that the right to counsel—once-
;o waived—is no longer absolute, we startf 
•e with the strong presumption that a defen-, 
it dant's post-trial request for the assistance \ 
a
 ;, of an attorney should not be refused. See-, 
i-. United States v. Holman, 586 F.2d 322 " 
(4th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (pro se plaintiff 
j . at trial retained constitutional right to " 
 counsel at sentencing).6 
 There are times when the criminal justice 
.1 system would be poorly served by allowing -
i  the defendant to reverse his course at the 
I- last minute and insist upon representation , 
r by counsel. See United States v. Studley, 
3 783 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1986); United.' 
* States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th ' 
 Cir. 1979). When, for example, for pur-
poses of delay, criminal defendants have 
: sought continuances on the eve of trial, we 
3 have refused to disrupt the proceedings to 
i accomodate their wishes. In determining 
whether the trial court abused its disere-
i tion in refusing to grant a continuance, 
i courts of appeals have considered whether 
the continuance would adversely affect wit-' 
: nesses, counsel, the court, and the govern-; 
5 ment; whether there have been other con-
; tinuances; whether legitimate reasons ex-
[ ist for the delay; whether the delay is the 
i.-i defendant's fault; and whether a denial 
would prejudice the defendant. Studley, 
783 F.2d at 938. The state argues that this 
test should be extended to post-trial pro-
ceedings. 
There is, however, a substantial practical 
distinction between delay on the eve of trial 
6. But see Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 
A.2d 580, 613, cert, denied, 479 U.S. at 873, 107 
S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (upholding unex-
plained denial of counsel at sentencing). Gran-
dison has not gone uncriticized. Two justices 
dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari. 
Even at midtrial in a non-bifurcated proceed-
ing, a trial court's unexplained refusal to per-
mit a defendant to revoke his assertion of the 
right of self-representation would surely con-
stitute an abuse of discretion. A trial court 
cannot insist that a defendant continue repre-
senting himself out of some punitive notion 
that that defendant, having made his bed, 
should be compelled to lie in it. Grandison, 
479 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. at 40 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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and delay at the time of a post-trial hear-
ing. Cf. United States v. Kennard, 799 
F.2d 556 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (abso-
lute right to counsel in retrial after defen-
dant represented himself in initial trial). 
Delay immediately prior to trial engenders 
a significant potential for disruption of 
court and witness, scheduling. Witnesses, 
may have travelled long distances and may 
be unable to accommodate more than one 
trip. Losing or substantially inconvenienc-
ing witnesses may prejudice the trial and 
the efficient administration of justice. 
Shifting lengthy trials may disrupt the 
court's docket. 
Conversely, it is unlikely that a continu-
ance after the verdict will substantially in-
terfere with the court's or the parties'; 
schedules. Witnesses and jurors will have 
been dismissed. Moreover, the hearing on 
a post-trial motion is generally a brief af-
fair, lasting substantially less than a day. 
Rescheduling such a hearing—more likely 
than not—will not involve a significant dis-
ruption of court scheduling. While we are 
aware that as a general matter it may be 
more efficient to have the motion for a new 
trial presented when the issue is fresh in 
the minds of the parties and court, that is; ; 
an insufficient interest to warrant denying 
defendants the assistance of counsel.. We 
therefore hold that, at least in the absence 
of extraordinary circumstances, an accused 
who requests an attorney at the time of a*. 
motion for a new trial is entitled to have 
one appointed, unless the government can 
show that the request is made for a bad 
faith purpose. -
•  I V . - . -- ' ^ •-:• 
[3] Once the principles of waiver, are 
clearly enumerated, the task of applying 
7. Under harmless error jurisprudence, Sixth 
Amendment violations that pervade trial require 
automatic reversal of the tainted proceedings. 
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 
1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 n., 
8, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wain-r 
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 
(1963)). The parties do not suggest that the rule 
should be different when the error pervades a 
post-conviction hearing. Following remand, the 
state court must determine whether, in the cir-
the standards to this case becomes fairly 
simple. Here, there is no indication that 
appellant was attempting to manipulate the 
right to counsel for any improper purpose. 
The record reveals that Menefield made a 
valiant, if ultimately futile, attempt to com-
ply with the rules of procedure at trial. 
Moreover, the transcript of the hearing 
shows that the trial court predicated its 
judgment not on bad faith but solely on its 
determination that appointment of counsel 
wrould require a continuance. 
Appellee argues that Menefield's pretrial 
dismissal of two attorneys proves his bad 
faith. While repeated firings of counsel 
may in some circumstances evidence an 
improper motive, pretrial dismissals should 
ordinarily have little influence on the deter-
mination of whether a post-conviction mo-
tion for appointment of counsel is improp-' 
er. Usually, the unsettling experience of, 
trial, as well as its unsatisfactory result, 
will be the source of a defendant's discon-
tent with his own services and, consequent-, 
ly, the basis for his post-trial motion for the , 
assistance of counsel. In any event, two 
prior decisions to. dismiss counsel consti-
tutes insufficient evidence standing alone 
to warrant denying the right to counsel. 
Without substantially more evidence of bad, 
faith on the record, we cannot conclude ,< 
that Menefield's post-trial request for ap-
pointment of counsel was made for an im-
proper purpose. We reverse7 the district 
court's denial of
 ?the writ of habeas corpus 
and order the court to issue the writ. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED 
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cumstanees; of this case, Menefield can receive 
as adequate, review of his, conviction by newly 
appointed counsel as he would have had if he 
had been represented by counsel on his motion 
for new.trial in the first instance. It may be-
that, because of the passage of time.of problems 
in reconstructing the record, he cannot, in 
which case a new trial may be necessary. See 
Bland v. Alabama, 356 F.2d 8, 15 (5th Cir.1965)," 
cert, denied, 383 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 1203, 16 
L.Ed.2d 210 (1966). 
281, 493 P.2d 1145. Nor does the require-
ment of observed volitional movement un-
der the implied consent/license revocation 
l770statutes call in question the propriety of 
convictions under section 23152 based on 
mere circumstantial evidence of vehicle 
movement. (See e.g., Wilson, supra, 176 
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 8-9, 222 Cal.Rptr. 540, 
and cases cited.) 
III. Conclusion 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
reversed. 
53 uai^sa iw 
MOSK, PANELLI, KENNARD, 
ARABIAN and BAXTER, JJ., concur. 
BROUSSARD, J., concurs in the 
judgment. 
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Defendant was convicted of two counts 
of attempted voluntary manslaughter and 
two counts of robbery in the Superior 
Court, San Mateo County, No. C-19513, 
John Bible, Alan Bollhofer, Jose DeLarios 
and Margaret Kemp, JJ., and defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Kline, P.J., 
held that: (1) where defendant seeks to 
withdraw waiver of counsel, prosecution 
does not have burden of demonstrating im-
proper motive for request for counsel but 
rather, defendant's motive in requesting to 
withdraw Faretta waiver is one of factors 
for trial court to consider in exercising its 
discretion, and (2) trial court's refusal to 
rule on defendant's posttrial motion for 
assistance of counsel was harmless error. 
Remanded. 
Benson, J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
1. Criminal Law ^641.10(2) 
Where defendant who waived right to 
counsel later seeks to retract that waiver, 
prosecution ia not required to demonstrate 
improper motive for request for counsel, 
but defendant's motive in requesting to 
withdraw waiver of counsel is one factor 
for trial court to consider in exercising 
discretion. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>641.3(4), 641.9 
Trial court improperly refused to rule 
on defendant's posttrial motion for appoint-
ment of counsel to assist with motion for 
new trial; court's statement that defen-
dant's pretrial motion had previously been 
denied did not address issue. 
3. Criminal Law <&»1166.11(6) 
Trial court's erroneous refusal to rule 
on defendant's posttrial motion for appoint-
ment of counsel to assist with motion for 
new trial was harmless in trial of defen-
dant for attempted voluntary manslaughter 
and robbery, though defendant claimed 
that attorney could have obtained medical 
testimony which, if favorable, could have 
constituted newly discovered evidence; 
medical evidence defendant sought to in-
vestigate regarding effect of wounds de-
fendant suffered was speculative, of mar-
ginal relevance, and extremely unlikely to 
affect outcome of case. 
4. Criminal Law <s=>1181.5(6) 
Defendant who was convicted of at-
tempted voluntary manslaughter and rob-
bery was entitled to remand to enable trial 
court to consider defendant's motion for 
appointment of counsel to assist at sentenc-
ing, after defendant had earlier waived 
right to counsel; defendant's claims that he 
should not have been sentenced separately 
on robbery and attempted manslaughter 
counts or given two weapon use enhance-
ments if he had counsel present questions 
on which reasonable minds could differ and 
on which counsel might have made a differ-
1 iiiTLinda Robertson, Burlingame, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Moala; Ngaue, pro se. 
Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Sharon 
Birenbaum, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Fran-
cisco, for plaintiff and respondent. 
KLINE, Presiding Justice. 
Moala Ngaue appeals from convictions of 
two counts of attempted voluntary man-
slaughter and two counts of robbery. He 
contends the trial court erred in denying 
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976 
and 976.1, this opinion is certified for publica-
tion with the exception of Part I. sections A.-D. 
and Parts II—III of the Discussion, 
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his repeated motions for substitution of his 
appointed counsel, denying his request for 
a continuance after granting his motion to 
represent himself at trial, denying his re-
quest for appointment of counsel to repre-
sent him in a motion for new trial, and 
compelling him to rest without enabling 
him to recall one of the victims as a wit-
ness. He further claims the trial court 
erred in imposing consecutive sentences on 
the robbery and attempted voluntary man-
slaughter counts, imposing consecutive 
sentence enhancements for gun use, impos-
ing a three-year enhancement for infliction 
of great bodily injury in connection with 
the subordinate term sentence on a robbery 
count, and giving an inadequate and con-
using statement of reasons for its sen-
ence choices, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 22, 1988, an information was 
filed in the San Mateo County Superior 
Court charging appellant with the attempt-
ed murders (Pen.Code, § 664/187) and rob-
beries (Pen.Code, § 211) of Abed Rabah 
and Ali Negem. It was further alleged 
that in the commission of these offenses 
appellant personally inflicted great bodily 
injury upon the victims within the meaning 
of Penal Code sections 12022.7 and 1203.-
075, subdivision (a), and personally used a 
firearm within the meaning of Penal Code 
sections 12022.5 and 1203.06, subdivision 
(a)(1), and that appellant had served two 
prior prison terms within the meaning of 
Penal Code section 667.5, 65
 m8subdivision 
(b). An amended information filed on Jan-
uary 30, 1989, altered the language of the 
attempted murder counts to add that they 
were committed deliberately and with pre-
meditation. 
Appellant made a total of five motions 
for substitution of his attorney, which were 
denied by two different judges. The last 
two of these were combined with requests 
that appellant be allowed to represent him-
self if the motions for substitution of coun-
sel were not granted. These motions were 
also denied. A final motion for self-repre-
sentation was granted by the judge to 
ttA REPORTER 
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whom the case had been assigned for trial 
on January 30, 1989, the first day of trial. 
After a one-week continuance, jury trial 
began on February 6. On February 14, the 
jury reached verdicts of not guilty on the 
counts of attempted murder but guilty on 
two counts of the lesser included offense of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter and two 
counts of robbery; it further found the 
firearm use, infliction of great bodily injury 
and prior prison term allegations true. 
The jury was then presented with evidence 
of the charged prior convictions and prison 
terms and found them true. 
Appellant requested a new trial and ap-
pointment of an attorney to assist him in a 
new trial motion and at sentencing; ruling 
on this request was deferred and appel-
lant's motion for a new trial was later 
denied at the sentencing hearing. Appel-
lant was sentenced to a total prison term of 
seventeen years and two months. He filed 
a timely notice of appeal on April 10, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Abed Elsalam Rabah owned the Hi and 
Bye Market on University Avenue in East 
Palo Alto. On the night of November 27, 
1987, Rabah and Ali Negem were working 
in the store. Both recalled that appellant 
came into the store three or four times that 
night, the first somewhere between 8 and 
10 p.m., and each time bought a bottle of 
wine or a bottle of wine and bottle of beer. 
Negem waited on appellant each time. Un-
til appellant's last visit to the store, Negem 
was behind the counter and Rabah was 
circulating around the store. 
The last time appellant came into the 
store, about 12:30 or 12:35 a.m., both Neg-
em and Rabah were behind the counter; 
Rabah was preparing paperwork and had 
his back to the counter. Appellant brought 
a small orange wine cooler to the counter 
and Negem put it in a small bag, rang up 
the purchase, and asked for a dollar. Ap-
pellant reached behind his back as though 
to get a wallet from his pocket but instead 
pulled out a small silver gun, pointed it at 
Negem and told Negem to open the cash 
register and give \ mohim the money. 
Hearing this, Rabah turned around; appel-
PEdPLE 
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lant pointed the gun at him and told him to 
open the other cash register and take all 
the money out. Both Negem and Rabah 
opened the registers immediately and put 
the money on the counter. Negem testi-
fied that appellant asked for a paper bag 
and Negem got one, put the money in it 
and handed it to appellant; Rabah could 
not remember who put the money in the 
bag but thought it was Negem, and testi-
fied that appellant grabbed the bag. Ap-
pellant also demanded that Negem and Ra-
bah empty their pockets; Negem had $20 
and his home keys, which appellant put into 
the bag with the money, and Rabah had 
nothing. 
After taking the bag, appellant told Ra-
bah " 'You guys must have a gun. Give 
me the gun you have. '" Rabah said they 
did not have a gun and appellant immedi-
ately shot Rabah twice in the right should 
der and once in his left hand. Appellant 
turned to Negem, who grabbed appellant's 
hand; Negem was shot through the bottom 
of his stomach and his left leg then turned 
appellant's hand away so that a second 
shot hit the counter. Rabah pulled out 
a .357 magnum and fired six shots at appel-
lant, at which time Negem let go of appel-
lant's hand and fell to the ground behind 
the counter. Rabah thought he hit appel-
lant but could not remember. When Neg-
em fell, he saw appellant fall and thought 
he saw some blood on appellant's back, 
then saw appellant get up and run away. 
As Negem and appellant were struggling, 
everything on the counter, including the 
cash register drawers and wine and beer, 
fell on the floor; when Rabah shot appel-
lant, the bag with the money and the wine 
fell on the floor. 
Rabah followed appellant out of the store 
with a shotgun kept behind the counter, 
chased him for two blocks and saw him go 
behind a small pick-up truck. Rabah told 
him not to move, saw him start loading his 
pistol and asked if appellant was going to 
shoot him again. Appellant started to run 
down the street and Rabah fired the shot-
gun, which "reared back" and hit him in 
the face. 
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The police arrived and Rabah gave them 
a description of appellant, including a tat-
too on the left side of his neck which Rabah 
identified on appellant at trial. Rabah was 
taken to the hospital; he had surgery to 
remove one bullet and another remained in 
his body. Back at the store, someone 
called the police and Negem told them 
what had happened. Negem also recalled 
the tattoo on appellant's neck and identi-
fied it at trial. Negem was taken to the 
hospital and had surgery to remove a bullet 
from his leg. 
Police officer Renaldo Rhodes received a 
call about a possible robbery at the Hi and 
Bye Market at about 12:43 on the morning 
of November 28, |
 u2oarrived there three to 
four minutes later and found officer Chris-
topher Samuels outside. They entered and 
found the store in disarray, with money on 
the floor. Negem gave a quick description 
of the suspect, which Rhodes broadcast, 
and was then taken by ambulance to the 
hospital. Other officers found Rabah, 
called paramedics and took custody of Ra-
bah's shotgun. Officer Frank Churchill1 
took photographs of the store which were 
produced at trial; he testified that he saw 
broken beverages, paper bags, currency 
and expended shell casings from a .25 cali-
ber weapon on the floor and that a bullet 
fragment lodged in the wall above the cool-
ers appeared to be larger than a .25 caliber. 
Samuels, in charge of collecting evidence at 
the store, seized $346.02 in cash which was 
scattered on the floor near the front door, 
two bags containing $17 and $342 respec-
tively, a spent bullet shell on the floor, six 
spent .38 bullet shells inside a .357 hand 
gun on the floor. Samuels recalled a bro-
ken bottle of alcoholic beverage on the 
floor and testified that the police photo-
graphs accurately depicted the scene as he 
found it. 
Detective Rod Lamour took photographs 
of bullet holes in the Hi and Bye Market on 
December 11, 1987. Three holes—one in 
the window behind the counter at chest 
level, one on the deli case next to the 
counter which appeared to be a ricochet, 
and one toward the rear,of the store about 
1. Churchill testified as appellant's first witness. 
eight to nine feet off the ground—were 
from a .25 caliber gun. Several others, 
mostly in the area of a cooler, were from 
a .38 weapons 
On March 28, 1988, Redwood City police 
sergeant Michael Manry went to the May-
fair Hotel looking for appellant. When he 
found appellant, identified himself and told 
appellant not to move, appellant asked " 'is 
this for the robbery?' " Nothing had been 
said about a robbery before this comment. 
Defense case 
Appellant called a number of witnesses 
who described aggressiveness on the part 
of the store owner and workers. Several 
customers testified that they had been 
beaten or chased from the store at gun-
point by the store owner and employees, or 
had seen others subjected to such treat-
ment. The owner of the business next 
door additionally described having seen Ra-
bah "sic" a dog on people, having been 
personally threatened by him and having 
complained about him to city officials and 
the police. 
Recalled to the stand by appellant, Ra-
bah testified that the whole shooting inci-
dent took about three seconds and he did 
not remember whether Negem had been 
shot before Rabah pulled his gun; he de-
nied the above j ^accusations regarding 
his conduct but admitted that he had de-
fended himself in incidents. On examina-
tion by the district attorney, Rabah testi-
fied that he had a bad relationship with the 
next door store owner, who he said sold 
drug paraphernalia and brought bad ele-
ments to the neighborhood, but denied hav-
ing threatened her or used his dog to intim-
idate anyone. 
Appellant testified that he had sold 
drugs in the past and had a prior felony for 
sale of cocaine. During Thanksgiving 
week of 1987 he had come from Los Ange-
les for a church "camp" in San Carlos with 
his sister and brother-in-law, who wanted 
to take him away from the drugs and 
street life. On Friday, November 27, ap-
pellant and one of his cousins from Hay-
ward went to a bar in East Palo Alto. 
229 Cal.App.3d 1120 
Appellant had never been to East Palo Alto 
before. 
During the evening, appellant went to 
Rabah's store three or four times to buy 
drinks for "Tongan kids" outside the bar. 
He eventually gave a .25 caliber automatic 
gun he was carrying to a "Tongan kid" at 
the bar who had been pestering him for it. 
The kid later told appellant he had sold the 
gun to people at the store where appellant 
had been buying beer. 
Appellant, upset, went to the store, but 
the two men there said no one had sold 
them a gun; after checking that he had the 
right store, appellant returned, told Rabah 
he had his gun and offered to return the 
$20. The two began to argue, then Negem 
came up from behind appellant and pointed 
appellant's gun in his face, repeating "you 
want gun? You want gun?" and jabbing 
appellant in the face. Appellant hit the 
gun out of his face and it went off, tempo-
rarily blurring appellant's vision. Appel-
lant grabbed. Negem's hand and the two 
struggled, during which time the gun went 
off three or four times. Appellant flipped 
Negem to the side of the counter, where 
Negem fell and got shot. Rabah and a 
third person appellant claimed was behind 
the counter pointed guns at appellant; ap-
pellant was shot in the shoulder and fell, 
then ran for the door, felt something hit 
him in the head and heard gunshots from 
behind the counter. Appellant ran from 
the store, stopping because of dizziness 
from the blow to his head; Rabah followed 
and shot at him with a .357. Appellant 
passed out and when he awoke managed to 
walk slowly to a street where a Tongan kid 
picked him up and told him someone had 
died at the store. Scared to go to a hospi-
tal in the area because he did not want to 
be held responsible for the death, appellant 
eventually had.relatives call his family in 
Los Angeles and a sister flew in and took 
him to a hospital in Monterey where he 
used a false name. 
Appellant found out a month and a half 
later that no one had died. When he was 
arrested, he asked whether it was for the 
robbery because he had been told the police 
had been looking for a Tongan named Moa-
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la with aiimtattoo on his neck. Appellant 
testified that Rabah and Negem were lying 
about the entire incident, that he never 
demanded money from them, shot them 
after demanding their guns or tried to rob 
them, and that the only reason he was the 
suspect in the case and Rabah and Negem 
the victims was that they went to the police 
and he did not 
DISCUSSION 
1. A.—D.** 
E. Appointment of Counsel for New 
Trial Motion 
At the conclusion of his trial, appellant 
asked the court to waive time for sentenc-
ing so he could prepare an appeal and to 
appoint a lawyer to file a "retrial" motion 
for him. Judge DeLarios explained that 
appellant could not appeal until after sen-
tencing and asked appellant to file his mo-
tions in writing/providing some authority 
which would be considered either by the 
trial judge or the criminal presiding judge, 
With respect to the request for counsel, the 
judge told appellant he had had the help of 
a lawyer for ten months and deferred rul-
ing, again telling appellant to submit mem-
oranda on the issue.10 Appellant filed no 
memoranda. 
On March 20, appellant's case came on 
for sentencing before Judge DeLarios. 
Appellant wanted to question Keyes about 
** See footnote *, ante. 
10. The judge's remarks indicate some irritation 
with appellant: "We'll assume your motion has 
been made. It has been made, but you support 
it with some authority, or some kind of memo-
randa, some kind of argument, something that 
indicates you should have. So that if you de-
cide you want one, then later on you don't want 
one, the judge will know what to do about it. 
All right. But you give some reasons for it, 
other than you want one now. [fl 1 You had one 
of the best lawyers on the private defender 
panel. You had the advantage of two investiga-
tors, then you had the guts to tell the jury you 
only had a week to prepare your case/Which 
was kind of dirty pool." 
11. Respondent suggests that appellant may have 
been asking only for advisory counsel to assist 
him while he represented himself. While appel-
lant used the terms "advise" and "assist," his 
request must be viewed in context. Appellant 
his pro per status but the court told him his 
motion for self-representation had been 
granted and was not going to be reconsid-
ered. Appellant made a lengthy statement 
regarding his dissatisfaction with Keyes 
and not having wanted to represent him-
self, then asked for a 60-day continuahce 
and court appointed attorney to advise him 
on sentencing procedure and assist him in 
the preparation of a new trial motion, 
promising to work with any lawyer other 
than Keyes.11 I n2sAppellant further stated 
that he did not have access.to a law. library, 
had not gotten assistance on writing a new 
trial motion and did not "know the first 
thing about points and authorities/', The 
court told appellant none of the statutory 
grounds for a new trial were present in the 
case and denied the motion for new trial. 
With respect to the motion for, appointment 
of counsel, there was some discussion of 
Judge Kemp having told, appellant before 
trial that he could either represent himself 
or accept representation from Keyes 12 and 
Judge DeLarios stated that appellant's mo-
tion had previously been denied. 
Appellant's contention that the trial 
court erred in denying his request for ap-
pointment of counsel to,make a motion for 
a new trial is based on Menefield v. Borg 
(9th Cir.1989) 881 F.2d 696. In that case, a 
defendant who had represented himself at 
trial later requested appointment of coun-
sel to assist in the preparation of a j ^ y 
had made numerous attempts to substitute 
counsel and, when these , were unsuccessful; 
tried several times to represent himself; as. the, 
only alternative to proceeding with ^ Keyes. 
None of his motions were coupled with requests 
for advisory counsel or give any reason to sus-
pect appellant considered this a possibility. In 
the request at issue, appellant told the court "it 
was only with the utmost reluctance that I be-
came pro per." His remarks indicate that ap-
pellant was seeking to change his status arid be 
represented by counsel rather than to have ad-
visory counsel assist him in representing him-
self... • _• 
12. After Judge Bible had granted appellant's 
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, motion and a one-week 
continuance on January 30 and 31, Judge Kemp 
had denied a further motion for continuance at 
another hearing on January 31 and confirmed 
the trial date of February 6 / ;; • ' 
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trial motion; the request was denied and 
the defendant obtained habeas corpus re-
lief from the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The court first determined that un-
der California law a motion for a new trial 
is a critical stage of the prosecution at 
which a defendant has a right to counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. (Id., at pp. 698-699.) 
Although recognizing that the right to 
counsel is not absolute after it has been 
waived, the court stated a strong presump-
tion that a post-trial request for counsel 
should not be refused. (Id.,'at p. TOO.) 
The court noted that there are times when 
defendants should not be allowed to change 
course and insist on counsel at the last 
minute, as when they seek continuances on 
the eve of trial for purposes of delay. 
(Ibid.) While delay immediately before tri-
al carries a significant threat of disruption 
for the court and witnesses, however, the 
court felt it unlikely that a continuance 
after the verdict would substantially inter-
fere with the court or parties. (Id., at pp. 
700-701.) "[T]he hearing on a post-trial 
motion is generally a brief affair, lasting 
substantially less than a day. Reschedul-
ing "such a hearing—more likely than not— 
will not involve a significant disruption of 
court scheduling. While we are aware that 
as a general matter it may be more effi-
cient to have the motion for a new trial 
presented when the issue is fresh in the 
minds of the parties and court, that is an 
insufficient interest to warrant denying de-
fendants the assistance of counsel. We 
therefore hold | imthat, at least in the ab-
sence of extraordinary circumstances, an 
accused who requests an attorney at the 
time of a motion for a new trial is entitled 
to have one appointed, unless the govern-
ment can show that the request is made for 
a bad faith purpose." (Id., at p. 701.) 
Since the record in Menefield did not indi-
cate any improper purpose, and the trial 
court had denied the request not because it 
was made in bad faith but because appoint-
ment of counsel would have required a 
continuance, the court granted relief, 
(Ibid.) 
Menefield in effect holds that a defen-
dant should be allowed to withdraw a Far-
etta waiver in circumstances substantially 
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identical to those presented here. Though 
decisions of the federal courts are entitled 
to great weight, we hesitate to follow 
Menefield because in a related context our 
state supreme court has allowed trial 
courts greater discretion than have the fed-
eral courts. In People v. Burton (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 843, 852, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 
1270 the court considered the issue of time-
liness of a Faretta motion, holding that 
since the right to self-representation is un-
conditional only if asserted " 'within a rea-
sonable time prior to the commencement of 
trial/ " a Faretta motion made after both 
counsel had answered ready and the case 
had been transferred for trial was directed 
to the trial court's discretion. Burton de-
clined to follow the federal rule that a 
motion for self-representation is timely as a 
matter of law if made before the jury is 
impaneled and must be granted unless 
shown to have been made for the purpose 
of delay. (Id.,- at pp. 853-854, 258 Cal.Rptr. 
184, 771 P.2d 1270.) The court noted that 
the federal rule was in practice similar to 
the California one, as it would allow denial 
of a Faretta motion before the jury was 
impaneled if the motion was made for the 
purpose of delay and the need for a contin-
uance could be evidence of dilatory intent. 
The federal rule differed, however, in that 
California put the burden on the defendant 
to explain the delay when making a late 
motion. (Id., at p. 854, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 
771 P.2d 1270.) The court concluded, "To 
the extent that there is a difference be-
tween the federal rule and the California 
rule, we find the federal rule too rigid in 
circumscribing the discretion of the trial 
court and adhere to the California rule." 
(Id., at p. 854, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 
1270.) Though it is not precisely on point, 
Burton thus suggests the Menefield prin-
ciple that counsel must be appointed to 
assist in a new trial motion unless the 
prosecution can prove an improper motive 
for the request would not be accepted by 
our state supreme court, which would vest 
greater discretion in the trial court. 
While no California case has addressed 
the specific question of withdrawal of a 
Faretta. waiver after trial, such a with-
PEGPLE 
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drawal during trial is a matter for trial 
court discretion. (People v. Hill (1983) 148 
Cal.App.3d 744, 760-761, 196 Cal.Rptr. 382; 
People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 
319, 147 CaLRptr. 740; People v. Elliott 
(1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 991-994, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 205.) Under California authority, a 
judge confronted with a defendant's re-
quest to withdraw a Faretta waiver during 
trial should consider, among other factors, 
I.1125" W ftne] defendant's prior history in 
the substitution of counsel and in the de-
sire to change from self-representation to 
counsel-representation, (2) the reasons set 
forth for the request, (3) the length and 
stage of the proceedings, (4) disruption or 
delay which reasonably might be expected 
to ensue from the granting of such motion, 
and (5) the likelihood of defendant's effec-
tiveness in defending against the charges if 
required to continue to act as his own attor-
ney.' " (People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 760,196 Cal.Rptr. 382, quoting 
People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 993-994, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205; People v. 
Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 319-320, 
147 Cal.Rptr. 740.) 
Elliott, Cruz and Hill found abuses of 
discretion in trial courts' denials of re-
quests to reinstate counsel during trial—in 
Elliott, after jury selection, in Cruz on the 
date set for trial, in Hill immediately be-
fore jury selection. These cases noted that 
the requests came at early stages of the 
trial and would not have required lengthy 
continuances or prejudiced the prosecution, 
and found improper the trial courts' denial 
of the motions on the basis that continuanc-
es would be necessary. (Hill, supra, 148 
Cal.App.3d at p. 761, 196 Cal.Rptr, 382; 
Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 320-321, 
147 CaLRptr. 740; Elliott, supra, 70 Cal. 
App.3d at pp. 996-998, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205.) 
Cruz and Elliott specifically noted that the 
defendants' reasons for requesting coun-
sel—recognition that they could not com-
13. Hill and Cruz also involved the fact that the 
defendants' initial Faretta waivers had been 
found invalid because they were tainted by the 
trial courts having improperly denied People v. 
Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 
465 P.2d 44, motions. (Hill, supra, 148 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 760, 196 Cai.Rptr. 382; Cruz, supra, 
83 Cal.App.3d at p. 318, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740.) 
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pete with the prosecutors—were valid and 
that the defendants were not likely to be as 
effective in defending themselves as an 
attorney would be. (Cruz, supra, 83 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 320, 147 CaLRptr. 740; El-
liott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 996, 139 
Cal.Rptr. 205.)13 
Application of these principles to the 
present case suggests counsel should have 
been appointed unless appellant was seek-
ing representation for an improper purpose 
such as delay: Since he had already been 
convicted, granting appellant's request 
would cause less disruption than that con-
sidered acceptable in Hill, Cruz and Elliott 
(see Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 P.2d at 
p. 701); the fact that appellant had made 
numerous requests for substitution before 
trial would not necessarily indicate that his 
request after "the unsettling experience of 
trial" (Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 F.2d 
at p. 701) was for an improper motive, and 
appellant clearly could not effectively rep-
resent himself at this stage of the proceed-
ing. 
[1] Indeed, as a practical matter, con-
sideration of the factors identified in Hill, 
Cruz, and Elliott in the post-trial context 
yields a result very similar to hi26that 
reached in Menefield. While the California 
test is discretionary, Menefield describes 
why most of the factors considered in the 
California cases would militate in favor of 
appointment at this stage. On the other 
hand, even under Menefield, the trial court 
retains discretion to deny a request for 
post-trial assistance of counsel where the 
request is made for a bad faith purpose, 
and factors such as the defendant's history 
in substitution of attorneys or purpose to 
delay further proceedings may bear on the 
determination whether such a bad faith 
purpose exists. (See 881 F.2d at pp. 700-
701.) Rather than imposing upon the pros-
ecution the burden of demonstrating an 
While the present case differs in that the denial 
of appellant's Marsden motions was proper, this 
was not the determinative factor in those courts' 
analyses. Elliott, like the present case, did not 
involve any question of the initial Faretta mo-
tion being invalid but only of a defendant who 
had waived his right to counsel later seeking to 
retract that waiver. 
improper motive for the request for coun-
sel, however, we view the defendant's mo-
tive in requesting to withdraw a Faretta 
waiver as one of the factors for the trial 
court to consider in exercising its discre-
tion; clearly, a finding that the request 
was made for an improper purpose such as 
delay would militate against granting the 
request.14 
[2] In the present case, the trial court 
never ruled on appellant's post-trial request 
for counsel; it simply denied his motion for 
a new trial on the merits. The court's 
statement that appellant's pre-trial motion 
had previously been denied by Judge Kemp 
simply did not address the motion for ap-
pointment of counsel to assist with a mo-
tion for new trial. This was error. 
Appellant urges that an erroneous denial 
of his request for appointment of counsel 
requires automatic reversal of the tainted 
proceeding. In Menefield, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the rule that Sixth Amendment 
violations pervading trial require automatic 
reversal to the situation before it, where 
erroneous denial of the request for counsel 
on a new trial motion pervaded a post-con-
viction hearing. (881 F.2d at p. 701, fn.. 7.) 
By contrast, several California Courts of 
Appeal have employed a harmless error 
analysis in determining whether a trial 
court's denial of a request to retract a 
Faretta waiver was prejudicial. (People v. 
Sampson (1987) 191 Cal.App,3d 1409, 1418, 
237 Cal.Rptr. 100; People v. Hill, supra, 
148 Cal.App.3d at p. 762, 196 Cal.Rptr. 382; 
People v. Elliott, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 998,139 Cal.Rptr. 205.) As explained by 
the court in Elliott, "[s]mce defendant has 
exercised his constitutional right of self-
representation, an abuse-of-discretion error 
in not |
 n27permitting defendant to change 
his mind does not appear to us to be of 
14. Respondent makes much of the fact that ap-
pellant did not file memoranda in support of his 
motion for appointment of counsel as directed 
by the trial court. Appellant's argument that he 
was unable to do so because he did not have 
access to a law library may be cast in doubt by 
the fact that he filed at least two written mo-
tions before trial, for a continuance and to ex-
clude use of prior convictions for impeachment 
purposes. As the issue was never developed in 
the trial court, the record before us does not 
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constitutional dimension." (70 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 998, 139 Cal.Rptr. 205.) We agree 
with these, latter cases. 
[3] The trial court's erroneous refusal 
to rule on appellant's post-trial motion for 
assistance of counsel must be /viewed as 
harmless. Appellant claims the record indi-
cates the possible existence of grounds for 
a new trial motion in that the court's forc-
ing appellant to rest without recalling Neg-
em to the stand and refusing to grant 
appellant a continuance could have been 
raised as errors in the decision of a ques-
tion of law arising during the trial (§ 1181, 
subd. 5) and an attorney could have ob-
tained medical testimony which, if favor-
able, could have constituted newly discover-
ed evidence. (§ 1181, subd. 8.) We have 
already determined that the court's denial 
of appellant's motion for a continuance was 
proper and, as will be explained in the next 
section of this opinion, will determine that 
the court committed no error in concluding 
the case when it did. As for the possibility 
of medical testimony, a party is entitled to 
a new trial on the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence only if certain conditions are 
met, including that the evidence be such as 
to render a different result probable on 
retrial. (People v. Martinez(1984) 36 
Cal.3d 816, 821, 205 Cal.Rptr. 852, 685 P.2d 
1203.) As has been discussed, the medical 
evidence appellant sought to investigate in 
this case was speculative,,of marginal rele-
vance, and extremely unlikely to affect the 
outcome of his case. Accordingly, it is not 
reasonably probable that the trial court 
would have granted a new trial motion on 
this ground. As for appellant's suggestion 
that new counsel might have perceived ad-
ditional grounds for a new trial motion, it is 
appellant's burden to show prejudice on 
appeal (People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 
permit any conclusions as to whether appellant 
could or should have filed such memoranda, 
but we caution that his failure to do so would 
appear an insufficient reason to deny him repre-
sentation unless that failure indicated an im-
proper purpose in making his motion. Appel-
lant's failure to file written memoranda was 
clearly not the basis of the trial court's decision 
to deny his new trial motion, as it was never 
.mentioned by the court. •.•*•••• 
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615, 643, 91 Cal.Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421) SMITH, J., concurs, 
and his speculative contentions fail to sus-
tain this burden. BENSON, J., concurs and dissents. 
[4] More persuasive is appellant's con-
tention that, entirely apart from the new 
trial motion, counsel would have been able 
to assist at sentencing either by arguing 
for a lesser sentence or by raising the 
claims of error addressed in later portions 
of this opinion. As discussed in unpub-
lished portions of this opinion, appellant's 
claims that he should not have been sen-
tenced separately on the robbery and at-
tempted manslaughter counts or given two 
weapon use enhancements present ques-
tions on which reasonable minds can differ. 
Clearly, the trial judge could properly have 
imposed the different sentence appellant 
now claims should have been given. Coun-
sel might have made a difference. Accord-
ingly, it is necessary to remand for a ruling 
on appellant's motion for appointment of 
counsel. If the motion is granted, the 
court shall hold a new sentencing hearing; 
if it is denied, the judgment shall be rein-
stated (Menefield v. Borg, supra, 881 F.2d 
at p. 701, fn. 7; People v> Winbush (1988). 
205 Cal.App.3d 987, 992, 252 Cal.Rptr, 722), 
subject to|n28the modifications of sentence 
specified in sections III-B and III-C, infra. 
II.-III.*** 
CONCLUSION , , ," 
The matter is remanded to the trial court 
for a hearing on appellant's request for 
appointment of an attorney to assist him at 
sentencing and, if this request is granted, a 
new sentencing hearing in accordance with 
the views expressed herein. If the request 
for counsel is denied, the judgment shall be 
reinstated subject to modifications that one 
enhancement under Penal Code section 
12022.5 must be stricken and the Penal 
Code section 12022.7 enhancement append-
ed to count 3 must be reduced to one year. 
***See footnote \ ante. 
1. The statement to Judge De Larios is as fol-
lows: "I'm not making new trial motion here 
today. I'm requesting 60 days continuance and 
court appoint me a lawyer to advise me on the 
sentencing procedure and to assist me in the 
BENSON, Associate Justice, concurring 
and dissenting. 
I dissent only to that portion of the ma-
jority opinion which remands to the trial 
court for the purpose of conducting a hear-
ing on appellant's motion for appointment 
of counsel to assist in sentencing. In my 
judgment the motion was heard by the trial 
court, considered, and judicial discretion 
properly exercised in denying appellant's 
request. 
While I might be more sympathetic to a 
convicted pro per criminal defendant who 
unconditionally seeks the guidance of coun-
sel in the complicated area of post-trial 
sentencing, that is not the situation before 
this court. Here request for assistance 
was conditioned on the court appointment 
of any lawyer other than Richard Keyes.1 
In effect appellant is asserting a veto over 
the court's discretionary power to appoint 
counsel, an incursion which cannot be con-
doned. 
The record provides no basis, in law or 
fact, justifying appellant's arbitrary, whim-
sical rejection of attorney Keyes as counsel 
to assist on post trial sentencing issues. 
On five separate occasions appellant's 
Marsden challengesj^to the adequacy of 
Keyes representation were heard by the 
trial court and rejected. Indeed, at the 
fourth Marsden hearing appellant acknowl-
edged "he had been trying to get rid of his 
lawyer 'not because he was incompetent' 
but because appellant felt he was not inter? 
ested in the case and had done nothing to 
help gain confidence in him." Whatever 
imagined shortcomings appellant may have 
perceived with respect to Keyes' represen-
tation before and during trial certainly 
new trial motion. I promise that I will work 
with any lawyer that the court appointments 
[sic] other than Richard Keyes, and I point out to 
the court that it was only with the utmost reluc-
tance that I became pro per." (Emphasis addl-
ed.) 
766 
were not germane to Keyes' ability to pro-
vide legal assistance on sentencing issues. 
Keyes' knowledge of the case, acquired 
during his trial preparation over a ten-
month span would have provided valuable 
insight on the sentencing issues to appel-
lant's benefit. On the other hand, appoint-
ment of new counsel would substantially 
increase the time and cost required to fully 
educate a lawyer unfamiliar with the pro-
ceeding. I see no good reason why,the 
taxpayers should be required to subsidize a 
proceeding occasioned by appellant's fanci-
ful intransigence. 
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any allegation of related physical injury or 
manifestation. 
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J309AIM INSURANCE COMPANY, Plain-
tiff, 
Cross-Defendant and Resp - * 
v. 




Court of Appeal, Sixth District. 
April 10, 199! 
As Modified May 8 J 991. 
Review Denied June " 1991. 
Liability insurer filed action seeking a 
declaration of no duty to defend and indem-
nify its insured in an underlying action by 
the insured's employee. The Monterey 
County Superior Court, No. 20868, William 
M. Wunderlich, J., granted insurer's motion 
for summary judgment, and insured ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeal, Capaccioli, 
Acting P.J., held that: (1) complaint in un-
derlying action stated a cause of action for 
negligence based on insured's breach of 
voluntarily assumed duty to process em-
ployee's health insurance application, but 
(2) liability insurer did not have have duty 
to defend or indemnify insured against its 
employee's emotional distress claim absent 
Affirmed. 
1, Insurance @=>514.9(1) 
Liability policy providing indemnifica-
tion for amounts insured "shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages" limit-
ed policy coverage only to tort liability, and 
did not obligate insurer to defendant in-
sured against action for breach of contract, 
2. Insurance <3=>435.32 
Employee's allegation that she entrust-
ed her health plan application and support-
ing documents to insured employer, who 
told her she would be properly enrolled in 
plan, but failed to properly forward doc-
uments, stated a cause of action for negli-
gence based on employer's alleged breach 
of duty to perform voluntarily assumed 
task and thus stated cause of action for 
negligence covered by employer's liability 
Insurance policy. ; 
8. Insurance ®=>514.22 
Whether insured's expe-1; e-
fense is reasonable is a q .- v. 
4, Insurance §=514.9(1) 
Under employer's liability policy which 
covered only "property damage" and "bodi-
ly injury," insured employer could not rea-
sonably have expected that insurer would 
defend employer from employee's claim for 
economic loss when employer unintention-
ally failed to process employee's health in-
surance documents which allegedly result-
ed in employee's loss of insurance benefits: 
loss of benefits was economic injury, not 
property damages. 
5, Insurance <s=»435(l) 
As used in a liability policy, the term 
"bodily injury" referred to physical injury 
and its consequences, and did not include 
emotional distress in the absence of any 
physical injury or manifestation. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. -
AIM INS. CO. 
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6. Insurance e»514.9(l) 
Under liability policy's coverage for 
"bodily injury," liability insurer did not 
have duty to defend insured employer 
against employee's claims of emotional dis-
tress based on employer's failure to pro-
cess employee's health insurance doc-
uments absent any indication of physical 
injury to employee related to emotional dis-
tress. ' 
7. Insurance ®=>514.9(1) 
Insured's alleged loss or destruction of 
a piece of paper insured's employee en-
trusted to insured was trivial or non-
existent property damage and thus did not 
implicate insurer's duty to defend under 
liability policy. 
8. Insurance <s=>514.10(2) 
Insured's employee's claim in underly-
ing action for "great emotional distress" 
she suffered as the result of insured's fail-
ure to properly process her health insur-
ance documents, without any suggestion 
that insurer was aware of facts indicating 
that employee suffered some physical inju-
ry or manifestation, did not implicate insur-
er's duty to defend insured. 
|2i2Raymond Coates, Geneva Wong.: BJbi-
su, Low, Ball & Lynch, Redwood City, for 
plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent. 
George S. Roberts, Pacific Grove, for 
defendant, cross-complainant and appellant. 
CAPACCIOLI, Acting Presiding 
Justice. -, 
Statement of the Case 
Defendant James Culcasi (Culcasi), dba 
Rosine's, a restaurant, appeals from a 
judgment entered after the trial court 
granted plaintiff Aim Insurance Company's 
(Aim) motion for summary judgment. He 
claims the court erred in granting the mo-
tion. We affirm the judgment. 
1. This statement is taken from the allegations in 
Culcasi's cross-complaint against Aim and, 
therefore, constitutes an admission. (1 Witkin, 
v. CULCASI 7 6 7 
(Cal.App.6DUt. 1991) 
IzizScope of Review 
The trial court may properly grant a 
motion for summary judgment only if there 
are no triable issues of fact and, as a 
matter of law, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment. (Blankenheim v. E.F. Hut-
ton & Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1470, 
266 CaLRptr. 593.) 
The Undisputed Facts 
In October 1986, Culcasi hired NoemI 
Grijalva as a waitress at Rosine's. At that 
time, Culcasi made health insurance avail-
able to his employees. Around July 24, 
1986, Grijalva submitted an application for 
insurance coverage to Culcasi, who accept-
ed it and undertook to forward it to the 
insurer. According to Culcasi, the applica-
tion "was entrusted by her to [me] for the 
purpose of, transmitting the same to the 
group health insurance company and plan 
administrator."1 
In January 1989, Grijalva sued Culcasi 
and others, for negligent breach of fiduci-
ary duty, breach of contract, and infliction 
of emotional distress. In her complaint, 
she alleged that eligibility for insurance 
was part of the compensation Culcasi paid 
his employees, and this potential eligibility 
induced Grijalva to apply for and accept the ' 
job at Rosine's. 
She alleged that on July 24, 1987, she 
filled out an application and gave it to 
Culcasi. He, in turn, represented that she 
would be properly enrolled in the health 
insurance program and undertook the obli-
gation "to insure that her application and 
documents were promptly and properly for-
warded to the health plan and that' her 
premium payment would result in the ex-
pected coverage." v • -.,-.•'. 
Grijalva alleged that she met all the re-
quirements for enrollment in the plan, pre-
miums were deducted from her paycheck, 
she believed she was so enrolled in the 
plan, and, as a result, she did not attempt 
to purchase other health insurance. How-
ever, according to Grijalva, Culcasi negli-
gently failed "to properly complete her en-
Evidence (3d ed. 1986) The Hearsay Rule, 
§ 646, p. 631-632.) 
9 1 0 Or. 958 r A C I N I C marum-uK, za or^u&o 
Before De MUNIZ, PvJ., and DEITS-C.J., 
andHASELTON,J.- vs;
 s - \ 
J261PERCURIAM. • JV,•• ..... i ••'•" . 
Reversed and remanded. State ex ret 
Carlilev. Frost,: 326 Or..-607, 956 P.2d 202 
(1998). ..;,.•• , , ; . . , : 
The Supreme Court -has remanded this 
case following its decision instate'-' ex rel 
Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or. 607, 956 P.2d 202 
(1998). The Supreme Court there^held that 
we were wrong in dismissing, by order, the 
state's appeal in this case. from the trial 
court's order excluding evidence from the 
penalty phase proceeding in defendant'^ 
death penalty case.., After deciding the ap*j 
pealability issue, the Supreme Court deter* 
mined that'the evidence could be admitted.* 
Id at 617-18, 956 P.2d 202. Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand;-...? ???-.'.- ,>y, ,:.• ..s*.;'^ . 
Reversed arid remanded. ' ' / 
Citeas958 P.2d 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appelleev 
John M. HEATON, Defendant 
ahdAppeflanC 
;•.-••
 8-:Na.:..950238.--;;!?.w , , , . ^ 
. 'Supr^e.,Cburt':Of/U^.7/.^r. ' ' 
May 1,1998. •^•y^U:;^ 
Defendant ..was •, convicted in the ; District 
Court, Ogden Department, .Michael J. Glass? 
man, J., of aggravated, robbery, and evading 
arrest. Defendant appealed: The Supreme 
Court, ;;Russon, J.,, held that; (1). burden,;of 
complying with the;_ detainer, statute; was .on 
the prosecutor, .not^-the. defendant;] (2) delay 
occasioned . by; .^ ourfe-. clerk's error did not 
constitute good cause for delay underr detain-
er statute; (3). extending trial, date to; a reaj 
sonable time outside detainer,.statute's 120-
day disposition period to accommodate, in 
part, defense counsel's schedule' constituted 
good cause .for.thg delay .under, the statute; 
and ,(4) ^defendant.
 sdjd not knowingly and 
intelligently^ waive* to ^constitutional right to 
appointed cojunsel./ • ,•.....,-y .w/. i'([ ~>: >^ 
Reversed^• -hoi--••-.::'••• AAy^rov,:?£.. ••#!*.# 
1. Criminal 1 ^ ^ ',.<•••+ 
Denial of defendant's motion to] dismiss 
under detainer statute was reviewed for cor-
rectness, where decision was based on legal, 
conclusion that clerk's administrative, mistake 
could excuse prosecutor's duty t a bring 
charges to trial within statutory time liniit. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3, 4). " K J j : "/' ' 
2. Criminal Law ^ 7 3 5 ? ^ 
Whether a waiver of counsel was made 
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. •V'*V>'-
3. Criminal Law ^ U 3 4 ( 3 ) 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's le-
gal deterriiinations for coirectrieSs. 
4. Extradition and Detainers <®=>59 ..*•-., ,,, 
• • " " " " . ' ' • • ' • ' • " • ' * ' .
y
 ' • ' • ' • • • A v ' " • ' • • ' • ' • " ' " ' ' • 3 
Burden of complying with the detainer 
statute was on the prosecutor, ^not.the defeg~ 
911 (Utah 1998) . 
dant, and/thus, the defendant did not have 
the responsibility to find out why his case 
had not been sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-
29-1. •• • •'•>'• ••;.<•• :-^. •*:>.< -I .> •< -i 
5. Extradition and Detainers ®»59 
.<. . Even though most of delay in bringing 
defendant to,. trial was occasioned by court 
clerk's,error, this did not constitute good 
cause under detainer statute..for delay since 
the prosecutor was not relieved of its burden 
of complying with the statute. U;CAll953, 
77-29r-l(l,3,:4), r 'M^ .. ;,;},. v^h., ....> 
6. Extradition anii Detainers ®»59 1 
When, a prisoner delivers vW^tten.:notice 
pursuant to detainer statute, prosecutor has 
affirmative,-,duty to have defendant's, matter 
heard within statutory period; implicitcin;this 
duty is duty.;tQ.:;notify court .that detainer 
notice, has; been filed and to. make fgoqd faith 
effort to;.complyfwith statute.,...,U.C JL1953, 
77^29-KlJ, 4X V "'• :<:, ''V'y'i. \ ; f 
7. Extradition arid Detainers fe»59 
• ' "" . ' • • . • • • ; '. • A , . ) - • • . ' • • 
Since the detainer statute places' on the 
prosecutor alone the burden of bringing case 
to trial within 120-day period, the prosecu-
tor's duty musit be independent of the court's 
docketing system. U.CJU953, 7fc£9n-l;... 
8. Criminal Law <s=»1134(6) ; ' 
Even if lower court erred in its legal 
conclusions, Supreme Court1 may affirm trial 
court's decision on any reasonable legal ba-
sis, provided that any- rationale for affir-
mance, .finds , suppqrt in tlie. record. . ,# 
9.. Extradition and Detainersj®=»59 
, > Deciding whether. ' the ; district, court 
properly denied defendant's motion .to.dis-
miss pursuant to detainer statute requires 
two-step inquiry", first; Supreme^ Court must 
determine when the 120-d^y period, com-
menced and when.<it expired,.second^,ifatrial 
was held; outside the- l^O^day period,. Su-
preme Court must then ^ determine whether 
good cause excused the delay, U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1... . 1.•;-".:.-^ vtf,•-.•'. ;;;-;r '•;'•.: ^ ; , V 
10. Extradition and Detainers <£*59 . 
detainer statute's
 r12(Hiay disposition 
'period must .-be extended by amount .<)f time 
912. Utah 958 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
during which prisoner himself creates delay, his choice is made with eyes open. U.S.GA 
U.C.A.1953/77-29-1.'' \ ConstAmend. 6. •% •.-,:; 
11, Extradition and Detainers ®=>59 
Extending trial date to a reasonable 
time outside detainer statute's 120-day dis-
position period to accommodate*-to'part, de-
fense couhsel's schedule constituted good 
cause for the delay under 'the - statute. 
U.C.AJ953,77-29-1(3, 4). 
12.: Criminal Law <3=*641.4(4)y 641.7(1) 
Defendant did not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel, evehtidugh court refused to 
dismiss: defense counsel, recommended that 
defendant^rely on counsel during voir dire 
andr strongly advised that he alldw^eounsel to 
crossr-examine state's witnesses; where trial 
court failed to advise defendant, at a mini-
mum,'of dangers and disadvantages'of self-
representation, and had already allowed de-
fendant to proceed pro se when warnings 
involving.- defense counsel were issued. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. : ; ' 
13. Criminal Law <3=>641.4(1) 
Sixth' Amendment guarantees an ac-
cused right to self-representation, provided 
only that "he knowingly and intelligently for-
goes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
14. Criminal Law;<S=».641.4(2). 
When a trial court is confronted with 
defendant who either refuses to proceed to 
trial with appointed counsel or insists on 
proceeding pro se, court must carefully con-
sider defendant's right to self-representation 
with his right to' counsel. U.S.C.A. Const 
A m e n d . 6 . ' ' - ' '' ''• "•'•• ' • ; : ! ; 
15. Crimirial Law ®^641.7(1) 
Before trial court may permit defendant 
to proceed' without assistance of counsel, 
court5-must conduct thorough inquiry of de-
fendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that 
defendant's waiver of edunsel is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made; in making 
this determination, the court must advise 
defendant of dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation so that the record will 
establish that he knowrs what he is1 doing and 
16. Criminal Law §=>641.7(1) 
In addition to advising defendant of dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation 
before permitting defendant to proceed with-
out assistance of counsel, trial court should 
(1) advise defendant of his constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel, as well as his 
constitutional right to represent himself, (2) 
ascertain that defendant possesses intelli-
gence and capacity to understand and appre-
ciate consequences of decision to represent 
himself, including expectation that defendant 
will comply with technical rules and recogni-
tion that presenting defense is not just mat-
ter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain 
that defendant comprehends nature of 
charges and proceedings, range of permissi-
ble punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to :'broad understanding of case. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6 . - v 
.17;=. Criminal Law <®=>1139 .,..-.> 
' In the absence of a ' colloquy ' on the 
record between the court and the defendant 
determining the validity 'of 'a- waiver of coun-
sel, Supreme Court will look at record and 
make de novo determination regarding validi-
ty of defendant's waiver only in extraordi-
nary circumstances, the existence of which 
the Court will address on a case-by-case 
-basis.'-''' U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. :;. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, nL>.. 
den, for defendant and appellant 
RUSSON, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION ; ' 
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict finding him 
guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree 
felony. We reverse. • • 
STATE ..it 
Cite as 958 P.2d 
BACKGROUND 
Because some of the dates corresponding 
to the facts in this case are critical to the 
resolution of this appeal, we provide a de-
tailed chronological summary of the relevant 
events. 
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for 
the robbery of an Albertson's grocery store 
in Roy, "Utah. The next,day,.;Heaton waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing and was 
bound over to district court.,, Heaton was a 
parolee at the time, and on July, 26, he was 
returned to the Utah State .Prison for violat-
ing his parole.
 r Heaton also...qualified for 
public, assistance, and was appointed
 f counsel 
from the public defender's office.., On August 
2, Heaton., appeared in district court for ar-
raignment, at, which time he pleaded "hot 
guilty" to the .charges and the judge set a 
pretrial conference for August 30 and 4 jury 
trial for September 9., On August 25, while 
incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed a 
written request for final disposition of all 
matters pending against him pursuant to 
Utah Qpde Ann. § 77-29-1' (the . "detainer 
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to 
bring pending charges against a prisoner to 
trial within 120 days from the date the notice 
is delivered to certain state officials'or their 
agents. An authorized agent at the prison 
received Heaton's notice on September 3.* 
At his pretrial conference on" August 30, 
Heaton requested a preliminary hearing, 
which he had initially waived. The prosecu-
tion had no objection, and the "parties and the 
court agreed to hold a preliminary -hearing 
on September 9, the date for which the (trial 
had'initially been set At the September 9 
preliminary hearing, the court found that 
probable cause existed and ;set a second ar-
raignment for September*;^./"At the second 
arraignment, Heaton ' requested that the 
judge recuse himself on the basis that the 
judge had also presided over Heaton's pre-
liminary hearing. The judge recused himself 
and ordered the case reassigned. However, 
as a result of an-error in the district court 
1. The prosecutor's office received the notice oh 
September 8. The record does not indicate 
whether the district court received Heaton's de-
tainer notice; however, the prosecutor stated 
that he believed the court probably received the 
notice on September 8; 1994. .,v-'-.:': :-'-h'ul.: . 
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clerk's office, the case was not reassigned. 
In.late November 1994, after receiving;inqui-
ry by a witness regarding thei trial date, the 
prosecutor contacted ithe: districtiacourt for a 
status report,... whereupon' the .cleric's ;office 
discovered the erroi* and reassigned the case 
to a different judfeei. as 'previously ordered 
On jNovernber'28,f%e':distri^ sent 
the parties a notice'^f: a trial^sch'edulihg con-
ference se£ for December'TV :*lAfr; that confer-
ence, the court: initially attempted to! set the 
trial date for January- 19^  1995/ 'However, 
because both'defense counsel andthe prose-
cutor had a scheduling conflict; -thecourt set 
the trial for the next available date suitable 
for all trie parties, February 16 and 17;' 1995.2 
Subsequent to the
 4 trial-scheduling confer-
ence on December 7, 1994, Heaton sent a 
letter to the court requesting %ew counsel. 
On February 8, 1995, the ebiirt held1 a hear-
ing to address Heaton's requ6strwhich:,was 
based in part oirhis defense counsel's1refusal 
to bring a 'motion to dismiss1 pursuant to the 
detainer statute. The1 court'denied Heaton's 
request. On February 16, 199© after reeval-
uating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense 
counsel moved to dismiss pui^aht^tb the 
detainer statute. The court, •however, found 
that, at least 60 days of the 7 W a y delay— 
le., , the period Jbetween the second:;arraign-
ment and* the itHal-scheduling .conferenee-r 
were attributable to the administrative error 
in the clerk's office.- <This delay, the court 
concluded, constituted, "good cause" ^ under 
the .statute, and the court'therefore denied 
the motion. •-.••,••, -•'••;:• 
Although originally scheduled for Febru-
ary 16 and-17,'1995j the trial was^not actually 
held until April, 20 a n c l ^ 1.995.3 • Before 
trial, JHeaton vflleia.pr^ se n]oton,reque§t^g 
that the judge recuse .himseli^d. requesting 
;new, counsel.; A; fcL6aTO& ?y#trWiJ-:> °^i APT^ 
19, 1995, and the Judgq denj^^.bo%|requests. 
During the hearmg,7Heatonimdieated that 
he did not feel hei was* reeeiving^adequate 
legal representation and that be felt forced to 
•• :•; '- •-:•'••. ^•r<(rho...L.!1} *;oi »vo''•' ',, 
2. Defense counsel and. the-.pnjsecutor,were work-
ing on another criminal J^iariii'mid-January, 
•3. The reasons for;,the. trial.delay,from .February 
to April are not perthient to:uSislipp&l.jA ^''" ' 
914 Utan y«>8 r a ^ i r xt> iwaijcrurvii^ xv, &u onixvi^o 
proceed on his own. His attorney indicated 
that a;:"rift" had developed:between them, 
that he was. uncomfortable agoing to triaLi be-
cause 'of the ^ "total^ conftict£;;( between -them, 
and that he thought Heaton .wanted to repre^ 
sent himself..Heatondid' not assert his right 
to^self-repfesentationv^an^thejudgedid not 
ask Heatontwhether he. <wished,t,o waive; his 
right to counsel;^  Instead^the, judge (1) ad-
vised Heaton /of his. right^to^self-representa-
tion, (2),refused,to-pennii-Heaton's counsel 
to withdraw, (3) indicated
 (tp Heaton, that. he 
was requiring, counsel to ^ remain, as standby 
counsel to, assist ,Heaton; if, he, wanted the 
assistance, and; (4) indicated that Heaton was 
free, to choose .to handle trial
 f matters ptn .his 
own but that the court would make a record 
of Heaton's decision to proceed prbjb'e.'" 
Although .Heaton's defense,,counsel assist-
ed Heaton in-selecting the jury,, Heaton-rep-
resented himself at trial.,. The jury convicted 
Heaton on both, charges,,and he was sen-
tenced ,{xu.serve concurrent; terms of five 
• years to life and zero to fiye years . at the 
Utah,State,Prison, such terms to.be served 
consecutivelyi;tp: any:.sentences Heaton; was 
already serving. ....•i.-j;.-,.
 ; f. y.,r,cn ';.'.. .•, 
On appeal, 'Heaton alleges' ther following 
errors: (l)the trialteourt ei*ed in denying 
his motion to; dismiss ^ pursuant > to the; detains 
er statute;1 (2) he: was denied his constitution^ 
al bright to counsel; (3) he^wasu denied ;his 
constitutional right!to effective: assistance ;©f 
counsel; and (4). the prosecutor's misconduct 
during closing 'argument r constituted; jfevers^ 
ible error. ..<^ '.;;->fo .r-ri-j 
•~...;,•;;• STANDARDS OF REVIEW^ nYm 
[1] The trial court's decision''to7 de'hy 
Heat6n'srmbtibtf to dismiss %afeb^se6rOri;its 
legal Conclusion- that under the '• detainer stat-
ute the'clerk's:Mmimstrative mistake could 
excusei' the"prosecutbrV duty to 'bring"Hea-
ton's' charges! to trial .within the 120-day peri-
od. Because/this is^ a* legal* rather than a 
factual, conclusion, we; review.the trial court's 
decision for correctness. See State v.. Peter-
sen, 810 P.2d.421,;425;(i/tah1991).;';;;;- :: 
[2,3] Whether a waiver of counsel was 
made kno\yingly^ and, intelligently is a mixed 
question of law and fact. We review the trial 
court's legal determinations for correctness. 
See. State v. Pena, ,869 P.2d 932, ,937-39 
(Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis^$Z4
 ;F.2d 
853,857(9thCir,198a.;; : , . ; , ' \0 ^i}X>w 
••••' • '
 :
 :'•••"-':. '•••" . ••''V>•-.};.:•: ''••» " > V " - • ; 7 i ^ ^ ^ ': • . • > . % $ 
ANALYSIS' ,*..w# 
" [4] - HeatoH ^ firstGca^gues:l that /the trial 
court erred in denying:his-motion to-dismal 
pursuarit-to" the detainer statute.^That stafc-' 
ute provides^ in relevant part: '-•' oj'jfr:.^. «> 
' (l)'Whenever a prisoner • is-"serving !a 
'term of imjprisohinpht'in! the1 state prison; 
jail or other f)eHMkor'cbrrectioHal ifistittif 




tried indiefohent^  or: inform&tibli' :iahd the 
prisoner shall deliver to the %ar(iiefi; sher^ 
iff or custodial officer' 'in' authority; pr any 
appropriate agent of thei:saxhe, raf written' 
'.demand specifying the nature' of the 
charge arid the court wherein it is pending 
and requesting'disposition of the-Spending 
charge, he-shall be entitled to'have ttie 
charge brought to 'trial wifhm 120 days? of 
, the date of delivery of written notice. K'' '•'. 
,, .,(3), After writften,demand is delivered,as 
; xequired in Subsection (l)ythe prosecuting. 
.•.-.attorney or the defendant.or his counsel, 
v yfor goqd cause shown in open court, with 
,.'the prisoner or his counsel being present, 
". may be granted any reasonable coniinu-
^qnce, /;.'.,.,''']['' ' '[ , ."' /'/'"'' ''* ' .' 
.}., j.,(4) In.;, theuevent the,,charge is' not 
.,.
 v,i)rought to, tr^al,within 120,days,, or within 
; -such continuance as has been granted,.and 
j. defendant or.-his counsel moves to, dismiss 
;... -the action,, the. court shall review tjie. pro-
ceeding. If the.court finds that theJailure 
,, of,the. prpseciiting attorney, to, have, the 
,.-,matter heard ,within the time, requirASs 
..not supported ibygoodj' epuse, whether; a 
previous . > motion for^continiianee, was 
\i .madeKor not, . the court shall order,the 
^matter dismissed with,prejudice..,,,•,'. ,,, 
Utah Code Ann. :;§ 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (em-
phasis added). 
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the 
district court made the following ruling: 
:..5;[T]his Court is going to deny;the Defen-
dant's [motion on] the basis- that I believe 
Cite as 958 P.2d 
that there has been good ;cause[.]. And 
that term doesn't quite fit in this, situation, 
but explainable cause shown as to why the 
delay occurred. And the Courts does, not 
• find in any way that it.was as asresult-of 
the prosecution's dragging its feet. 
The facts are that the bulk of thet-delay, 
60 days at least of it,was the. fault prpba-
: bly of the Clerk's office in this case..,: And 
again I don't know whether that fits into 
.what could be called-, a good cause .shown, 
but the Court believes that it happens 
from time to time,, that there can be]that 
kind of a glitch.
 r '_'"V .• '..'•';...'. 
And certainly: the.jDefendantcpuld have 
pushed to find out why his case liad not 
been set for trial. [He] [ciould haye 
pushed his counsel to make that request, 
[a]nd. was in the same position [as was],the 
Stsite.tfc»-.. i ':i-i,- .'i\ •;•.,.••:.....»:. .... ^ ' : - - j " . . , - VVM 
The case sat And it is unfortunate it 
did, but the Court;,will deny the motion at 
this time. •.._,, ,....,.; 
The district court's ruling contradicts sec-
tion 77-^ 29-1 and our pribr case law.; The 
statute. requires the prosecutor "to have, the 
matter- heard within the. time required." 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 77-29^1(4), ,-Moreover, 
this court has; consistently (held, that, the lan-
guage ,.of the detainer, statute;clearly places 
the burden of complying with the statute, on 
the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 P.^djiat 
424; State %. Wilson, ',22. Utah; 2d 3 6 ^ 4 ^ 
P.2d 158, 160. (1969)., In Petersen, tfee'trjal 
court asked the defendant whether the .trial 
date was acceptable, and the defendant did 
not object to the date, which was outside the 
120-day period. Nevertheless, this court 
concluded that the defendant was'not re-
quired to object to the trial date in order to 
maintain his rights under the statute because 
the burden of bringing the case to trial with-
in the disposition period rested solely with 
the prosecution. 810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in 
the case at bar, the
 (court clearly erred in 
concluding that Heaton was in the same posi-
tion as was the State and therefore shared 
some of the responsibility to find out why his 
case had not been set for trial.... ,.,,, .
 : , 
[5] The trial court furtherr erred ini its 
legal conclusion that the 71-niay delay, most 
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of which was; occasioned-fry the court derk's 
error, constituted "good-cause" and thereby 
relieved the prosecutor of its burden -under 
the statute. , We first-note that the judge's 
finding that the State did not * contributed 
the delay .carries little significance. ><The 
mere fact that the^delay was not cause<i by 
the prosecutor has never been considered 
dispositive because, "to Kpld that
 (good cause 
ig supported. by the/lone feet that^e delay 
was not caused by the prosecutor would ccm-
tradict the1 language in section 77-2^ -11:4) 
which places! the burden, of coniplying .with 
the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 426; 
see also^ Wilson, 453, P ^ a t .1?M0 (revers--
ing trial court's decision not to, dismiss, not-
withstanding, feet that prosecution clid not 
c a u s e d e l a y ) . *M'' ••,•••;•* • ••-••i wtf*- •••.'» 
% 7] The State'ar^ie^that while it could 
have followed up on the cases earlier^ "defen-
dant cites ho precede^ for attribtitmg td the 
prbsecutd^ the responsibility fbr'anticipating 
or preventing unexpected and infrequent ad-
ministrative mistakes made by co.urt person-
nel.";>,.We agree-,with the State, that ..it is not 
resporisible for. the administrative mistakes 
of the courtv.vNevertheless, it is responsible 
for complying with section ,77-29-1.. ..Because 
the statute .places on thevprosecutor alone 
the burden of bringing thehvcase;to: trial with-
in the 120-rday i)eriod, the prosecutor's iduty 
must be independent of the court's docketing 
system. While Heaton's case-fell victim to 
;&i administrative "glitch*', at the clerk's •of-
fice, his case- also fell through a crack in* the 
prosecutor's: office;>• Even though'the prose^ 
cutor's office received Heaton's detainer no-
tice on September 8, 1994, neither the briefs 
nor our review of the fecoM. indicates that 
the prosecutor'-even addressed Heaton's de-
tainer notice to the court until. February 16, 
1995, after the dispositionperibd had Already 
expired;- Wheii a prisoner delivers a written 
notice pursuant to the^detainer statute, the 
prosecutor has^ an ^ affirmative duty to have 
the defendant's matter heard within the^  stat-
utory period;; Implicit in this duty'is the 
duty to notify the court that a detainer notice 
has been filed and to make a good faith effort 
,to comply with the^statute. This is not to 
say that the -prosecutor; must; succeed>; ^ fpr 
"good cause" may support -rthe^pTosecutor's 
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failure to comply,^ • However, where the" pros-
ecutor's failure is inaction—in this case,: do-
ing nothing whatsoever to bring Heaton's 
case to trial within?-the statutory period—the 
trial courtvmay not conclude that the prose-
cutor's failure is supported by "good cause." 
; [8,9] Nevertheless, even if the lower 
court erred in its legal' edrielusioiis, this' court 
may. a t o m a trial court's' decision on any 
reasonable legal basis, provided that aiiy ra-
tionale for affirmance finds support in ' the 
recorbf. See' K & f, Inc.1''% Koroulis, '888 
P.2d %23;);6^ (IJtaH,!1994);;ri/iH b>SeMe 
. First'"Ntiil Bokk,^ P2& 2 4 1 / M ^ U t a h 
1992)" Deciding whether the district court 
properly Sehied Heaton's motion to; 'dismiss 
pursuant'to the detainer statute requires a 
two-step inquiry. First, we must determine 
when the 120-day period (.commenced and 
when,, it expired. Second, if the trial was 
held .outside the 120r-day period, w,e. must 
then determine whether "good cause" ex-
cused ,the delay. 
[10] The detainer statute clearly? provides 
that the 120-day period commences on the 
date the written notice is delivered :"to the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in; authori-
ty, or any appropriate agent of the? same." 
Utah Code Ann. §'77-29-1(1); see also State 
v. Viles,- 702 P;2d;1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) 
(holding that 12CMay disposition period com-
mences from date rof delivery :of; written no-
tice to warden, not from date defense.counsel 
files notice of appearance). ; .However, this 
court has held that when a prisoner himself 
acts to delay the trial,- he indicates .his. will-
ingness to l temporarily waive i his right ,to, a 
speedy: trial. .[Thus, the disposition period 
must be extended by the amount of time 
during which the prisoner ^ himself.(Creates the 
delay./See"Statejv.: Velasquez^ 641 P.2d 115, 
116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that where de-
fendant's trial date was originally scheduled 
less than, one month
 ;after defendant's re-
quest for disposition and • court: granted, de-
fendant's request for continuanee^defendant 
was responsible for number of;;days during 
which continuance was granted and, could not 
include those days in disposition, period). 
In the case at bar, the'I204iay disposition 
period commenced on- September 3/1994, 
because that I s ; the date ori' which an autho-
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rized agent.at the prison received Heaton's 
written notice." However, Heaton did cause a. 
trial/delay. As set forth above, the court 
initially scheduled trial for September 9, 
1994. At his pretrial conference on August 
30, Heaton requested a preliminary hearing, 
which he had initially waived. The prosecu-
tor having no objection^ the court granted 
Heaton's request, changing the trial; date to 
the preliminary bearing date. But for Hea-
ton's1 request for'a preliminary hearing, his 
case would have^beeri^brought ibJ trial on 
September 9, 'just" *6 days after his 'written 
notice had' been*' delivered. Thus',' fieaton 
delayed his own trial and indicated hiss will-
ingnessto' temporarily waive his rights under 
the /detainer statute. /'See Velasquez, 641 
P.Matll6? 
When the court changed Heaton's. trial 
date to the preliminary hearing date,- in ef-
fect I t "continued Heaton's-trial pending the 
outcome' of the preliminary hearing. Had 
the court not found probable cause at the 
hearing,: it would have had :lo dismiss the 
charges.. See;Utah R.Crim>P..7^hX3)/ How-
ever/ the court did - find probable cause, and 
therefore scheduled a' second arraignment 
for September 27/ 'The court could hot set a 
new trial date until. Heaton entered his pleas 
at the second arraignment: Thus/fbecause 
Heaton's trial date was ; continued: for the 
purpose of accommodating his request for a 
preliminary hearing, and because a'new trial 
date could 'hot even have been considered 
until the'second arraignment, Heaton niajr 
not include the 18 days between September 9 
and September 217 as part of the 120-da;y 
disposition period. "
 ; ' 
J
 Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to 
Heaton, the State had until January 19, 1995, 
to bring Heaton to trial.V Although the court 
initially attempted to set the jtrial for Janu-
ary 19, 1995, it scheduled the trial beyond 
the disposition period because of the defense 
counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling coh^ -
flict. Therefore, we must proceed to step 
two of our inquiry to determine whether 
continuing the trial to accommodate, in part, 
defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good 
cause" under section 77-29-1. 
;• STATE v. 
Cite as 958 P.2d 
[11] A nearly identical issue was raised in 
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2dl47 
(1970), wherein the initially scheduled trial 
date fell within the disposition period, but 
because defense counsel had a • scheduling 
conflict the court rescheduled the trial for 
five days beyond the- disposition period. 
This court concluded that: section 77-65-1, 
the predecessor to section 77!-29-l,4 permit-
ted the court to grant, "'foj*,a good cause 
shown in open court . V, any necessary or 
reasonable continuance..';" . Bonny, All P.2d 
at 147-48 {quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-
1). Thus, because the trial was rescheduled 
at defense counsel's request and to accommo-
date his schedule, this.court held that' the 
trial court/ had authority to' grant such .a 
continuance, which was "entirely reasonable 
and practical under the circumstances." M 
at 148. 
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains sub-
stantially ; the same language as section 77-
65-1. and gives the court discretion to .grant 
continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is ap-
plicable to the case at bar. The January 19, 
1995, date initially offered by the trial court 
fell within the 120-day disposition period, 
and,the court was therefore within its au-
thority to, grant a reasonable continuance 
under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate de-
fense counsel's schedule. In light of the 
other criminal trial both defense counsel and 
the prosecutor were engaged in, setting Hea-
ton's trial one month beyond the,disposition 
period was not unreasonable. Therefore, we 
hold that,while the.district court, erred,sin its 
legal conclusions, extending the trial date to 
a reasonable time outside the disposition pe-
riod to accommodate, in part, defense coun-
sel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under 
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court 
correctly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss. 
[12,13].... We next address Heaton's argu-
ment that he did not knowingly and-intelli-
gently waive his constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees an 
accused the right to the assistance of counsel. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372, U;S. 335, 
342-44, 83 S.Ct., 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 
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S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Edv 1461 (1938). If an ac-
cused is indigent, .he is entitled to court-
appointed counsel. : See ••>State v. Wulffen-
stein, 733 P.2da20/421 (Utah 1986). How-
ever, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees 
an accused the right to : self-representation, 
"provided only thatrhe [or she], knowingly 
and intelligently forgoes; his [or her] right to 
counsel." • McKaskle .-.#.s.Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 173,/104 S.Ct. 944,; 79;.L,Ed.2d 122 
(1984); see also Farettav.- California, 422 
U.S. 806, 807, 818) .85 S.Ct 2§25, 45 L.Ed.2d 
562 (1975). 
The right to have the "assistance of counsel 
in a criminal trial is a'fundamental cdhst te 
tional right which'must be jealously protect-
ed by-the trial ^ourt. ilie United States 
Supreme Court'Has'stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by' counsel invokes, of itself, 
the protection of a trial court, iri which the 
accused—whose life orlfcertyis at s t a k e -
is without counsel. Tliis protecting' dMy 
imposes the serious and Mighty responsi-
bility upon the tridl judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and compe-
tent waiver by the accused. 
Jojmso^ 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (em-
phasis added). Because of the importance of 
the right to, counsel and the heavy .burden 
placed upon the trial court to protect this 
right, there is a presumption against waiver, 
and doubts concerning waiver, must be, re-
solved, in the defendant's favor. See,,, e.g., 
Johnson, 304;U.S.7at 464, 58.s. S.Ct. .1019 
(M'[C]ourts indulge every reasonable ^re-
sumption! against waiver' of fundamental con-
stitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. 
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 
81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937)));; United States v. "Wil-
liamson,806 F.2d'216, 220 (10th Cir.1986) 
(doubts concerning waiver of-counsel'must be 
resolved in defendant's favor). -
[14-16] When a trial, court is confronted 
with a defendant who either, refuses, to pro-
ceed to trial with, appointed counsel .or insists 
on proceeding pro se, the court must careful-
ly consider the defendant's' rigHtvto self-^rep-
resentatiori with l^ ' /pg^^-Munsel^ Never-
theless, before .the v^eourt ,^ay, permit.Vithe 
4. Section 77-29-1, enacted in 1980,; replaced section 77-65-1. 
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defendant to proceed without the assistance 
of counsel, the court ffiust conduct a thor-
ough inquiry of the''defendant to fulfill fits 
duty of insuring that-the-defendant's waiver 
of counsel is knowingly,a intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. • In making this determina-
tion, the court must advise the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-repre-
sentation "so vthat the record will establish 
that 'he knows what he--is doing--and his 
choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, 
422 U.S; at1 -835, 95 :S.C^ 2525 '(quoting 
Adams v. United States ex ret. McCahni 317 
U.S,jr269, 279, ,63 S.Ct- 236, ,87 ,L,Ed.,268 
(1942)); see Von MoUke^ Gillies,, 332* U.S. 
708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct^Jl^, 92" kJSd,. 309 
,(1948);
 :,State v^rFram%tpn, ",737 P>2djl83, 
187-88 (Utah 1987).
 L'In Edition,' 'the Atrial 
court should (1) advise the defendant of-his 
constitutional right to tne assistance of coun-
sel, as well as his constitutional fright Ho 
represent m^self;;; (2)'ascertain that the de-
fendant possesses the intelligence and capaci-
ty to understand and appreciate the conse-
quences of the decision to represent himself, 
including the expectation that the defendant 
will comply with technical rules and the rec-
ognition that presenting a defense is not just 
a matter of telling one's story;r arid (3) ascer-
tain that the defendant comprehends the riaL 
ture of the charges and' proceedings) the 
range of' permissible punishrhentsy' arid :any 
additional facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the case. See State v. Fr#6,224 
Conn. 253, 617 A.2d 1382,1386-87 (1992); ^ ee 
also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88.5 • ^ v -S '• 
This court stated in Frampton that a collo-
quy on the record between the court and the 
defendant is the preferred method of deter-
mining the validity of a.waiver,of counsel. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 1&7. ",.r The reasoning 
behind this, conclusion is that ithei information 
necessary for the court to" ma% its determi-
nation generally "can only be elicited after 
penetrating questioning by-the'' trial' court." 
Id.; see also VonMoWie, 332U.S. at 724/68 
S.CtL3i6 ("A judge can make certain that-an 
5. . ;In, Framptom
 Tas a guide for trial courts, ..this 
court quoted a sLxteen-point colloquy recom-
1
 mended to the federal'courts for use' jwhehtori-
•''Fronting !ai. prospective pro se defendant. Framp-
ton, 111 P.2d at 187-88 n. 12 (citing Bench Book 
for United States District Court Judges, vol: 1, 
accused's^ professed waiver of counsel is un-
derstaridingly > arid wisely made .only from* a 
penetrating and comprehensive examination 
of all the circumstances."). In Frampton? we 
also stated ;>that> in the absence of such a 
colloquy, we will look at any evidence in: the 
record to determine-whether the particular 
facts and circumstances' support a valid waivF 
er. 737 P.2d-at 188; 
[17] However, in light of the foregoing 
discussidri, this,court is; reluctant to assume 
the important responsibility'whichhas b&eri 
placed upon' ther trial court ' After ajl,' the 
trial court—hayingthe berieffi'of questioning 
the defendant arid bbserving his deriiefarior-^ -
is in trie best position to determine whether 
the defendant knowingly,'voluntarily, and in-
telligently waiveid his right to cminsei.'; In 
contrast, thiis court's proper role is to review 
the trial court's findings and conclusions and 
then determine whether the trial court5cor-
rectly concluded that the -defendant validly 
waived counsel. - A meaningful review of the 
trial court>'can take place ;b"nly after-that 
court has conducted a meaningful inquiry of 
the defendant. ; Therefore; in the absence- of 
such a colloquy, this court will' look^at the 
record and make-a de novo determination 
regarding the validity of the defendant's 
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, 
the existence of which We will address on a 
case-by-case basis- See Harding; '834 F.2d 
a t 8 5 7 . ••:•'•••. ••••-•• • - • ^ . r ) : . • . . : . . • : v : 
'"' In the case at bar, the trial court clearly 
did not' advise Heaton of1 the dangers arid 
disadvantages of self-represehtatioii. The 
day before trial, during the hearing address-
ing Heatori's motion for new counsel', the trial 
judge stated: '" " ' r"'"•"' 
,,'"'" Now, with respect to counsel, you ^ do 
" have the right to represent y°urself- I ani 
not going to allow Mr. 'Caine's withdrawal 




 fense attorney. He is. very familiar with 
•••;: the facts1 in ' your case. * I am going to 
•'
y
* require that he remain on- as -counsel to 
'••'•* assist you if you want thetassistancej. • ! 
w§§ 1,02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, '3d eo\ 
''i'986)). Once again, we strongly recommend 
that trial courts use that-approach; ;as it is'an 
'effective means by, which to; vdetennine. whether 
the defendant has validly waived his right to 
• > counsel/' 
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Mr: Heaton, if during the .process of the 
Jury selection,, and the defense that you 
want to present during the trial, you want 
to handle that on your own, you are free to 
do that. And you will be making that 
decision as you ^oi We will makeTa record 
of your decision to handle those riiatters on 
your own if that's yourchoice.''', 
; My recommendation, to you,,is' that you 
rely on Mr. Caine's expertise.and experi-
ence and have him help you. But you can 
make that choice. V 
The. court's cursory recommendation to 
Heaton to rely on defense counsel did not 
apprise Heaton in any way.of the. constitu-
tional significance of the right to counsel and 
the consequences of waiver.,. .The t .State, ar-
gues that Heaton should have been* aware of 
the dangers and.disadvantages of self-repre-
sentation because on the rlay;,p^ trial, after 
the jury- had been selected, the:cpurt strong-
ly advised Heaton .to allow defense, counsel to 
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch 
as Heaton would certainly not be as effective 
as .defense counsel. While the court's advice 
was; certainly appropriate, it addressed only 
one of the; disadvantages of self-representa-
tion—i.e., not having experience and exper-
tise in cross-examining witnesses. More-
over, the trial cotirt had' already deterniined 
that iieatori had decided to' represent him-
self. As we have previously mentioned^ be-
fore a trial court riiay'pehnit a defendant to 
proceed pro se, the court must'deterriiine 
whether the defendant cbriipeteritly waived 
counsel at the time. of waiver, not after. 
,We therefore hold that jbecause the trial 
court failed to advise Heaton, at a minimum, 
of the dangers and' disadvantages of setf-
representatiorij Hektori did not validly waive 
his constitutional right to courisel. The trial 
court erred in permitting' Heaton to proceed 
pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a new trial. 
There are no e'xtradrcunary circumstances in 
this 'case which would-justify' our exarniriatibn 
of the record and maidrig1 a de novo determi-
nation as to whether Heaton knowingly arid 
intelligently waived : his • right to- counsel. 
Moreover, because the waiver of counsel'is-
sue is dispositive, of this appeal, we need not 
address Heaton'& other,arguments. vvti;'. 
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We reverse Heaton's convictions and order 
a new trial. 
; HQWE,;CJ., DURHAM, Associate CJ., 
land STEWART and ZIMMERMAf ,:.JJ., 
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
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R. Lee ALLEN, Allen 1^, Jensen^ James 
J^White,,and BoxJEl^er County; 
I)efencia.nts and Appellees. 
No. 960463. 
Supreme Court of Utah. ' 
May, 12, 1998. 
Former justice court judge brought ac-
tion alleging county coirimission's pre-elec-
tion elimination: of his precinct
 ;violated statu-
tory prohibition against abolishing precincts 
within SO days of-an election; The First Dis-
trict Court, Box Elder County, 'Ben H. Had-
field, J., granted summary judgment in favpr 
of county, and former judge appealed. J!he 
Supreme Court,'Howe^CJ,, held;! that:. (1) 
statutory, prohibition against • pre-election 
changes applied to precinct fin which justice 
•court judges served, and (2) county commis-
sion violated statutory prohibition! against 
pre-election changes when-;it combined two 
precincts 62 days prior to election, even 
though combination; was- not to take effect 
until over two months after election. 
Reversed. 
1. Appeal and Error ®»842(1) 
Interpretation of statutes poses a ques-
tion of law, which Supreme Courftreviews for 
correctness and without deference to the low-
er court's conclusions.. 
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. K 16 I CONCUR: JACKSON, Associate 
Presiding Judge. 
' 1f 17 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
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Michael Cole LINDSAY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 990739-CA. 
.Court of Appeals; of Utah. . 
Dec. 29, 2000. 
• Parolee appealed conviction entered in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Depart-
ment, J. Dennis Frederick, J., pursuant to 
conditional guilty plea to various drug-relat-
ed felonies. The Court of appeals, Orme, J., 
held that statutory right to demand speedy 
trial was not triggered by written request for 
disposition of pending charges, where no for-
mal charges were pending. 
Affirmed. .. 
1, Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
Matters of statutory interpretation pres-
ent questions of law which Court of Appeals 
reviews for correctness, according no particu-
lar deference to the trial court's interpreta-
tion. 
2. Statutes <3=>181Q) 
Court of Appeals' primary objective in 
construing enactments is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent. 
X Statutes <S^188 
When examining a statute, Court of Ap-
peals looks first to its plain language as the 
est indicator of the legislature's intent and 
; urpose in passing the statute. 
4. Criminal Law ^577.11(1) 
Utah detainer statute, requiring 
er against whom untried indictment or 
mation was pending to be brought t 
within 120 days of date of delivery of \ 
notice to warden, is designed to promc 
prompt prosecution of charges againsi 
oners, to prevent those charged with er 
ment of criminal statutes from holding 
head of a prisoner undisposed of cl 
against him, and while not supplanting 
statutes of limitation for various crim 
encourage trials while witnesses are ava 
and their memories are fresh. U.CA.uoo, 
77-29-1. ""^ 
5. Criminal Law <s»577.10(10) 
Under Utah detainer statute, after;, iai! 
prisoner appropriately requests speedy reso-"0: 
lution of pending charges, the .burden shifts ] 
to the prosecution to commence trial withui'* 
the 120-day period set out in the statute 
prisoner's request must comply with tht 
quirements of the statute in order V 
effective. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
6. Criminal Law ®=>577.10(10) 
Prisoner's statutory right to deir 
speedy trial was not triggered by wri 
request for disposition of pending char 
where defendant had not been charged v 
crimes by indictment or information, 
thus, no formal charges were pending 
which he could be tried under statute reqi 
ing prisoner against whom untried ind 
ment or information was pending to 
brought to trial within 120 days of date 
deliver}' of written notice to warden speci 
ing nature of charge and court in which it 
was pending; prisoner was not entitled to-
tender request in anticipation of forthcoming* 
charges, as statute spoke in terms of untried 
information pending against prisoner; 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. . • •> 
7. Criminal Law <s»1134(3) ]\ 
Deciding whether the district court.' 
properly denied a prisoner's motion to dis-
miss pursuant to detainer statute, requiring 
prisoner against whom untried indictment or 
information is pending to be brought to trial' • 
within 120 days of date of delivery of written 
notice to warden, requires a two-step inquiry: 
STATE v . ] 
Cite as 18 P,3d 504 
Efct, Court of Appeals must determine when 
fe 120-day period commenced and when it 
jl&jred. and second, if the trial was held 
Hlgide the 120-day period, Court of Appeals 
Kg t then determine whether "good cause" 
Bused the delay. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.-^ 
•Cr imina l Law'<s=>577.10(10) ' 
BT. Premature request for disposition under 
lltainer statute, requiring prisoner against 
fyhom untried indictment or information was 
pending to be brought to trial within 120 
da^s of date of delivery of written' notice to 
warden, does not later "kick in" once the 
information is ultimately filed or the indict-
ment returned; premature request is simply 
a nullity, having no legal effect. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1. - . •• r< 
9?J Criminal Law <§=*577.2 ... 
Purpose of detainer statute, requiring 
prisoner against whom untried indictment or, 
information
 ;was, pending to be brought, to 
trial within 120 days of date of delivery of 
written notice to warden, is. • to promote 
speedy trials, not the speedy filing of infor-
mations. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. \, . 
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Appellant. 
Jan Graham, Kris C. Leonard, and Scott 
W. Reed, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 




11 Defendant Michael Cole Lindsay en-
tered guilty pleas on, various drug-related 
felonies. Lindsay conditioned his,; pleas of 
guilt on his right to*, appeal the. trial court's, 
conclusion regarding his statutoryright to a 
1. Lindsay has applied himself.-;to constructive 
pursuits while in prison.
 T He is a member of a 
highly-regarded inmate fire-fighting team called 
the Flame-n-go's. While-fighting a fire in the 
Stansbury Mountains • on August 23, 2000, a 
Flame-n-go's crew, including Lindsay, was 
struck by lightning. Lindsay was knocked un-
conscious. When he came to, he discovered 
team members , Michael Bishop and Rodgie 
Braithwaite lying on the ground. He and the 
LINDSAY Utah 505 
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speedy trial pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1 (1999). See State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Gt.App.1988). Lindsay, 
who lodged an invocation of his speedy trial 
right with the prison warden, argues the 
claims against him should have been: dis-
missed for violation of the statute. We dis-
agree and affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
112 On July 23, 1998, Lindsay, who was on 
parole at the time, was arrested and booked 
on several charges. Soon thereafter his pa-
role was revoked, and he was returned to 
prison.1 On October 6, 1998, after his rein^ 
carceration, Lindsay filed a "Notice and Re-
quest for Disposition of Pending Charges,"' 
pursuant to Utah Code' Ann. §77-29-1 
(1999). Section 77-29-1 states, in relevant 
part, with our emphasis: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term 
of imprisonment in the iitate prison, jail or 
other penal or correctional institution of 
this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner inthis state any untried indict-
ment or information, and the prisoner 
shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or cus-
todial officer in authority, or any appropri-
ate agent of the same,, a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge and the 
court, wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall 
be entitled to have the charge brought to 
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery 
of written notice. ., 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought 
to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and de-
fendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceed-
ing. If the court finds that the failure of 
the prosecuting attorney to have the mat-
other survivors feverishly administered CPR,' ulti-
mately to no avail. Bishop and Braithwaite were. 
the first Flame-n-go's to die in the line of duty in 
the group's 22-year history. See The Salt Lake1 
Tribune, August 24, 2000, at A-l; The. Deseret 
News, August 25, 2000, at B-l. Without in any 
way condoning the conduct that led to their 
incarceration, we. salute the Flame-n-go's, the. 
.sacrifice of their fallen comrades, and Lindsay's 
devotion to duty. • , .; ,, • 
ter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previ-
ous motion for continuance was made or 
not, the court shall order the matter dis-
missed with prejudice. 
113 The information formally 'charging 
Lindsay with the crimes for which he was 
arrested on July 23, 1998, was not filed until 
March 2, 1999, almost five full months after 
he filed his disposition request. On April 6, 
1999, Lindsay moved to .dismiss the charges 
against him, alleging the 120-day statutory 
time frame had begun to run when he filed 
his disposition request with the warden and 
thus had long since expired. On May 3, the 
magistrate denied his motion to dismiss. Af-
ter bindover, Lindsay renewed his motion to 
dismiss in the district court. On July 16r the 
district court denied the motion to dismiss 
and adopted the magistrate's findings, con-
clusions, and order. On July 20, 1999, Lind-
say entered his conditional guilty pleas. This 
appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] 114 Lindsay argues the district court 
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann.'§ 77-29-1 
(1999) by refusing to dismiss- the charges 
pending against him because more than 120 
days had transpired between when he ten-
dered his disposition request and when his 
trial was scheduled to commence. Matters 
of statutory interpretation present questions 
of law which we review for correctness, ac-
cording no particular deference to the trial 
court's interpretation. See State v. Harley, 
1999 UT App 197,1119-10, 982 P.2d 1145, 
cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
[2,3] 115 In reviewing the trial court's 
application of section 77-29-1, we apply long-
standing rules of statutory construction. 
"This court's primary objective in construing 
enactments is to give effect to the legisla-
ture's intent." Gohlerv. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 
562 (Utah 1996). " 'When examining a stat-
ute, we look first to its plain language,as the 
best indicator of the legislature's intent and 
purpose in passing the statute.' "; Holmes v. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court long ago determined 
that the time limit in the detainer-statute did not 
create a different statute of limitation for inear-
American States Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 552, 
UT App 85,1-10-, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. r|§ 
(quoting Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, ! 
P.2d.416, 418 (Utah 1998)). Thereto 
"where the statutory language is plain 
unambiguous, we do not look beyond t h j 
language's plain meaning to divine legislative 
intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sum 
821 P.2d 1167,1168 (Utah 1991).
 ; 3 
ANALYSIS :'M 
[4] 116 Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (199™ 
known as the detainer statute, is designedly 
promote the prompt prosecution of chargeJj 
against prisoners, "to prevent those charged! 
with enforcement of criminal statutes frono| 
holding over the head of a prisoner undis^ 
posed of charges against him." State v. WiX$ 
son, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969^ 
The statute, while not supplanting other stat-
utes of limitation for various crimes,2 encour^ 
ages trials "while witnesses are available ancB 
• ^ ;. ..to 
their memories are fresh." Id. The s t a t u t e ^ 
designed to "protect the constitutional right'i 
of prisoners to a speedy trial," State v. Viles?* 
702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985), and ttr 
"more precisely define what is meant by; 
'speedy trial,'" as constitutionally guaran-... 
tied. Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159. ^ 
[5] 117 After a prisoner appropriately re-; 
quests speedy resolution of pending charges/ 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to com-
mence trial within the 120-day period set out 
in the statute. See State v. Petersen, 810 
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). However, the' 
request must comply with the requirements 
of the statute in order to be effective. See 
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 
1987). 
H8 Lindsay argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion t^ o dismiss. In denying 
the motion, the trial c/)urt adopted the magis-
trate's conclusion: 
The Court finds that the 120 day re-
quirement of Utah Code Annotated § 77-
. 29-1 et seq. is triggered by an information 
or indictment existing or pending against 
the defendant. The date of defendant's 
cerated individuals. See State v. Farnsworth, 30 
Utah 2d 435, 519 P.2d 244, 246 (1974). 
arrest and/or his filing of a request for 
^disposition of detainer prior to charges 
joeing filed is irrelevant for purposes of 
'.calculating the time requirement set forth 
[say's request for disposition was premature, 
land thus not properly tendered, because no 
linfbrmation had been filed, and thus was not 
|-officially pending, when the request was 
linade. 
| ••.[?> ,71 1f 9 "Deciding whether the district 
court properly denied [Lindsay's] motion to. 
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute re-
quires a two-step inquiry. First, we must 
determine when the 120-day period com-
menced and when it expired." State v. Hea-
tb%958 P.2d 911, 916 (Utah 1998). "Second, 
if the trial was held outside the 120-klay 
period, we must then determine whether 
'good cause' excused the delay." Id. In this 
case, we must decide whether the 120-day 
period was properly triggered by Lindsay's 
request for disposition, which followed-•. his 
arrest but preceded the filing of an informa-
tion against him. Our answer obviates any 
need to move to the second step of analysis. 
U 10 The plain language of the detainer 
statute provides that the 120-day period 
commences on the date the written notice is 
delivered "to the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appropriate agent 
of the same." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) 
(1999). No one disputes that Lindsay made 
such a request on October 6,199& However, 
formal charges must be pending against him 
when the request is delivered. It is hot 
appropriate to tender a request in anticipa-
tion of forthcoming charges, as the statute 
speaks in terms of an untried information 
"pending against the prisoner."3 Id. 
111 "Pending" is1 defined as "[remaining 
undecided; awaiting decision." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1154 (7th ed.1999). I t is also de-
3. The decision to bring charges at all is in the 
prosecutor's discretion. In many cases a defen-
dant might be able to anticipate which charges 
are likely to be officially filed, but until the time 
of filing, no one can be certain what action the 
prosecutor will take. Therefore, logically, it 
makes no sense to start the 120-day period with 
a defendant's merely anticipatory request for dis-
position. 
fined as "[throughout the continuance of; 
during." Id. Facing a similar question
 ; of 
interpretation regarding whether a judge 
had made an inappropriate. comment during 
a "pending proceeding," the Utah Supreme 
Court recently said: 
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct 
does not define "pending,proceeding," the 
meaning of the .term is easily understood. 
"Pending," by definition, means "begun, 
but not yet completed; during; before. thes 
conclusion of; prior to the completion of; 
unsettled; undetermined; in process of 
settlement or adjustment." Black's ' Law 
Dictionary 1291 (rev.14th ed.1968). ' 
In re Young, 1999 UT 81,133. n. 7, 984 P.2d 
997. 
II12 The problem with Lindsay's request 
is that, although parole revocation proceed-, 
ings were in process, at the time he made his 
request there were no criminal charges pend-
ing against him for which he could be tried in 
court.4 An action cannot be pending when it 
is yet to be commenced. As explained, with 
our emphasis, in the rules, 
[u]nless otherwise provided, all criminal . 
prosecutions whether for felony, misde-
meanor or infraction shall be commenced 
by the filing of an information dr the re-
turn of an indictment. Prosecution by in-
formation shall be commenced before a 
magistrate having jurisdiction of the of-
fense alleged to have been committed,un-
less otherwise provided by law. * • 
Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). Thus, without such an 
official filing, there were; no charges "pend-
ing" against Lindsay on October 6, 1998. 
The 120-day period could not commence un-
til March 2, 1999, the day the information 
charging him was filed. 
. 113 . While an arrest is not a meaningless 
gesture, the statute does not in any way 
suggest a mere arrest is adequate to trigger 
4. The Utah Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized that reincarceration as a result of a parole 
violation, standing alone, does not trigger a de-
fendant's speedy trial right regarding a different 
crime. See State v. Smith, 699 P.2d 711, 713 
(Utah 1985). 
,,. the 120-day period. Rather, the statute spe-
cifically states that the action must relate to 
a "pending . . . untried indictment or infor-
mation." 5 Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 
(1999). Before charges are formally brought 
in an information, which eventually occurred 
in this case, the prosecution follows several 
steps that had not taken place when Lindsay 
made his request for disposition. -See State 
exrel Cannon v. Leary, '646 P.2d 727, 730 
(Utah 1982) (detailing how prosecutor first 
screens case, authorizes prosecution by sign-
ing information, presentment of information 
to magistrate, subscribing and swearing to 
information by complaining witnesses, and 
finally filing information with clerk of court). 
Whether—and with what—the prosecution 
would charge Lindsay were questions "pend-
ing" in one sense of the term when Lindsay 
made his request. But according to the plain 
language of the statute, an "indictment of 
information" must have been brought so 
that it was "pending" against Lindsay; the 
mere possibility of such was simply riot 
enough. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) 
(emphasis added) .6 
-~ . . * v « ^ xvjc/.rurtxj&K, 3d SERIES 
theless, that "at the time the [alleged req^, 
for disposition] was sent, defendant hacUij 
yet been charged with the . . . robbery/;! 
no untried indictment or information'5'® 
pending against defendant. Thus, not] 
triggered the statutory right to demand « 
on any 'untried indictment or information^! 
(citation omitted); State v. Clark, 28 Utah%, 
272, 501 P.2d 274, 276 (1972) (recognizihgl 
persuasive State ex rel Dennis v. Morph&rk 
ios, 252 So.2d 845 (Fla.Ct.App. 1971), and'cS 
ing its holding that any request for d isp^ 
tion filed "before" the charging informal^ 
• "is a nullity"). • " " ^ 
[9] 1115 The purpose of the statute is j jL 
promote speedy trials, not the speedy filitM 
of informations. Lindsay's request came tog|| 
early in the process—defendants must awaitij 
the;filing of an information or the return^eM 
an indictment for an action to be official!^ 
pending. Lindsay jumped the gun, andhis§l 
request for disposition had no legal effectiff 
Lindsay was entitled to file a valid request^! 
for disposition only after the information was"-U 
filed. 
[8],, If 14 Moreover, a premature request 
for disposition does not later "kick in" once 
the information is ultimately Sled QT the in-
dictment returned. A premature request is 
simply a nullity, having no legal effect. Cf. 
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 
1987) (While finding no actual request for 
disposition was filed, Court concluded, nqne-
5. Defendant's parole revocation proceeding fea-
tured a document entitled "Information on Pa-
role Violation," generated on .August 3, 1998. 
Such an "information" is not the,, sort contem-
plated in the statute. The statute refers to "trial 
within 120 days" arid "the court wherein'[the 
information or indictment] is pending,'; ;thus 
making it clear the statute refers only to the 
traditional and statutorily identified "informa-
tion" used to commence a criminal proceeding. 
Significantly, no document formally entitled an 
"information" is required to commence parole 
revocation proceedings, see Utah Code Admin.P. 
R671-405-1, R671-509-1 to -516 (2000), and 
Adult Probation and Parole's choice of terms in 
captioning the document, while inadvertently 
adding an additional layer of intrigue to our 
resolution of when an "information" is "pend-
CONCLUSION 
1fl6 Charges cannot be pending against.'a 
defendant until an indictment or information 
is filed with the court. Therefore, Lindsay's 
motion to dismiss was properly denied by the 
district court. Moreover, such a request, if 
filed before charges are pending, is a nullity, 
ing" for purposes of section 77-29-1, is of ho' 
moment. 
6. While we conclude a case must first be "pend-
ing" to invoke the 120-day period, there are 
limits. For example, as the Utah Supreme. Court 
recognized under a previous version of the stat-
ute, when a pending 'case is dismissed after a . 
defendant has filed his request that the pending 
charges be disposed of, and the prosecution then 
refiles, the new "complaint, information or in-
dictment does not affect the commencement of" 
the original 120-day period. State v. Moore, 521 
• P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1974) (applying Utah Code 
' Ann. § 77-65-1 (a) (1953) with its 90-day period 
for commencement of trial). Such manipulative 
tactics would not restart the 120-day clock, even 
though the case, after its first dismissal, would 
not technically still be "pending." 
MANCIL 
Cite as 18 P.3d 50 
Kg no legal effect, including when the ;es are later officially filed. " 
l*f.:17 Affirmed. 
IS:- ' 
if 18 WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, 
idge, William A,. Thorne, Jr., Judge. 
: SYSTEM^ 
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jjawn MANCIL, Plaintiff, and Appellee, 
Serald SMITH, Defendant and Appellant 
State of Utah, Office of Recovery 
Services, Intervenor. 
No. 990804-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. : , 
Dec. 29, 2000. 
In post divorce proceeding, after former 
husband was ordered to pay child support, 
he filed a motion for summary judgment, ar-
guing that he was a full-time student with no 
income other than his Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance and so should be excused 
from paying child support. The Fourth Dis-
trict Court, Provo Department, GuyR. Birm-
ingham, J., denied motion. Former husband 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., 
held that:' (1) husband was not entitled, as 
matter of law, to exemption from having 
income imputed to him, for purposes of pay-
ing child support, because he was obtaining a 
bachelor's degree; (2) evidence was: sufficient 
to impute former husband's income though 
trial court made no explicit findings as to 
husband's occupational., qualifications and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds; and .(3) Social Security Admin-
istration's determination that ; former hus-
band was disabled was not material change 
in circumstances justifying a child support 
modification. 
. Affirmed. 
v. SMITH Utah 509 
J (UtahApp. 2000) 
1. Child Support €>89 
Divorced father was not entitled, as mat-
ter of law, to exemption from having income 
imputed to him, for purposes of paying child 
support, because he was obtaining a bache-
lor's degree under statute permitting exemp-
tion in pursuing career or occupational train-
ing to establish basic job skills; four-year 
college education was not training contem-
plated by statute, since it would afford em-
ployment at a level far beyond that necessary 
to establish basic job skills. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7.5(7)(d)(iii). 
2. Divorce <®=>150 
Trial court's findings in divorce proceed-
ing are adequate only if they are sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
3. Appeal and Error <s»919 
In determining whether trial court prop-
erly dismissed action for failure to state 
claim upon which relief may be granted, 
Court of Appeals assumes factual allegations 
in complaint are true and draws all reason-
able inferences in light most favorable to 
plaintiff. Rules CivJProc, Rule 12(b)(6). 
4. Divorce @=>184(5) 
In divorce proceeding. Court of Appeals 
reviews a determination on whether a sub-
stantial change of circumstances has, been 
shown for abuse of discretion. 
5. Child Support @=>201 
Evidence was sufficient to impute for-
mer husband's income at rate of pay of $6.00 
an hour for purposes of determining child 
support obligation, though trial5court made 
no explicit findings as to husband's occupa-
tional qualifications and prevailing earnings 
for persons of similar backgrounds, where 
husband's qualifications, background, and ac-
tual past earnings were, not; in dispute. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.5(7). 
6. Child Support <3=>234 
Social Security Administration's deter-
mination that former husband was, disabled 
was not material change in circumstances 
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proceedings.6 
IV. CONCLUSION 
H 156 Inez Campbell had no standing to 
sue State Farm for bad faith, and the jury 
never found that State Farm was liable to 
her in that regard. Her only actionable 
claims were for fraud and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. As a result, the 
trial court's multiple instructions that State 
Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Camp-
bell for bad faith tainted both the entire 
verdict as to Mrs; Campbell and the punitive 
damages assessed against State Farm in be-
half of Mr. Campbell. Accordingly, I would 
(1) reverse as to Mrs. Campbell's claim for 
bad faith, (2) vacate and remand for a, new 
trial on Mrs. Campbell's, claims for fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress,.(3) 
affirm on the issue, of State Farm's liability 
to Mr. Campbell, and (4) vacate and remand 
for a new trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages as to Mr. Campbell inasmuch as that 
award was rendered jointly to both Mr. 
Campbell and Mrs. Campbell. 
O i KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Contending that Crookston does not question 
the legitimacy of joint punitive damage awards, 
the majority opinion assails the argument. that 
the punitive award in this case must be vacated. 
However, the majority's contention must fail for 
at least two reasons. First, in characterizing the 
necessity for vacating the punitive award solely 
"due to its joint nature," Justice Durham over-
simplifies the reasons stated above for why the 
award must fail. While Crookston did recognize 
the policy objectives of punitive damages to in; 
elude "punish[ment] and deter[rence]," 817 P.2d 
at 807, we specifically held in Crookston that 
awards rendered for such purposes must be con-
strained by well established "parameters" that 
tether punitive damages to some sense of reason-
ableness in order to avoid "excessive awards." 
Id. at 808. Those parameters include the seven 
factors listed above, which "must be considered 
[by the jury] in assessing the amount of puni-
tives." Id. (emphasis added). Because, as ex-
plained above, the jury was unable to properly 
consider two of those factors in this case due to 
the trial court's erroneous instruction that State 
Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for 
bad faith, the punitive award must be vacated 
and remanded. See id.; C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. 
2003 UT 2 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
Charles K. LEATHERBURY, Deffehdajtp 
and Petitioner. ^ $ 
No. 20010424. 
: Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb, 11, 2003. 
Inmate moved to dismiss vanouj| 
charges against him in connection.with 1& 
alleged participation in a police chase,, allegt 
ing that period for bringing him to trjaj 
expired based on inmate's request for dispo-' 
sition of pending charges. The trial court 
dismissed case. State appealed. The Court of 
Appeals reversed. Inmate petitioned for cer-
tiorari review. The Supreme Court, Wilkinsy 
J., held that: (1) signed minute entry direct-
ing inmate's counsel to prepare findings of 
fact and conclusions of law precluded entry 
from constituting final, appealable order; (2) 
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law did not constitute final, appealable 
order; (3) order incorporating court's firid-
Johnson, 1999 UT 35, Iff 17-26, 977 P.2d 4?9 
(upholding a punitive award only because the 
trial court's failure to instruct the jury to consid-
er all of the seven Crookston factors was harm-
less since the jury did in fact fully and properly 
assess each factor); Onglnt'l (USA.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d.447, 458-59 (Utah 1993) 
(affirming a punitive award because the jury 
"made a detailed finding based on the seven 
factors enunciated in Crookston "). Indeed, no-
: where in her opinion does Justice Durham even 
attempt to address this issue. Second, there is 
good reason why the "joint nature of the punitive 
damages award was never questioned" in Crook-
ston. Unlike the case now before us, neither of 
the parties involved in Crookston ever had their 
standing to sue questioned, nor was the issue 
raised on appeal. Consequentiy, the problematic 
situation created here—where one party who 
was awarded punitives had every right to sue but 
the other party given the same award should 
have never been involved in the lawsuit—simply 
did not exist in Crookston. See 817 P.2d at 794 
* (recognizing that both Mr. and Mrs; Crookston 
were named as insureds in their homeowner's 
. policy). 
OX^VJIJUJ -'Tk... XJJUJXTL JL AJUUI J . * * - . *s-.-.*. 
Cite as 65 P.3d 
ings of fact and conclusions of law and specif-
ically ordering dismissal of case against in-
mate constituted final, appealable order; and 
(4) there was no information pending against 
inmate at time inmate requested disposition 
of pending charges, and thus, request had no 
legal effect. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s>1179 
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court 
reviews the .Court of Appeals'decision, and 
not the opinion of the trial court. 
2. Criminal Law <&>1179 
In exercising certiorari jurisdiction, Su-
preme Court reviews the appellate court's 
ruling for correctness. 
3. Criminal Law <a=>1024(l) 
Requirement in signed minute entry di-
recting inmate's counsel to prepare findings 
of fact and conclusions of law dismissing the 
case against inmate indicated that trial court 
did not intend for entry to be final, thereby 
precluding entry from constituting final, ap-
pealable order, in case against inmate'arising 
from inmate's alleged involvement in police 
chase. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>1024(1) 
Trial court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law did not constitute final, 'appeal-
able order, in case against inmate arising 
from inmate's alleged involvement in police 
chase, where findings merely explained 
court's rationale for and intent to,.dismiss 
case against inmate, and contained no order. 
5. Criminal Law <3=>1024(2), 1069(1) • 
Order incorporating trial court's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and specifically 
ordering dismissal of case against inmate 
arising from inmate's purported involvement 
in police chase. constituted final, appealable 
order, and thus, State's appeal filed within 30 
days of order was timely. Rules App.Proc., 
Rule4. 
6. Criminal Law <®=>1023(2) 
A signed minute entry will not be con-
sidered a final order for purposes of appeal 
where its language indicates that it is. not 
1180 (Utah 2003) 
intended as final; thus when: further action is 
contemplated by the express language of the 
order, it cannot be a final determination sus-
ceptible of enforcement. 
7. Criminal Law <&=>577.10(l0) 
Indictment and Information <s=»43 
Filing of signed accusation against .u> 
mate by the clerk of court was precondition 
to having a pending information against •• in-
mate, such that inmate's request for disposi-
tion of charges pending against him .filed 
prior to clerk's filing of signed accusation 
was premature, and. thus,, inmate's -disposi-
tion request had no legal effect. U.C JL1953, 
77-1-3,77-29-1. , 
Mark Shurtleff, Utah Att'y Geii.,; Kri"C. 
Leonard, Asst. Att'y Gen., for jriaintiff. ' ' 
Joan C. Watt, Daniel, M. Torrence,; Salt 
Lake, for defendant. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
WILKINS, Justice: • 
111 We granted Charles "Leatherbury's pe-
tition for, certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision in State, v. Leatherburyt 
2001 UT App 113U, 2001 WL, 333079, The 
court of appeals held that it had appellate 
jurisdiction of the case, i t also reversed the 
trial court's order of dismissal, which was 
premised on section ; 77-29-1 of the Utah 
Code. We affirm. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
U 2 Leatherbury. was charged by informa-
tion with failing to respond to a police offi-
cer's signal to stop, possession of o>ug para-
phernalia, reckless driving,, and other 
charges related to his alleged participation in 
a police chase on January 14, 1999. The 
information was authorized for presentment 
and filing by the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office on February 2, 1999, sworn 
to a magistrate on February 12, 1999, and 
filed with the clerk of the Third District 
Court on March 26,1999. , • •• 
• 113 On January 29, 1999, Leatherbury, 
then an inmate at the Utah State Prison, 
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signed a form entitled "Notice and Request 
for Disposition of , Pending Charge(s)" re-
questing final disposition of any charges 
pending in the Third District Court related 
to his "fleeing a police officer." The request 
was signed as received by the appropriate 
prison official on February 8, 1999 and for-
warded to the Salt Lake, County District 
Attorney's Office. This form purportedly 
satisfies the requirements of section 77-29^-1 
of the Utah Code and invokes Leatherbury's 
right to be tried within . 120 days of the 
request. • 
14 On June 10, 1999, at.the final pretrial 
conference, Leatherbury filed a motion to 
dismiss arguing that the 120 day period for 
bringing him to trial-had expired on June 8, 
1999 and that the charges must be dismissed. 
The State argued in response that Leather-
bury's request for disposition was premature 
and of no effect because no information was 
pending against Leatherbury at the time of 
its preparation. At a hearing held on June 
21, 1999, the parties argued the motion and 
the trial court indicated its intention to dis-
miss the case. However, the court ordered 
Leatherbury's attorney to prepare findings 
of fact and conclusions of law ("findings"). 
The court's intention to dismiss the case was 
memorialized in a signed minute entry. 
115 On July 26, 1999, the trial court signed 
the findings, which had been prepared by 
Leatherbury's attorney. Nearly two months 
later, on September 17, 1999, the trial court 
signed an order of dismissal prepared by the 
State. The State filed its notice of appeal on 
September 23,1999. 
11 6 Before the court of appeals, Leather-
bury argued that the court had no jurisdic-
tion to hear the case because the notice of 
appeal was untimely filed. The State argued 
that the order of dismissal should be re-
versed because no information was pending, 
within the meaning of section 77-29-1, at the 
time Leatherbury made his request for dis-
position. In an unpublished memorandum 
decision, the court of appeals rejected Leath-
erbury's jurisdictional argument. It held 
that the State's notice of appeal was timely 
filed because the order of dismissal, not the 
signed minute entry of June 21, 1999, was 
the final order. State v. Leatherbury, 2001 
UT App U3U, 2001 WL 333079. The court o i l 
appeals reversed the case on the merits hold^§ 
ing that at the time of Leatherbury's request^ 
for disposition there was no pending infbrm>$|j 
tion and his request had no legal effect. M ? | 
ANALYSIS 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] 117 On certiorari review "we review 
the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion 
of the [trial] court." State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 
98, 1110, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 61 P.3d 1000. 
That decision is then reviewed for correct1 
ness. Id. 
II. JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
[3-5] 118 Leatherbury argues that the 
State's notice of appeal failed to vest the 
court of appeals with jurisdiction to hear the 
case because it came more than thirty days 
after entry of the final order. If the final 
order in the case was, as Leatherbury con-
tends, either the signed minute entry or the 
findings, he is correct and we must vacate 
the court of appeals' decision. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4; State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 115, 
57 P.3d 1065 (noting 30 day filing require-
ment in rule is a jurisdictional requirement), 
Thus, our resolution of this point turns on 
whether either document was a final appeal-
able order, or whether, as the State argues, 
the final order did not come until the order 
of dismissal was signed and entered. 
[6] If 9 Although Leatherbury is correct 
that a signed minute entry may constitute a 
final appealable order, he is incorrect that 
the minute entry in this case was such an 
order. A signed minute entry will not be 
considered a' final order where its language 
indicates that it is not,intended as final. 
Swenson Assocs. Architects, P.C. v. State ex 
rel Div. of Facilities Constr., 889 P2d 415, 
417 (Utah 1994). Thus, where further action 
is contemplated by the express language of 
the order, it cannot be a final determination 
susceptible of enforcement. The court of 
appeals correctly concluded that the signed 
minute entry's requirement that Leather-
bury's counsel "prepare Findings of Fact and 
STATE v. LEATHERBURY 
Cite as 65 P.3d 1180 (Utah 2003) 
indicated that the trial request for disposition.. 
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court did not intend the minute entry as a 
final order. Leatherbury, 2001 UT App 
113U, 2001 WL 333079. Further, Leather-
bury's argument that the findings constituted 
a final order is also incorrect. The findings 
merely explain the trial court's rationale for 
and intent to dismiss the case, and contained 
no order. Thus, the final order in this, case 
was the order of September 17, 1999, which 
incorporated the previously entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and specifically 
ordered dismissal of the charges against the 
defendant. As a result, the State's notice of 
appeal was timely filed, and the court of 
appeals had jurisdiction, to hear the case. 
III. AN INFORMATION WAS 
NOT PENDING 
[7] 110 Leatherbury would have us re-
verse the court of appeals' determination that 
there was no information pending against 
him at the time of his request for disposition 
under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code! He 
argues that an information is pending once it 
is signed by a prosecuting attorney, even 
before filing with the court. We disagree. 
1111 Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code 
provides: . 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term 
of imprisonment in the state prison . . . 
and there is pending against the prisoner 
in this state any untried ..'.. inforrnation, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the war-
den . . . a written demand specifying the 
nature of the charge and the court wherein 
it is pending and requesting disposition of 
the pending charge, he shall be entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 
days of the date of delivery of written 
notice. •• 
Utah Code Ann. § 77^-29-1(1) (1999) (empha-
sis added). Section 77-29-1 also provides 
that failure to bring the matter to trial.within 
the 120 day period, unless justified by good 
cause, shall result in dismissal. Id at § 77-
29-1(4). Under subsection (1) there are es-
sentially two prerequisites to the filing of a 
1. In his brief Leatherbury places the date of his 
request for disposition as February 8, 1999, 
when the designated agent at the prison signed 
her name to the request. This date is the latest 
_.-,
 4 First, a prisoner 
must be serving a term of imprisonment in a 
state penal institution, and second, there 
must be an untried indictment or information 
pending against that prisoner. Only the sec-
ond requirement is at issue here. 
. 1112 "Information" is a statutorily defined 
term. It "means an accusation, in writing, 
charging a person with a public offense which 
is presented, signed, and filed in the office of 
the clerk [of the court] where the prosecution 
is commenced." Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 - 1 -
3(3) (1999) (emphasis added). Pursuant to 
the statute, a written, signed accusation does 
not become ran information until filed with 
the clerk of the courts Assuming but not 
deciding that Leatherbury's request for dis-
position of the charges against him was made 
on February 8, 1999,1 the request was pre-
mature because there was no- pending infor-
mation until the clerk of the court received 
the signed document and filed it on March 
26, 1999. Because there was no pending 
information, the request for disposition had 
no legal effect. We affirm the court of ap-
peals' decision. 
CONCLUSION 
U 13 Because the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider 
the State's appeal and ,it correctly held that 
filing was a precondition to a pending inform 
mation under section 77-29-1, we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision in State v. Leather-
bwry, 2001 UT App 113t, 2001. WL333Q79 
and remand for further proceedings. '' 
1114 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice 
RUSSON, Judge BALDWIN, and Judge 
LOW concur in Justice.WILKIN$' opinion. 
U 15 Having disqualified himself, Associate 
Chief Justice DURRANT does not: partici-
pate herein, and Justice HOWE- did not par-
ticipate herein; District Judge BALDWIN 
and District Judge LOW sat. 
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of the dates on the request itself; Leatherbury 
signed it on January 29, 1999. For purposes^of 
this opinion we apply the date offered by Leath-
erbury in his brief. 
,KS, Justice (dissenting): 
e buyer had paid $120,395 of the $245,-
>rincipal due on the purchase of the 20 
An additional payment of $50,895 
due on February 2, 1980. Under the 
ided agreement, the buyer was entitled 
jsignate 4.24 acres of the subject prop-
for conveyance to him upon making 
payment. He made a timely designa-
and offered to make the Feb. 2, 1980 
lent (though not formally tendering 
noney), but the seller disputed the acre-
chosen and offered an alternative 5.2 
3 instead. Six weeks after the due 
, the seller served a notice of default, 
one week later the seller brought this 
and obtained a decree forfeiting the 
>r's interest. The majority affirms that 
ee on the basis that the seller's agree-
t to convey the 4.24 acres was "condi-
ed upon and not concurrent with" the 
*r's payment, and the buyer made no 
ment or tender of payment. 
he buyer's payment and the seller's par-
conveyance were concurrent conditions, 
ultaneous obligations, each dependent 
n the other, are commonplace in real 
ite contracts. Such obligations should 
interpreted as concurrent conditions un-
the contract clearly directs otherwise. 
\ language in this contract ("upon re-
)t of said payment, Sellers will release to 
jrer 4.24 acres of land") does not make 
se obligations other than concurrent con-
ions. 
is we said in Century 21 All Western 
al Estate v. Webb, Utah, 645 P.2d 52 
82), a contract that contemplates simul-
iieous performance by both parties—i.e., 
jjfeurrent conditions—can pose "precisely 
por t of deadlock meant to be resolved 
§the requirement of tender." Id. at 55. 
tihat circumstance, we held, 
l^either party can be said to be in de-
l i s t (and thus susceptible to a judgment 
fer damages or a decree for specific per-
femance) until the other party has ten-
feed his own performance. 6 Corbin on 
Mntracts § 1258 (1962). In other words, 
me party who desires to use legal process 
§|> exercise his legal remedies under such 
STATE v. CASAREZ Utah 1005 
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a contract must make a tender of his own 
agreed performance in order to put the 
other party in default. Huck v. Hayes, 
[Utah, 560 P.2d 1124 (1977)]; 15 Willi-
ston on Contracts § 1809 (3d ed. W. Jae-
ger 1972). [Emphasis supplied.] 
Id. at 56. 
Under the quoted rule, the district court's 
finding that this buyer made no payment or 
tender of payment would prevent the buyer 
from suing for specific performance of the 
seller's promise to make the partial convey-
ance. But the buyer's nonperformance does 
not entitle the seller to a decree forfeiting 
the buyer's interest unless the seller has 
tendered performance of his own concur-
rent obligation—to convey the acreage des-
ignated by the buyer. Since the seller 
made no such allegation and the court made 
no such finding, the decree of forfeiture 
was inappropriate. I would reverse. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opin-
ion of OAKS, J. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Steven Michael CASAREZ, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16997. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 9, 1982. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr., J., of aggravated sexual as-
sault, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that full disclosure 
of presentence report should be made ex-
cept that identify indicia of person who 
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would be sentenced may be excluded from 
report. 
Affirmed, vacated and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., concurred in result. 
L Criminal Law <s=>988 
Sentencing is critical stage of criminal 
proceeding at which defendant is entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
2. Criminal Law «*=»986.1 
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at 
sentencing phase of trial as at guilt phase. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>986.5 
If defendant cannot inspect contents of 
presentence report, his constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel at time of 
sentencing is seriously impaired if judge 
may rely on information which may be inac-
curate and is unknown to defendant. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Constitutional Law <s=>48(l) 
Statutes <s=> 181(1) 
It is policy of court to construe statutes 
when possible to effectuate legislative in-
tent and to avoid potential constitutional 
conflicts. 
5. Criminal Law <s=>978 
Statute providing that court may dis-
close all parts of presentence report to de-
fendant or his counsel as interest of justice 
requires was not intended to make disclo-
sure of presentence report depend on per-
sonal whim or subjective standard of indi-
vidual judge; rather, Legislature expressly 
provided that exercise of discretion should 
be guided as "the interest of justice re-
quires" and, thus, statute was constitution-
al. U.C.A.1953, 77-18-1(2). 
6. Criminal Law <s=>986.5 
Only when disclosure of presentence 
report will jeopardize life or safety of third 
parties should there be deletions from re-
port to protect them and, in such cases, 
disclosure to defendant of as much of report 
as possible should be made. U.C.A.1953, 
77-18-1(2). 
1. Criminal Law &=> 339.5, 1169.5(2) 
In prosecution for aggravated se 
assault, inasmuch as whether defen< 
took bus home or drove home was not m 
rial to central issue of whether he 
guilty, it was error to admit evidence c 
paring his footprints in area where r 
occurred with footprints around a st< 
vehicle later found near defendant's r 
dence; however, court's striking of t 
part of testimony relating to stolen car ; 
its subsequent admonishment and instr 
tion to jury to disregard stricken evide 
was sufficient remedy under circumstam 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-30. 
Ginger L. Fletcher, Salt Lake City, 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Joseph P. McCart 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and resp< 
dent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant was convicted of two cour 
of aggravated sexual assault, one for ra 
, and one for sodomy, in violation of U . C J 
' 1953, § 76-5-405. He contends that t 
trial court erred in 1) denying him access 
his presentence report prior to sentencin 
2) admitting evidence of another crim 
and 3) denying him his statutory right < 
• allocation at the time of sentencing. 
As is to be expected, the testimony of tl 
5
 prosecutrix and the defendant are in coi 
flict. We, of course, accept that version < 
the facts which supports the jury's verdic 




The prosecutrix testified that at approx 
mately 9:00 p.m. on December 21, 1979, sh 
parked her car on First South and Stat 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and proceed 
ed to her place of employment. She wa 
i confronted on the street by the defendan 
I who told her that he was a prison escape* 
- and needed her car and warned her that i: 
, she did not comply with his wishes he woulc 
t kill her. At defendant's instruction the 
, prosecutrix walked back to her car. The 
defendant pushed her into the car, drove a 
STATE v. 
Cite as, Utah, I 
few blocks, and stopped the car. After two 
acts of sexual assault, rape, and forcible 
sodomy, the prosecutrix bit the defendant, 
who then struck her in the face. During 
the ensuing commotion the prosecutrix es-
caped from the car. The driver of a passing 
car took her to the rape crisis center at 
Holy Cross Hospital. An emergency room 
physician examined the victim that evening 
and the defendant the following morning. 
At trial the physician testified that the 
bruises on the prosecutrix and the defend-
ant were consistent with the prosecutrix's 
testimony. Other facts in support of the 
State's case need not be recounted. 
The defendant testified that he had 
stopped to ask the prosecutrix for the time. 
,He then asked her if she would like to go 
X)ut and have a good time, and she accepted 
the invitation. He drove her a couple of 
blocks and stopped. According to defend-
ant, the prosecutrix then engaged in sex 
acts with him voluntarily, upon the conclu-
sion of which she unexpectedly bit him, and 
after being struck by defendant, she fled 
the car in fear. Defendant stated that he 
then also left the car and took a bus home. 
On appeal the defendant contends that 
the imposition of the sentence was improper 
because the trial court did not, prior to 
sentencing, give him access to the presen-
tence report as required by State v. Lipsky, 
Utah, 608 P.2d 1241 (1980). The State 
counters with the argument that an amend-
ment to U.C.A., 1953, § 77-18-1(2), enacted 
subsequent to the decision in Lipsky, modi-
t fied the rule in that case and justified the 
trial court's discretionary refusal to give 
|he defendant the presentence report. 
i%at amendment reads: 
Prior to imposition of any sentence for 
an offense for which probation may be 
granted, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date 
for the imposition of sentence for a rea-
sonable period of time for the purpose of 
obtaining a presentence report on the de-
fendant. . . . The contents of the report 
£shall be confidential. The court may dis-
' close all or parts of the report to the 
defendant or his counsel as the interest of 
justice requires. [Emphasis added.] 
:ASAREZ Utah 1007 
56P.2dl005 
On the basis of that provision, the State 
argues that the trial judge acted within the 
proper bounds of discretion in not disclosing 
the report. 
[1-3] Sentencing is a critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding at which a defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. E.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 
S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Specht v. 
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 
L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252,92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). 
Procedural fairness is as obligatory at the 
sentencing phase of a trial as at the guilt 
phase. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16, 
99 S.Ct. 235, 236, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 
1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), held that it is a 
denial of due process in a capital case to 
sentence a defendant on the basis of confi-
dential information not disclosed to a de-
fendant or his counsel. In Lipsky, a non-
capital case, this Court held on a due proc-
ess analysis that "fundamental fairness" re-
quires that a defendant have the right to 
inspect a presentence report prior to sen-
tencing so that a sentence will not be influ-
enced by inaccurate information. 608 P.2d 
at 1248. Furthermore, if the defendant 
cannot inspect the contents of the presen-
tence report, his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel at the time 
of sentencing is seriously impaired if a 
judge may rely on information which may 
be inaccurate and is unknown to the de-
fendant. 
A number of other courts have held that 
fundamental fairness requires disclosure of 
the presentence report. See, e.g., Buchea v. 
Sullivan, 262 Or. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 (1972); 
State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 
(1969); Jones v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 477 
P.2d 85 (1970). This rule is implicit in sev-
eral more recent cases. For example, in 
State v. Lockwood, La., 399 So.2d 190 
(1981), the court approved disclosure and 
held that a defendant, who alleged that 
false and prejudicial statements were con-
tained in his presentence report, was enti-
tled to an opportunity to refute or explain 
656 P 2d—23 
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even though the trial court contended that 
its decision was unaffected by the report. 
In State v. Phelps, N.D., 297 N.W.2d 769 
(1980), the court held that the trial court 
acted unreasonably and abused its discre-
tion in allowing defendant's counsel insuffi-
cient time to read and investigate a presen-
tence report which contained a complicated 
medical history. And in Howell v. State, 
Del., 421 A.2d 892 (1980), the court, constru-
ing a statute which provided that the trial 
court "may, in its discretion, permit the 
inspection of the [presentence] report or 
parts thereof by the offender or his attor-
ney," id. at 900, stated in dictum that "[fail-
ure to disclose the investigative portion of 
a presentence report to counsel for a crimi-
nal defendant may 'in practical effect' be 
equivalent to denial of access to counsel." 
Id. at 900 (quoting in part from United 
States v. Verdugo, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 
1968), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct. 
1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971). 
Except for the very rare possibility when 
disclosure might lead to harm of a third 
person, there is no substantial reason for 
sentencing criminal defendants on the basis 
of confidential information gleaned from a 
variety of more-or-less reliable sources 
without affording those defendants some 
opportunity to point out mistakes in that 
information. It is essential to both the 
form and substance of a fair proceeding 
that the defendant have the right to point 
out errors, misinterpretations, or even to 
demonstrate that he is not in fact the per-
son who is the subject of the report. Such 
errors are not unknown. Particularly when 
the criminal justice system is being pressed 
to deal with ever more criminal defendants 
on an impersonal basis not unlike an assem-
bly line, the possibility of error becomes 
even greater. If a defendant were not 
allowed to correct an error at the time of 
sentencing, the error is likely to go unde-
tected for as long as the defendant remains 
subject to the criminal justice system since 
the presentence report remains in the file 
on the defendant and is used by the Board 
of Pardons and other authorities in making 
decisions as to the length and terms of his 
incarceration, rehabilitation, and parole. 
We also note that it is not just the 
fendant, but the State as well, that has 
interest in the sentence being based on 
curate information. Decisions as to 
type of rehabilitation program, if any, 
which a defendant is assigned and the du 
tion of incarceration both influence the a 
cation of scarce personnel and monefc 
resources. Such decisions should be baj 
upon the most reliable data possible as 
each defendant so that this State may d 
with its criminal justice program as ei 
ciently as possible. 
[4-6] It does not follow, however, tl 
§ 77-18-1(2) is unconstitutional. It is t 
policy of the Court to construe statut 
when possible to effectuate the legislati 
intent and to avoid potential constitution 
conflicts. E.g., State v. Wood, Utah, 6 
P.2d 71, 82 (1982); In re Boyer, Utah, 6 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1982). In accord with tl 
approach, we find no difficulty in reconc 
ing the defendant's right to disclosure wi 
the language of § 77-18-1(2). That pro\ 
sion was not intended to make disclosure < 
a presentence report depend on a person 
whim or a subjective standard of an indivii 
ual judge. The interests at stake are h 
too important for that. Rather, the Legi 
lature expressly provided that the exereis 
of discretion should be guided as "the into 
est of justice requires." Under that star 
dard, it is the exceptional case where fu 
disclosure is not justified. Only when dis 
closure of the presentence report woul 
jeopardize the life or safety of third partiej 
should there be deletions from the report t 
protect them. In such cases, disclosure to ; 
defendant of as much of the report as possi 
ble should be made. Identifying indicia o. 
a person who would be threatened shoul< 
be excluded from the report, sealed, anc 
included in the record on appeal. In al 
other cases, full disclosure of the repon 
should be made. 
Finally, it is of no moment that the trial 
court may disregard the presentence report 
altogether in imposing a sentence. A de-
fendant still has a right to disclosure of the 
report because of the subsequent uses made 
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST CO. v. JENSEN 
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it. State v. Lockwood, La. 399 So.2d 190 circumstances. 
•81). 
7] Defendant also alleges error in the 
mission of evidence comparing his foot-
nts in the area where the rape occurred 
bh footprints around a stolen vehicle later 
md near defendant's residence. Defend-
t argues that the evidence was improper-
offered to link him with a separate, unre-
ed crime. The State contends that the 
idence was admissible to contradict de-
ldant's testimony that he took a bus 
me from the scene of the crime, and 
jreby attack the defendant's credibility. 
Whether the defendant took the bus 
me or drove home was not material to 
i central issue of whether he was guilty 
aggravated sexual assault. There was 
need to prove how the defendant re-
rned home. The testimony was neither 
ckground evidence useful to establish the 
•cumstanees surrounding the commission 
the crime nor did it shed any light on 
sfendant's conduct which might tend to 
ow a consciousness of guilt. The only 
>ssible materiality of the evidence was 
ith respect to defendant's credibility. The 
ference that he drove a stolen car home is 
deed inconsistent with his testimony of 
,king the bus home. However, not every 
consistency is admissible on the theory 
lat it bears on credibility. The law is that 
witness may not be impeached on matters 
)llateral to the principal issues being tried. 
',g., State v. Oswalt, 62 Wash.2d 118, 381 
;2d 617 (1963); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 
i Trials at Common Law §§ 1000-1003 
piadbourn rev. 1970). The manner in 
iiich defendant returned home following 
(fe crime is a collateral issue; therefore, 
Tipeachment evidence on that issue was 
ladmissible. 
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On no reasonable view of 
the evidence did the objectionable evidence 
taint the fairness of the trial. 
Defendant also complains that he was not 
afforded his statutory right of allocution 
before sentence was imposed. See U.C.A., 
1953, § 77-35-22(a). We have reviewed 
the record and conclude the allegation is 
without merit. 
The conviction is affirmed, but the sen-
tence is vacated. The case is remanded for 
the defendant to review and verify the con-
tents of the presentence report, unless the 
narrow exception above defined applies, 
and for the trial judge to resentence the 
defendant on a nunc pro tunc basis. 
Affirmed. 
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, J J., con-
cur. 
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result. 
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
• • • . • ' ' 
Wendell Alan JENSEN and Ann Jensen, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 17754. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 10, 1982. 
^However, the admission of the evidence 
| s harmless. See U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-
^ Even assuming the evidence was of-
ifed to link defendant with an uncharged 
§pe, the court's striking of that part of 
p testimony relating to a stolen car and 
P subsequent admonishment and instruc-
|$ji to the jury to disregard the stricken 
pdence was a sufficient remedy under the 
Bank brought action seeking money 
judgment against defendants for unpaid 
balance on defendants' credit card account. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
George E. Ballif, J., entered default judg-
ment against defendants and denied de-
fendants' motion to set aside the default, 
and defendants appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) summons 
Addendum D: Notice from Prison of 120-Day Disposition, Certificate of Inmate 




UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE (S) () 
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Notice is hereby given that I, J o W L i L g G k A R \°QXQ (Inmate name) 
do hereby request final disposition. Charge (s) of 
ftt^fbc*^ jf^oCvo A ^ e - V j y U^ej*r~e o^r ^ V ^ c ^ T are now 
pending against me in the X o c e l ^ Cd , Court 
brought by ^ V e ^ I X W W H Y / ^ U * > ^ ^ / y V ^ \ (prosecuting 
agency i.e., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of Utah) and request is 
hereby made that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities together with such 
information as required by law. 
Dated this _Q day of Q e c E f A Y ^ f C (Month/Year). 
Inmate's Name Tv<bUw JLi W J E G G . -^- USP # l°\ Z v O 
I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing notice this a day of 
\-lftiU/jULi cJ/JT V (Month/Year). 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634 
nnn 




Scott V. Carver 
Division Director 
"1 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
PO Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
(801)576-7000 
nun mnrnsn euro 
Third Judicial Dtetrict 
m j s 200% 
TOOELE COUNTY 
8 January 2004 
Tooele County Attorney 
47 S. Main Street 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
RE: LEGG, John Lyle Jr. 
U.S.PJ 19210 DOB 12/13/68 
YOUR CASE # UNKNOWN INTAKE REC # A31081 
Dear Sirs: 
MR/MRS/MS John Lyle Legg Jr. is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Arson and Auto Theft, pending in 
your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request. 
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. David Worthington 
Director of Institutional Operations 
by: Alberta Smith 
Records Office Tech HI 
End. (2) 
cc: Third District Court Clerk - Tooele 
Inmate File 
nonoR 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
C E R T I F I C A T E OF INMATE STATUS 
120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: Third District Court Clerk - Tooele 
RE: LEGG, John Lyle Jr. 19210 
Inmate Name USP# 
TERM of COMMITMENT: Aggravated Assault 0-5 yrs, Burglary of a 
Building 0-5 yrs Consecutive to Agg. Assault, 
Attempted Receive or Transfer Stolen Vehicle 
0-5 yrs Consecutive to Burglary of Building. 
Total 15 yrs. 
TIME SERVED: Approx 03 year(s) 08 mo 
TIME REMAINING: Approx. 11 year(s) 04 mo 
**time calculated may not include toll time/credit time served** 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: scheduled for parole 00/00/00 
BOARD OF PARDONS Hearing set for 00/00/00 
DECISION: 
Mr. David Worthington, Director 
Institutional Operations 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84 020 
cc: file 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th of October 2005 I hand delivered to: 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
two (2) copies of the attached Appellant's Brief. 
Dated this 27th day of October 2005 
^ ' (j^yj^r^ 
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